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ABSTRACT
Can we ever be fully practically justified in acting contrary to moral
demands? My contention is that the answer is 'no'. I argue that by
adopting a 'buck-passing' account of wrongness we can provide a 
philosophically satisfying answer to the fam ilia r'w hy should I be 
moral?'. In working my way toward the buck-passing account of 
wrongness, I outline (and, to some degree, defend) the metaethical 
and 'metanormative' assumptions on which my theory stands. I 
also consider and reject the 'internalist' (or as it can also be 
described, the neo-Humean) answer to 'why should I be moral?'. 
The account I end up with is decidedly non-consequentialist and it is 
consistent with common-sense morality. I t  also provides a way of 
showing why moral considerations (in competition with non-moral 
considerations) are overridingly normative in a way that is 
consistent with our best current understanding of what practical 
reason requires of us.
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IN TR O D U C TIO N
Most of us believe that some actions are right and that some 
actions are wrong; others believe that there are no such actions. 
Many of those who believe that there are right and wrong actions 
also hold that the wrongness of an action gives us good reason not 
to do it. Others, although they agree that there are such things as 
right and wrong actions, believe that an action's wrongness gives us 
little or no reason not to perform such actions. These people 
cannot all be right. In this dissertation I will address these issues in 
an attempt to answer one of the oldest questions in moral 
philosophy: why should I be moral?
'The Moral Question', as I will call it, is a question that can be 
approached from several different angles. The question may be, 
and frequently has been, asked as a request for a defence or 
elucidation of some metaphysical, epistemological, or normative 
issue thought to be problematic with or within moral discourse or 
practice. My main interest in this dissertation is not metaethical or 
metanormative (although I do have some things to say about these 
issues), with one exception: I am interested in the justification  of 
morality. We are all familiar with the idea of theoretical, or 
epistemic, justification, but what could a justification of morality 
consist in? This is the main question I am trying to answer in this
vin
dissertation. A sound working hypothesis is, I believe, that a 
justification of morality - if one is to be found - must be sought in a 
sound theory of practical reason. As I understand 'justification' in 
its practical sense, a justification of morality must show not only 
that moral considerations are genuinely normative, it must also 
show that these considerations are overridingly or trumplngly 
normative.
Although I am interested in investigating the possibility of 
there being a rational, or justificatory, foundation for morality, I am 
not particularly interested in what may be called the content of 
morality. A working hypothesis of mine is that common-sense 
morality is roughly right. Indeed, it might be true that insofar as 
any morality can be said to be right, common-sense morality must, 
by conceptual necessity^ be at least roughly right. Moral 
functionalists, for example, will tell us that, in spite of Humpty 
Dumpty's declaration that we are entitled to mean what we like by 
our words,
...if we wish to address the concerns of our fellows when 
we discuss the matter - and if we don't, we will not have 
much of an audience - we had better mean what they 
mean. We had better, that is. Identify our subject via the 
folk theory of rightness, wrongness, goodness, badness, 
and so on. We need not identify rightness as the property
IX
that satisfies, or near enough satisfies, the folk theory of 
rightness - and likewise for the other moral properties. I t  
is, thus, folk theory that will be our guide in identifying 
rightness, goodness, and so on.^
According to common-sense (o r'fo lk ') morality, moral 
considerations are very much like Kant said they were: categorical 
and authoritative; i.e. they apply to all agents Independently of 
their inclinations, and their normative force is overriding. I t  is this 
aspect of common-sense morality that I wish to provide a defence 
for.
In chapter one I set out my metanormative and metaethical 
position. This chapter also contains a preliminary and introductory 
discussion of some the over-arching themes In current thinking 
about practical reason and morality. I have also, for the sake of 
completeness, included a discussion of Prichard's intuitionism about 
morality. Chapter two, in a way, forms the bulk of this thesis. In it 
I outline, discuss, and eventually reject, Bernard Williams' 
internalism about practical reason. This chapter makes almost no 
use of the words 'm orality ' or 'obligation'. Rather, I focus on 
matters internal, so to speak, to internalism. In chapter three I 
carry on where chapter two left off: with more criticism of 
internalism. Here I focus on the connection between internal 
reasons for action and theories of motivation. I eventually conclude
that we should be cognitlvists about motivation. So why this 
emphasis on internalism? The answer is that I have always found 
internalism and its intellectual forerunner, David Hume, to present 
the best, most plausible, case against not only the Kantian nuances 
of common-sense morality, but also against the currently most 
popular view of practical reason(s): externalism. Chapter four 
begins by posing a problem for externalists who think they have an 
answer to 'why should I be moral?' This puzzle takes the form of a 
tricky dilemma, and my discussion of this dilemma centres around 
the writings of one of the most influential externalists today - T. M. 
Scanlon. I reject Scanlon's answer to this dilemma along with his 
particular version of contractualism.
Although my own account has close affinities with Scanlon's it 
is clearly distinguishable from it. I argue that what m ight be called 
a buck-passing account of wrongness, fully worked out, has many 
advantages: it promises to explain, in a metaphysically and 
epistemologically acceptable way, why we should be moral. I t  also 
provides a clear alternative to consequentialism - which I see as 
counting in its favour - and it squares well with our moral intuitions. 
Although I acknowledge that more needs to be said in order to fully 
vindicate this account, the two aims of this dissertation is to 
attempt to clear the way for such an account, and to provide at 
least a rough sketch of what a plausible buck-passing account of 
wrongness should look like.
XI
IJackson, p. 118"
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CHAPTER ONE:
A RATIONAL FO UNDATIO N FOR MORALITY?
Two things fill the mind with ever new and 
increasing awe, the more often and steadily we 
reflect upon them; the starry heavens above 
me and the moral law within me.
- Immanuel Kant^
Once you give up integrity, the rest is a piece 
of cake.
- J. R. Ewing^
1.1 Introduction
Why should I be moral? This question is probably as old as ethics 
itself. So too, it seems, is the worry that no satisfactory answer can 
be given to it. The question (albeit in slightly different versions) 
was put forward by several of Socrates' interlocutors. Callicles, 
Thrasymachus, and Glaucon all demanded a showing that it is in 
one's self interest to be moral (or just). The question is perhaps 
best, or at least most provocatively, formulated by Glaucon who
13
wants to know whether someone who is in the possession of the 
Ring of Gyges (and who as a result would be guaranteed impunity) 
still has good reason not to act immorally. Socrates' famous 
answer Is that being an unjust person (or acting unjustly) comes at 
the price of having a fragmented or chaotic soul. Although an 
unjust person may be able to secure many goods for himself, 
having a well-ordered soul is the highest good a man can possess.
It  is interesting, and significant, that Socrates' answer has 
traditionally been interpreted as being unashamedly egoistic: it is in 
your self-interest to be jus t because It is in your self-interest to 
have a well-ordered soul - you would be worse off w ithout one.
A considerable part of Western ethics after Plato has consisted 
in defending or rejecting Socrates' answer to what we might call the 
moral question ('why should I be moral?'). Very roughly, the 
sceptic wants to know why he should behave in the ways we usually 
call moral. And typically (and apparently), the only land of answer 
that has seemed to be able to give the sceptic what he wants is an 
answer to the effect that it is in his self-interest to do so. Although 
Glaucon's question (and Socrates' answer) has worried moral 
philosophers for the last two thousand years, it is worth noticing 
that the same kind of worry or anxiety has never been aroused by 
the question 'Why should I do what is in my self-interest?'.
Many philosophers have taken it for granted that it is true 
that we ought to be prudent. Even those who deny this are
14
nonetheless happy to endorse the weaker claim that it is true that 
we have at least some reason (or a reason) to be prudent. This 
appears to have been the case for the majority of thinkers in 
Ancient Greece. But is it true? Perhaps. But w ithout argument to 
support the supposed truth of 'you ought to be prudent', this claim 
seems no less problematic than the question we are concerned 
with. As Stephen Darwall points out: '...many of the same 
philosophical motives that prompt the question "why be moral?" 
should lead us to be similarly questioning of any other system of 
considerations and n o r m s . I n  other words, even if we can show 
that prudence requires us to be moral, why is it so obvious that we 
ought to be prudent? Have we gained anything, philosophically 
speaking, by showing that considerations of prudence demand that 
we act morally (if this is indeed the case)? Prudence, as a system 
of norms, does not, on the face of it, have a more privileged 
normative status than morality. And, it seems, neither does any 
other system of norms.
Much of moral philosophy, then, has been devoted to 
establishing that morality can be given a rational foundation. In 
fact, many philosophers (past and present) think this should be 
moral philosophy's primary task. I think that in one sense of the 
word 'rational' this is true. However, and as I hope to show, this 
choice of terminology has not exactly been helpful in the search for 
an answer to the challenges of the sceptic. Given the ambiguity
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(and possible vagueness) of the word 'rational' I think that in many 
ways the search for a rational foundation for morality has taken 
philosophy into places it need not go in order to provide an answer 
to 'why should I be moral?'. I hope that by the end of this chapter 
it will become clear what I mean by this.
The traditional worry, then, is that without a rational 
foundation, morality must be a chimera, a fantasy propagated by 
various moralists and religious folk throughout history. I f  there is 
no rational foundation for morality are we not better off w ithout it? 
One author who thinks otherwise Is John Mackie. He seems to 
suggest that although morality is indeed an illusion, we will all be 
better off if we act as if it were not."^ Bernard Williams similarly 
claims that although 'the morality system' does provide us with 
moral obligations, by engaging in sound ethical reasoning we can 
come to see that these obligations are not as important as the 
morality system claims that they are.^ Williams too writes that we 
would be better off without morality in its distinctively modern (and, 
as he sees it, Kantian) form; he advocates, if not a return to, then 
at least a favourable re-appraisal of, the ethical ideas offered by the 
ancient Greeks.
Nonetheless, for those of us who believe that there is a 
rational foundation to be found (not to say 'discovered'), one of the 
biggest obstacles to establishing that there is such a foundation is 
that there is widespread disagreement about what such a
16
foundation would be like - what it would consist In. And one of the 
reasons for this disagreement is that there is an equally widespread 
disagreement about what it means to say of a person, an action, or 
an institution that he or it is rational. So one of the aims of this 
chapter is to provide an outline of what, in the requisite sense, a 
rational foundation of morality would consist in. However, there is 
a more immediate concern we need to attend to first. I f  there is to 
be a rational foundation for morality, we need to be clear about 
what it means to be moral. Without a clear understanding of what 
it means to be moral we run the risk of missing our target; we could 
end up with an account of the rational foundation for something 
that looks very much like morality but which on closer inspection 
turns out to be mere schmorality.
1.2 'Being m orar and the choice of methodology
I t  is no easy task to say what sort of a person a moral person is. I 
take it that a moral person is someone who has taken up 'the moral 
point of view'; someone who accepts that moral demands are what 
Kant called categorical imperatives (which is not meant to beg any 
questions against non-Kantian theories; I take it that utilitarians for 
example would agree that 'you ought to maximise happiness' is a 
categorical imperative in this sense). A moral person is someone 
who, among other things, accepts that moral demands are objective
17
and inescapable. Even more importantly, a moral person is 
someone who not only accepts these claims but who also structures 
her life in accordance with these moral demands; i.e. she is a 
person who accepts that if an act is wrong then it ought not be 
performed, and who, at least under normal circumstances, acts in 
accordance with this acceptance; i.e. she refrains from doing (or 
refrains from intending to do) what she believes to be wrong.
This sort of person should be contrasted with the kind of 
person who, in Kant's words, acts merely in accordance with 
morality, but not for the sake of morality. An example of this kind 
of person is Kant's shop keeper who decides not to overcharge his 
more gullible customers In order to maintain profits in the long run. 
Similarly, Hume's 'sensible knave' who believes ^honesty is the best 
policy, may be a good general rule, but is liable to too many 
exceptions; and he...conducts himself with most wisdom, who 
observes the general rule, and takes advantage of all the 
exceptions'® is not someone we would normally call moral.
Likewise, a person who, inspired by David Gauthier's Morals by 
Agreement^ perhaps, manages to make him self'translucent' and 
who succeeds in disposing himself to be such that he acts in 
accordance with common sense morality (provided that others are 
similarly motivated) can never be anything more than a 
sophisticated egoist. Since it is true of'economic man' -  no matter 
how sophisticated and translucent he may be -  that were he able to
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get away with lying, stealing, and cheating, he would do so were 
these activities to be in his self-interest. Such a person could not 
possibly be called moral, even though he would act in accordance 
with common sense morality in the vast majority of nearby possible 
worlds.
Now one of the difficulties in specifying what is involved in 
being moral consists in the fact that there is widespread 
disagreement about what morality actually demands that we do; in 
other words, there is widespread disagreement about which actions 
are right and which ones are wrong. This problem belongs to what 
is normally referred to as 'normative ethics' in introductory books 
on ethics, and I am not interested in trying to answer questions of 
this sort; or not directly interested in doing so anyway. I am 
interested in the question: 'Suppose we had a complete and correct 
list of actions that we are morally obliged to do and to refrain from 
doing. Why should anyone pay any attention to what is on that 
list?' As James Dreier puts it:
...suppose a moral theorist has proposed a certain set of 
rules, as the set of moral rules, the set that constitutes 
morality. We are bound to have some questions. We 
might question whether these rules really do constitute 
morality. This challenge is a kind of request for 
justification: what is the justification for the claim that
19
these rules constitute morality? But we could also ask for 
another kind of justification. We could ask what reason 
we, or anyone, has to follow these rules. This would be a 
request for a practical justification.®
So the idea is that we can distinguish two sorts of questions:
(a) What is the morally right thing to do (In this situation)? 
and
(b) Why should I care about the answer to the previous question?
(a) is a question about what we might call the content of morality 
and (b) is a question about the normative force of moral 
considerations. I understand the question 'why should I be moral?' 
as being equivalent to (b); it as a request for a practical justification 
of morality. This request would be satisfied by a showing that 
moral demands really are objective and normatively inescapable.
But this of course prompts the question 'how can we know whether 
a certain set of demands are objective and inescapable unless we 
know what those demands are?'
Some philosophers believe that we cannot answer the latter 
question without having first answered the former question. 
According to these philosophers, questions about the normative 
force of various considerations characterised in general terms (such
20
as moral or prudential considerations) cannot be separated from the 
substantive content of those considerations. In opposition to this 
line of thought, some philosophers (usually of a Kantian persuasion) 
believe that we can only hope to derive, and ultimately justify, the 
content of morality by first asking questions of the second kind. So 
there are some methodological issues at stake here. Scanlon has 
recently commented on this choice of methodology. He says:
Explanations of the importance of morality and its reason- 
giving force can...be compared...according to the ir degree 
of formality or, on the other hand, of substantive content.
The strategy of formal explanation is to appeal to 
considerations that are as far as possible independent of 
the appeal of any particular ends. Kant's theory is a 
leading example insofar as he undertakes to show that 
anyone who regards him- or herself as a rational agent is 
committed to recognizing the authority of the Categorical 
Imperative. [...] The alternative strategy is to explain the 
reason-giving force of moral judgements by characterizing 
more fully, in substantive terms, the particular form of 
value that we respond to in acting rightly and violate by 
doing what is wrong.
And, he goes on to say.
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Formal accounts have been attractive because it has 
seemed that the force and inescapability of the moral 
"m ust" would be well explained by showing that moral 
requirements are also requirements of rationality, and not 
dependent on the appeal of any particular good. But 
although showing this might provide the secure basis that 
some have sought for the demand that everyone must care 
about morality, it does not give a very satisfactory 
description of what is wrong with a person who fails to do 
so. The special force of moral requirements seems quite 
different from, say, principles of logic, even if both are, in 
some sense, "inescapable." And the fault involved in 
failing to be moved by moral requirements does not seem 
to be a form of incoherence.^
What Scanlon calls the formal approach better suits my ambitions in 
this dissertation, but I disagree with his last point - I do think that 
the fault involved in failing to be moved by moral requirements is a 
form of incoherence. I shall of course have to make good on this 
claim in due course.
I think we can deflect some of the worries associated with the 
idea that we cannot answer questions about the normative fc^rce of 
moral considerations without knowing what the content of those
22
considerations are by focusing on the fact that although there is, 
undoubtedly, some disagreement about what morality demands, 
there is also considerable agreement on what morality could not 
demand on pain of ceasing to be 'a morality'. A 'm ora lity ' which 
allowed or required(l?) the torturing of infants for the sake of 
sadistic pleasure would not be considered a misguided or mistaken 
morality; rather it would not be considered a morality at all. I f  
someone were to tell us that he believed that it was morally 
permissible for him to torture babies for fun, we would (I dare say) 
be warranted in believing that this person is either irrational, or that 
he is insincere, or that he does not understand the meaning of the 
locution 'morally permissible'. I f  morality demands anything at all, 
it certainly demands that we don't torture babies for fun. As 
Michael Smith puts it:
...there are platitudes concerning the substance of 
morality: 'Right acts are often concerned to promote or 
sustain or contribute in some way to human flourishing'... 
'Right acts are in some way expressive of equal concern 
and respect'... What these platitudes about substance 
force us to admit, at the very least, is that there are limits 
on the kind of content a set of requirements can have if 
they are to be moral requirements at all, as opposed to 
requirements of some other non-moral kind....^°
23
I think there is wide convergence in opinion on this matter. I also 
think this is so for a fairly large number of substantive moral claims. 
I am simply going to assume that the content of morality (whose 
overriding normative force I am interested in explaining) is 
relevantly similar to what we might call 'common sense' morality; 
where common sense morality consists in a set of moral beliefs that 
are widely shared and In whose truth we have a high degree of 
confidence.
1.3 Metaethics and m etanorm ativity
Although I am interested in (b) rather than (a), (b) in a way 
presupposes that there are answers to be given in response to (a). 
But why should we accept that there are such answers to be found? 
After all, there is a long standing tradition in ethics which denies 
that there are any answers to questions like 'what is the morally 
right thing to do?'. Generalising somewhat, we can say that 
antirealists (or irrealists) of various kinds (e.g. nihilists and error 
theorists) have all argued that since there are no moral properties 
in the world, there cannot be such a thing as 'doing that which is 
morally required'. Antirealists aren't the only sceptics however. As 
we shall see, H. A. Prichard believes that whereas (a) is a perfectly 
respectable question (to which a positive answer can be given), (b) 
is at best confused and at worst illegitimate. I shall discuss
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Prichard's scepticism presently. First, however, I need to say 
something about the challenge presented by the anti realists.
I should begin by pointing out that the kind of scepticism (if I 
am allowed to call it that) represented by anti realists of various 
kinds in metaethics, can also be brought to bear on normative 
questions and discourse in general. If, like Mackie, we think that 
moral properties are too queer to be allowed into our ontology, why 
should we not think the same about normative properties in 
general? The reason why moral properties are queer, according to 
Mackie, is that they (supposedly) have this 'to-be-doneness' built 
into them. But if this is the ground for rejecting the existence of 
moral properties, is this then not also sufficient ground for rejecting 
the existence of normative properties (or relations) in general?
After all, if the existence of moral properties is to be rejected 
because of the supposed queerness of their buiit-in 'to -be­
doneness', then since normative properties or relations could quite 
plausibly be seen as simply being this 'to-be-doneness' relation, 
these would have to be rejected on the same grounds. Presumably, 
for the sake of consistency, if normative properties have to be 
rejected, they have to be rejected across the board. This would 
mean that the properties of, say, 'being such that it ought to be 
believed' and 'being a reason to believe' would have to be rejected 
as well. I f  this is so, however, none of Mackie's arguments can be 
said to be rationally persuasive. Even if his arguments were sound.
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we would have no reason whatsoever to assent to them. But if this 
is so, one might then (for good reason as it were) begin to wonder 
whether this is a coherent idea at all.
In light of this challenge, however, I need to say something 
about the assumptions I am going to make in this dissertation. To 
begin with, I am going to assume cognitivism about moral and 
normative discourse; i.e. I am assuming that moral and normative 
judgements are expressions of beliefs and are therefore 'tru th-apt'. 
According to the 'm inimal' theory of truth-aptness, a sentence is 
truth-apt if the following two criteria are met:
(a) Discipline'. The sentences figure in an area of 
discourse that is disciplined. There must be standards 
operative with respect to which uses of those sentences 
are judged to be appropriate or inappropriate. There must 
be acknowledged standards for the proper and improper 
use of those sentences.
(b) Syntax: The sentences must possess the right sort of 
syntactic features. In particular, they must be capable of 
conditionalization, negation, embedding in prepositional 
attitudes and so on.^^
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The Idea is that if sentences in a given domain of discourse conform 
to these standards, then these sentences (and, presumably, the 
domain of discourse as a whole) are truth-apt; i.e. they are 
assessable in terms of truth and falsity. This should be contrasted 
with non-cognitivism (and those theories which fall under that 
umbrella concept, such as expressivism and emotivism), which 
holds that moral and normative discourse is not truth-apt; that 
moral and normative discourse or judgements should be taken to 
express or report agents' feelings or sentiments.
I think it is quite clear that moral and normative language 
conform to the standards of minimalism. Sentences like ' I t  is wrong 
to tell lies' and 'Smith ought to look after his health' certainly meet 
the syntactical criterion. In fact, one of the most celebrated 
arguments against non-cognitivism -  the so-called 'Frege-Geach 
Argument' -  derives much, if not all, of its strength from the fact 
that moral judgements are capable of conditionalisation -  a fact 
which non-cognitivists are still struggling to explain (away?).^^
What about discipline? Again, it seems moral and normative 
discourse satisfy this criterion as well. Here I shall only point to few 
examples. I t  is a standard of both domains of discourse that claims 
made within these discourses are 'universalisable': if it Is wrong for 
Bob to (|) in circumstance C, then it is wrong for anyone relevantly 
similar to Bob to (j) in circumstance C. Likewise in the (more 
general) normative domain: if Sarah ought, or has a reason to (j> in
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circumstance C, then anyone who is relevantly sim ilar to Sarah 
ought, or has a reason, to (j) in circumstance C. To claim otherwise 
would be to apply Improper standards of use for moral and 
normative sentences. Other examples of such standards might 
include the prohibition against deriving 'ought' statements from 'is ' 
statements and a licence to validly infer 'can' from 'ought' etc. 
Likewise, all deontic logics (as far as I am aware), as well as natural 
language, allow us to infer 'ought' from 'not permissible to not' and 
vice versa; it also allows us to infer 'ought not' from 'not 
permissible' and vice versa.
Furthermore, and importantly (and as we saw in the quote 
from Smith) moral discourse is also disciplined by various 
platitudes. Although some of these have already been mentioned, 
Peter Railton lists the following platitudes^^: moral discourse is 
surface cognitive -  i.e. on its face it bears all the marks of cognitive 
discourse; statements of moral principles, and the stances taken in 
disagreements over such principles, are on their face nonrelativistic, 
or surface universal; moral judgements are typically linked to 
motivation in various ways -  e.g. a judgement that X is wrong 
typically carries with it a motivation not to do X; moral judgements 
are surface categorical -  i.e. ordinary lack of motivation or 
willpower on the part of the person to whom we are attributing a 
moral obligation is not an excusing condition but rather a fault, 
liable to sanction; moral discourse is surface justified by reasons of
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well-being, nonpartiality, and cooperation -  i.e. these are typically 
the kinds of considerations that ground moral judgements. This list 
is by no means meant to be exclusive or exhaustive. There may be 
(and probably are) many other moral platitudes besides the ones 
jus t mentioned. Even so, how do these platitudes help shape the 
discipline of moral discourse? I think the answer lies' in the fact that 
all the platitudes listed above are prefaced by the word 'surface'. 
Moral discourse is disciplined by these platitudes in the sense that 
the plausibility of a moral theory is proportional to the number of 
platitudes it can accommodate satisfactorily. The failure of a theory 
to accommodate a particular platitude counts against the plausibility 
of the theory, unless of course defenders of the theory can 
persuasively show why we should simply discard the platitude in 
question. I think the same applies to theories of more generally 
normative concepts as well.
However, one of the main challenges for those who want to 
maintain that moral and normative discourses are tru th-apt is to 
provide a plausible epistemology for moral and normative 
propositions. The non-cognitivist can of course supply such an 
epistemology but he can do so only at the cost of robbing normative 
and moral discourse of their truth-aptness. Since I am not going to 
argue for cognitivism, I shall not spend much time addressing the 
epistemological issue. Nonetheless, what I will say in chapter four 
will, I think, go a long toward providing such an epistemology.
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Unfortunately, most, if not all of this is compatible with what 
the error theorist wants to claim. The error theorist maintains that 
moral and normative discourse is truth-apt all right, but, he claims, 
since these discourses presuppose that there exists some mind- 
independent sui generis normative and/or moral sector of reality, all 
claims made within normative and moral discourse are false, since 
there simply is no mind-independent normative or moral order 
which is capable of conferring truth on these claims. My reply to 
the error theorist is that (insofar as this challenge can be made 
sense of) we can accept irrealism and cognitivism without thereby 
being committed to error theory. The idea behind the position I 
have in mind is that although judgements about moral and 
normative matters are expressions of beliefs (and which are, as a 
result, capable of being true or false), this does not imply that 
judgements about the moral or the normative are judgements 
about some section of reality which is independent of our cognising 
about it. As Scanlon puts it (in reference to discourse about 
reasons):
...in order for judgements about reasons to be taken to be 
about some subject matter independent of us in the sense 
required for it to be possible for us to be mistaken about 
them, what is necessary is for there to be standards for 
arriving at conclusions about reasons. ... I t  is not
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necessary, in order to explain the possibility of being 
mistaken to construe the relevant subject matter in a 
metaphysicai way as existing outside us. [...] The 
question of whether there are standards of the required 
sort is a substantive one within the subject in question...it 
need not be a metaphysical question about what 
exists....
The distinctive error theoretical claim, as I see it, is that the truth of 
irrealism about ethics makes it  the case that all ethical judgements 
are false. I suspect that the reason why error theorists believe this 
is that they (implicitly perhaps) subscribe to a correspondence 
theory of truth. I f  this theory is rejected, however, it is perfectly 
possible to remain an irrealist cognitivist without being an error 
theorist.
I cannot defend the claim that we should reject the 
correspondence theory of truth (at least with respect to the moral 
and normative domains) in favour of a minimal theory of 
truth(aptness). Here I am simply suggesting that by rejecting the 
correspondence theory of truth we can perfectly well remain 
irrealists about normativity and morality (i.e. we can deny that 
there exists some mind-independent, truth-making order of 
normative or moral facts) and we can remain cognitivists about 
normativity and morality (i.e. we can assert that normative and
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moral discourse is truth-apt) without thereby committing ourselves 
to some form of error theory. I am simply going to assume that 
some moral and normative propositions are true and that these true 
propositions are not merely negative existential claims of the form 
'I t  is true that there are no moral properties' or ' I t  is true that 
there are no reasons for doing anything'. Rather, I take it that 
there are true (atomic) propositions of the form ' I t  is wrong to steal' 
and 'Bob ought to look after his health'. The position I am 
assuming may be called 'non-error theoretic irrealist cognitivism'.^^ 
I t  is against the backdrop of these admittedly large 
assumptions that I want to try  to answer the question 'why should I 
be moral?' Since I cannot defend these assumptions, I have to 
admit that the conclusions I reach will be no stronger or more 
persuasive than the assumptions on which these conclusions stand. 
With these preliminaries in place, and before I outline what I think a 
rational foundation for morality (in the requisite sense) must consist 
in, I first need to say something about Prichard's view that 'why 
should I be moral?' is an illegitimate question.
1.4 Prichard's Intuitionfst challenge (1 )
In his essay 'Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake'^® H. A. 
Prichard claims that, traditionally, moral philosophy has consisted
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more or less in an attempt to provide an answer to the following 
question:
Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in 
which hitherto I have thought I ought to act? May I not 
have been all the time under an illusion in so thinking?
Should I not be justified in simply trying to have a good 
time?^^
Since he believes this is an illegitimate question, Prichard believes 
that moral philosophy rests on a mistake:
I...contend that the existence of the whole subject, as 
usually understood, rests on a mistake, and on a mistake 
parallel to that on which rests, I think, the subject usually 
called the theory of knowledge.
In this and the next section I will try to show that it is Prichard who 
is mistaken. The two questions asked in ethics and epistemology 
respectively, are legitimate questions. Prichard presents two 
arguments that supposedly show why the question above is 
illegitimate. One proceeds via an analogy with epistemology (and 
the mistakes supposedly made therein), and the other tries to 
show, more directly -  within the confines of moral philosophy, so to
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speak -  why the question is illegitimate. I shall begin by discussing 
his analogy between moral philosophy and epistemology.
Prichard says:
Just as the recognition that the doing of our duty often 
vitally interferes with the satisfaction of our inclinations 
leads us to wonder whether we really ought to do what we 
usually call our duty, so the recognition that we and others 
are liable to mistakes in knowledge generally leads us, as it 
did Descartes, to wonder whether hitherto we may not 
have been always mistaken. And jus t as we try  to find a 
proof, based on the general consideration of action and of 
human life, that we ought to act in the ways usually called 
moral, so we, like Descartes, propose by a process of 
reflection on our thinking to find a test of knowledge, i.e. a 
principle by applying which we can show that a certain 
condition of mind was really knowledge, a condition which 
ex hypothesi existed independently of the process of 
reflection.^®
In the epistemological case, then, when we attempt to provide a 
proof of the alleged fact that a given mental state was one of 
knowledge we set ourselves the task of finding a criterion by which 
we can judge whether we are in possession of genuine knowledge.
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And It Is only by knowing that a given mental state satisfies this 
criterion of knowledge that we can be said to have genuine 
knowledge:
instead of its being the fact that the knowledge that A is 6 
is obtained directly by consideration of the nature of A and 
Bf the knowledge that A is B, in the full or complete sense, 
can only be obtained by first knowing that A is B, and then 
knowing that we knew it by applying a criterion, such as 
Descartes principle that what we clearly and distinctly 
conceive is tru e /^
But, Prichard tells us, this epistemological enterprise is mistaken:
Now it is easy to show that the doubt whether A is B, 
based on this speculative or general ground, could, if 
genuine, never be set at rest. For if, in order to know that 
A is B, we must first know that we knew it, then really, to 
know that we knew it, we must first know that we knew 
that we knew it.^^
So an infinite regress threatens this kind of argument, and this is 
one of the fundamental mistakes Prichard wants to attribute to 
Descartes and, consequently, to the epistemology as a whole.
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Whether Descartes actually made this mistake or not is beyond the 
scope of the present discussion. Prichard nonetheless seems to 
want to draw the conclusion that since we cannot (on pain of 
regress) include a criterion of this sort (or indeed any other) in our 
definition of knowledge, knowledge must be sui generis; like 
goodness is for Moore^^, knowledge, for Prichard, is unanalysable.
The epistemological mistake, Prichard maintains, is the result 
of our inattention to the 'immediacy of knowledge':
[A moral] apprehension is immediate, in precisely the 
same sense in which a mathematicai apprehension is 
immediate, e.g. the apprehension that this three-sided 
figure, in virtue of its being three-sided, must have three 
angles. Both apprehensions are immediate in the sense 
that in both, insight into the nature of the subject directly 
leads us to recognise its possession of the predicate; and it 
is only stating this fact from the other side to say that in 
both cases the fact apprehended is self-evident.^"^
A striking feature of this passage is that the two kinds of knowledge 
it mentions are species of a priori knowledge. Mathematical 
judgements are paradigmatically a priori, and so too it seems, are 
moral judgements (although some philosophers working in the 
empiricist or naturalist tradition might think otherwise). However,
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not all a priori judgements are Immediate in this sense. A difficult 
proof in logic for instance sometimes requires careful examination 
before a correct verdict regarding its validity can be reached.
Hence, there is a significant difference between a priori knowledge 
and immediate knowledge. So the 'immediacy' of knowledge is 
something we should be sceptical about, and this (justified) 
scepticism, I think, should be extended to the claim that knowledge 
and certainty are inextricably linked as well.
I t  is a mistake to think that we have to be either Cartesian 
internalists or intuitionists about knowledge. There is another 
interpretation of the Cartesian programme; an interpretation which 
escapes the infinite regress objection. Consider Descartes' 
principle:
(A) For all P, if I clearly and distinctly perceive that P, then I 
know that P.
Contrary to Prichard's interpretation of Descartes, (A) could be 
understood as not being a ground (or criterion) for knowledge, 
rather, it can be regarded as a source of knowledge. As Van Cleve 
points out:
In order to [know] a proposition I do not need to know
that I am clearly and distinctly perceiving it, nor that
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whatever I so perceive is either certain or true. I t  is 
enough that I do clearly and distinctly perceive the 
proposition. (A) says that this is enough. . . .  (A) is not a 
principle I have to apply in order to gain knowledge, I need 
only fall under it.^^
Thus there is a 'criterion-based' theory of knowledge which does not 
obviously lead to an infinite regress. This has become known as 
'externalism ' in epistemology. Within the class of externalist 
theories of knowledge there are several proposals available as to 
what this criterion is. Alvin Goldman, for instance, has advocated a 
theory of knowledge according to which the criterion under which 
'one has to fall' is that one's belief that p was caused by p.^ ® 
Similarly, Robert Nozick has constructed a conditional theory of 
knowledge according to which one's belief that p must be such that, 
counterfactually, had p not been the case, one would not have 
believed p, and were it the case that p, one would believe that p.^^ 
Both Goldman's and Nozick's theories are sometimes called 
'reliabilist' theories as they both, in their respective ways, attempt 
to specify ways in which we gain knowledge through a 'reliable 
knowledge-generating process'.
The crucial difference between these theories and the ones 
Prichard has in mind, is that, according to externalists, it is not a 
necessary condition for S's knowing that p that S knows that he
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knows that p. I t  is sufficient for S to know that p that S believes p, 
that p is true, and that S has come to believe p through some 
reliable process. S's having acquired the true belief that p in the 
right way does not, however, mean that S \s Justified in believing 
that p or asserting that p. But this, in turn, can be taken to show 
that justification is not essential to knowledge.
Although I will not try  to defend externalism here, it should be 
pointed out that it has some notable advantages over internalism. 
Perhaps the most appealing aspect of externalism is that it can 
accommodate the common-sense conviction that higher animals, 
young children, and unsophisticated adults can possess knowledge 
without necessarily knowing that, or why, they do. Although this 
sort of theory might not, in the end, save Descartes from the fate 
Prichard assigns him, it nonetheless provides us with a prima facie 
alternative to both Descartes and Prichard.
So Prichard cannot simply help himself to the conclusion that 
if Cartesian internalism fails intuitlonism is the only available 
alternative. By divorcing the notions of justification and knowledge 
we can maintain that there is a third position available, a position 
that Prichard has not considered. So Prichard faces a dilemma 
here. Either he has to retract his claim that the epistemological 
case and the moral case are analogous, thus eliminating one of his 
main arguments in support of the claim that the question asked by 
moral philosophy is illegitimate, or he has to admit that a non-
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intuitionistic answer to 'Is  there really a reason why I should...?' is 
still on the table.
1.5 Prichard's intuitionfst challenge (2 )
Consider again Prichard's question:
Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in 
which hitherto I have thought I ought to act? May I not 
have been all the time under an illusion in so thinking? 
Should I not be justified in simply trying to have a good 
time?
I suspect that Prichard thinks that this question is the same as the 
question 'why should I be moral?'. This is not so however -  they 
are different questions. For one thing, the question Prichard has 
identified is in fact not one, single question, but three separate 
questions. To distinguish 'why should I be moral' from Prichard's 
questions, I will refer to the former as 'the moral question' and the 
latter as 'Prichard's question' (or as 'his question'). I f  one of the 
chief aims of moral philosophy 'as usually understood' is to answer 
Prichard's question (understood as a conjunction) then Prichard's 
conclusion is absoiutely correct - moral philosophy does rest on a 
mistake.
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I believe 'why should I be moral?' is a legitimate and 
important question. However, Prichard's failure to establish the 
illegitimacy of his question is instructive in several ways; we can 
learn a great deal about how one should go about answering the 
moral question by pointing out where and why Prichard is mistaken. 
In the end, or so I wiil argue, it is Prichard's question and his 
subsequent arguments, not moral philosophy, that rest on, not only 
a mistake, but several mistakes.
As I said, Prichard's question is in fact three separate 
questions. They are:
(I) Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in 
which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?
(II) May I not have been all the time under an illusion in so 
thinking?
(III)  Should I not be justified in simply trying to have a good 
time?
Intuitively, the answers to these questions are 'tha t depends on 
what you hitherto thought you ought to do', 'yes', and 'probably 
not'. At this stage it is far from obvious that the second and third 
questions have any bearing whatsoever on the first question. Let 
us set these consideration to the side and take a look at Prichard's 
'reductio' answer to his question. He says:
41
[Answers to this question] all fall, and fall from the 
necessities of the case, into one of two species. E ither 
they state that [1 ] we ought to do so and so, because, as 
we see when we fully apprehend the facts, doing so will be 
for our good, i.e. really, as I would rather say, for our 
advantage, or, better still, for our happiness; or they state 
that [2 ] we ought to do so and so, because something 
realized either in or by the action is good. In other words, 
the reason 'why' is stated in terms either of the agent's 
happiness or of the goodness of something involved in the 
action.^®
For simplicity's sake I have labelled these alternatives [1 ] and [2], 
respectively. [1] attempts to supply each agent with an egoistic 
(agent-relative) reason for acting morally. [2] is more agent- 
neutrai in spirit.^®
We should note right away that there is an important 
assumption underlying this passage: all potentially acceptable 
answers to his question necessarily fall into one of the two 
categories described by Prichard. By this I take Prichard to mean 
that answers which fall under these categories are the only ones 
that could possibly supply the type of answer we are looking for. 
There are two obvious questions at this point: (1) are these types of
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answers really the only ones available?; and (2) are these types of 
answers really incapable of answering his question? I th ink the 
answer to (1) is no. The two categories Prichard identifies are too 
narrowly teleological (or value-based). Since agent-relative and 
agent-neutral reasons exhaust the logical space of reasons (so 
described), it is true that any acceptable answer to Prichard's 
question must fall within one of these categories. This does not 
mean, however, that all reasons (agent-relative and agent-neutral) 
must be teleological reasons. The distinction between agent-neutral 
and agent-relative reasons is not the same distinction as that 
between teleological and non-teleological reasons. So Prichard's 
first mistake consists in his thinking that any acceptable answer to 
his question must proceed via a teleological justification of morality. 
Let us continue by looking at Prichard's answer to (2).
Prichard seems to suggest that his question should be read as 
a mistaken request for a proof of the truth that we are under moral 
obligations. According to Prichard, it is a question asked by 
someone who is no longer confident that he ought to do those 
things he previously thought he was under an obligation to do. I t  is 
fairly clear that the obligations Prichard has in mind here are the 
various obligations associated with acting in ways we normally 
describe as being in accordance with morality: keeping ones 
promises, repaying debts, telling the truth etc.
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However, It is unclear (at this point anyway) what the 
content of this person's doubt is. Prichard does not explicitly tell 
us whether the person asking the question has come to doubt 
whether a) it really Is morally obligatory to do these things; or, 
b) whether, although these acts may be morally obligatory, it is 
reasonable to do what morality tells him to do; i.e. whether 
moral obligations really make normative claims on us. So we 
need to find out which kind of doubt Prichard is concerned with 
in order to understand what it is he wants a proof of. The two 
doubts are after all very different. The following passage 
suggests that Prichard's question should be understood as an 
expression of a doubt of the latter kind:
The formulation of the question implies a state of 
unwillingness or indifference towards the action, and we 
are brought into a condition of willingness by the answer. 
And this process seems to be precisely what we desire 
when we ask, e.g., 'Why should we keep our engagements 
to our own loss?'; for it is jus t the fact that the keeping of 
our engagements runs counter to the satisfaction of our 
desires which produced the question.^®
This passage suggest that the question is being asked by someone 
who wants a psychologically compelling answer. But this is only
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one possible motive behind asking this question. We could also ask 
this question because we want to enquire about the normative 
status of moral obligations - is it really true that we ought to do 
what we are morally obliged to do? I f  desire satisfaction were the 
only source of normativity then the two questions wouid be asking 
for the same thing, but why should we accept that this is the case? 
The question may be asked, for example, by someone who has 
come to doubt whether moral obligations are genuinely normative, 
not because of his 'appreciation of the degree to which the 
execution of these obligations is contrary to our interest', but 
because he has become convinced that, say, aesthetic 
considerations bid him to act contrary to the demands of morality. '
I f  we interpret (I) in such a way that it presupposes that any 
acceptable answer to it must be psychologically compelling, then 
since it is doubtful that we should be able to provide an affirmative 
answer to (I) that every person will find psychologically compelling,
I think we can safely say, with Prichard, that (I) is illegitimate. But 
why should we interpret (I) in this way? As Parfit puts it, our aim 
here may be 'not influence, but truth.
Given Prichard's assumption that the only kind of reason(s) 
that can be given for why we ought to act in accordance with 
morality are necessarily derived from teleological considerations, 
then If the 'desire satisfaction' answer is unacceptable^^ the only 
other alternative, according to Prichard, is to base 'the obligation to
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do something on the goodness either of something to which the act 
leads or of the act itself ([2]).^^ The most common version of this 
alternative is of course utilitarianism 'in the generic sense' (to 
borrow Prichard's term). So let us assume (with Prichard) that 
utilitarianism supplies such an answer: those acts are right which 
produce maximum happiness. What we would like to know next is 
whose happiness we should be concerned with. Again, for the same 
reasons as mentioned above, if utilitarianism is to be able to 
account for the sense of being under an obligation that Prichard is 
after, it cannot, according to Prichard, appeal to 'our own happiness' 
- that is to the happiness of the agent who finds himself under an 
obligation to promote happiness. I f  it did the answer would resolve 
itself into the same answer as [1]. So what are the alternatives 
available to the utilitarian? According to Prichard, there are only 
two alternatives available: either
[2.1] Anyone's happiness is a thing good in itself and 
therefore we ought to do whatever will produce it; or,
[2 .2] Working for happiness is itself good, and the intrinsic 
goodness of such an action is the reason why we ought 
to do it.34
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These two options, then, are the only available ones left. What, if 
anything, can be said in favour of these kinds of positions? Prichard 
says:
The advantage of this appeal to the goodness of something 
consists In the fact that it avoids reference to desire, and 
instead refers to something impersonal and objective. In 
this way it seems possible to avoid the resolution of 
obligation into inclination.
Prichard equates [2.1] with utilitarianism 'in the generic sense'. 
According to Prichard, utilitarianism 'takes its stand upon the 
distinction between something which is not itself an action but 
which can be produced by an action and the action which wiil 
produce it, and contends that if something which is not an action is 
good then we ought to undertake the action which will, directly or 
indirectly, produce it.'^® But for this argument to succeed (i.e. to 
restore the sense of obligation), Prichard continues, we must 
assume not only that 'what is good ought to be', but also that the 
apprehension that a good state of affairs ought to be involves the 
feeling of imperativeness or obligation which is to be aroused by the 
thought of the action which will originate it - otherwise 'the 
argument will not lead us to feel the obligation to produce It by the 
action.'3^  But, Prichard argues, both these assumptions are false.
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First, the word 'ought', he claims, refers to actions and 
actions a l o n e . He explains:
Even if we are sometimes moved to say that the world or 
something in it Is not what it ought to be, what we really 
mean is that God or some human being has not made 
something what he ought to have made it.^®
I think this is right, or roughly right anyway. 'Ought' statements do 
in a sense apply to actions, but they also apply to agents. More 
specifically, 'oughts' are relational, they hold (like reasons) between 
agents and actions (and circumstances perhaps). Of course we say 
things like 'the train ought to have arrived by now', but 'ought' is 
here used in a different sense than in a statement like 'you ought to 
be kind to your little brother'. In the first instance the word 'ought' 
is used in what we might call a predictive sense whereas in the 
second It is used in a normative sense. I t  is in this second sense 
that 'ought' only applies to agents. I t  does not make sense to say 
that the world ought to be such and such (in the normative sense). 
I f  it were true that the world ought to be such and such but that it 
is not, then the world would be a thing which is in some way 
criticisable (or blameworthy perhaps), and clearly the world is not. 
The world is not an agent; It cannot be held responsible for 'what it 
does'.
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However, it is hard to see why a teleologist should be 
bothered by this. No doubt teieologists frequently disagree about 
what is intrinsically good; happiness, well-being, pleasure, and 
human perfection are only some suggestions. They also disagree 
about what the appropriate response to these suggested goods 
should be; some advocate maximisation while others endorse 
'satisficing' accounts as the appropriate response to the value in 
q u e s t i o n . 4 ®  But this does not mean that teieologists are committed 
to the claim that 'what is good ought to be'. Rather, they believe 
that what is (maximally, satisficingly etc.) good ought to be brought 
about. Here the 'ought' is attributed to agents, and bringing about 
a particular state of affairs is (or at least can be) an action. 
Furthermore, teieologists need not concede that 'what is good ought 
to be brought about' Is derived from 'what is good ought to be'. 
Prichard seems to assume that teieologists must conceive of the 
good/right relation in the following way^^:
(1) A certain state of affairs, x, is the best state of affairs.
(2) Therefore I ought to bring about x.
We can agree with Prichard that (2) does not follow from (1). But 
this does not mean that the teieologists must presuppose 'What is 
best ought to be'. (Were they to do so, the argument would still be 
invalid.) They need not suppose anything of the sort. Rather, they
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could (and presumably do) claim that what the argument above 
presupposes is 'I  ought to bring about the best state of affairs'.
With this assumption in place, (2) does follow from (1).
What about the second assumption - the assumption that 'the 
apprehension that a good state of affairs ought to be involves the 
feeling of imperativeness or obligation which is to be aroused by the 
thought of the action which will originate it'? Prichard's rejection of 
this assumption is based on his rejection of the first one: our feeling 
of imperativeness, or of being under an obligation, can never be 
aroused simply by the recognition that something is best. Since he 
believes that teleologists must hold that what is best ought to be, 
and that this ought does not refer to an action (but to a state of 
affairs), he says:
...it is merely stating another side of this fact to urge that 
we can only feel the Imperativeness upon us of something 
which is in our power, for it is actions and actions alone 
which, directly at least, are in our power."^^
This challenge has already been stopped dead in its tracks. I f  the 
teleologist simply rejects the assumption 'what is best ought to be' 
in favour o f'w h a t is best ought to be brought about', Prichard's 
challenge loses all its force.
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Nonetheless, I think it is fairly clear that Prichard means to 
say that teleology in general, and utilitarianism in particular, are, 
according to common-sense morality, counterintuitive. He says:
I t  is because this view is so plainly at variance with our 
moral consciousness that we are driven to adopt the other 
form of the view, viz. that the act is good in itself and that 
its intrinsic goodness is the reason why it ought to be 
done.'"^^
Not surprisingly, Prichard dismisses the 'intrinsic goodness' answer 
as well. Our use of the term 'good', he says, is always in respect of 
the motive and refers to actions which have been actually done and 
of which we think we know the motive. 'Further', he says, 'the 
action of which we approve and which we should describe as 
intrinsically good are of two and only two kinds. They are either:
[2.2.1] Actions in which the agent did what he did because he 
thought he ought to do it; or,
[2.2.2] Actions of which the motive was a desire prompted by 
some [intrinsically] good emotion such as ... 
benevolence.''^'^
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Prichard does recognise that actions can be carried out as a result 
of a combination of these motives. Although such a combination of 
motives might present a problem with regards to the possible 
overdetermination of (operative, or explanatory) motives capable of 
producing an action, I think Prichard is right when he says that 
problems of this kind will not affect the argument he puts forth 
next. Before we take a look at this argument, let us remind 
ourselves about what Prichard has done so far.
Prichard began by considering the attempt to ground the 
reason why we ought to act in accordance with morality in agent- 
relative considerations (advantage, happiness etc.). 'But', he 
concludes, '[th is ] answer is, of course, not an answer, for it fails to 
convince us that we ought to keep our engagements; even if 
successful on its own lines, it only makes us want to keep them.''^^ 
This left us with a choice between grounding moral obligations in 
either the intrinsic goodness of universal happiness or in the 
intrinsic goodness of performing certain acts. The ’universal 
happiness' answer is dismissed because it is so 'plainly at variance 
with our moral consciousness'. So the only alternative left is to 
ground the reason why we ought to act in accordance with morality 
in the intrinsic goodness of working for happiness. But, Prichard 
says
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...our approval and our use of the term 'good' is always in 
respect of the motive and refers to actions which have 
been actually done and of which we think we know the 
motive. Further, the actions of which we approve and 
which we should describe as intrinsically good are of two 
and only two kinds. They are either actions in which the 
agent did what he did because he thought he ought to do 
it, or actions of which the motive was a desire prompted by 
some good emotion.
I think Prichard Is right about this. I will have more to say about 
this issue later, but for an event to be an action that event must be 
under the conscious control of some agent - i.e. the event must be 
brought about intentionally, it must have some purpose. So when 
we evaluate the goodness of actions (as opposed to 'mere 
happenings' or'quasi-actions'), we cannot accurately do so without 
knowing what the intentions were that brought about a particular 
event (a person's moving his body in a certain way). However, 
according to Prichard, this presents us with a dilemma:
The dilemma is this: I f  the motive in respect of which we 
think an action good is the sense of obligation, then so far 
from the sense that we ought to do it being derived from 
our apprehension of its goodness, our apprehension of its
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goodness will presuppose the sense that we ought to do it.
In other words, in this case the recognition that the act is 
good will plainly presuppose the recognition that the act is 
right, whereas the view under consideration is that the 
recognition of the goodness of the act gives rise to the 
recognition of its rightness. On the other hand, if the 
motive in respect of which we think an action good is some 
intrinsically good desire, such as the desire to help a 
friend, the recognition of the goodness of the act will 
equally fail to give rise to the sense of obligation to do it.
For we cannot feel that we ought to do that the doing of 
which is ex hypothesi prompted solely by the desire to do 
it.47
There may be various ways for teleologists to respond to this 
challenge, but on the standard definition of teleology (i.e. that the 
goodness of an action can be defined independently of its rightness, 
and that rightness of an action is then defined in terms of some 
suitable response -  maximising, satisficing etc. -  to the good), 
Prichard has a real target here. Even so, this does not mean that 
Prichard has shown that the question he asked is illegitimate. At 
best, he as shown that teleological answers in general (and perhaps 
consequentialist answers in particular) will, at best, yield 
counterintuitive answers to his question, at worst they cannot
54
provide an answer at all. So much the worse for teleology perhaps. 
But, alas, there are other moral theories besides teieology.
In the end, I believe we must conclude that Prichard's 
arguments fail to establish that the moral question is illegitimate.
His argument presupposes that there is a close analogy between 
the mistakes supposedly committed in both epistemology and in 
moral philosophy. But, as I have shown, no mistakes have been 
committed in either case. Prichard's attempt to establish the truth 
of intuitionism in moral philosophy by appealing to the supposed 
truth of intuitionism in epistemology does not succeed. The reasons 
for this is that Prichard has overlooked the fact that the forced 
choice between Cartesian internalism and intuitionism is a false 
dichotomy. Prichard is nonetheless right in believing that his 
question is illegitimate although he is not right about the reason 
why it is illegitimate. The illegitimacy stems not from the question 
as such, but rather from the presupposition that any satisfactory 
answer to it must be able to meet two particular criteria: It must be 
psychologically compelling, and it can only successfully proceed via 
an appeal to considerations of goodness. We need not accept either 
of these criteria.
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1.6 Different conceptions of 'rational'
I said earlier that the question 'why should I be moral?' has 
traditionally been interpreted as a request for a showing that there 
is a rational foundation for morality. Much of the controversy 
surrounding the possibility of there being such a foundation for 
morality stems from the fact that the word 'rational' is ambiguous.
In what follows I shall try  to distinguish (some of) these senses of 
'rational'.
Since there is an enormous amount of literature on various 
theories of rationality, I cannot possibly canvass all these theories 
in what follows. As a result I shall have to be selective. Theories of 
rationality can be divided into various categories depending on what 
one takes to be their most salient features, e.g. instrumental or 
non-instrumental theories, consequentialist or non-consequentialist 
theories, maximising or non-maximising theories etc., or into 
almost any combination of these. I shall, however, discuss a 
slightly different categorisation which cuts across many of the 
distinctions drawn above. I am going to call these formal and 
substantive theories of rationality, and I shall discuss them 
presently.
I should point out that the difference between the two 
theories I am about to discuss is unfortunately obscured by the fact 
that these theories are often referred to by other names in the 
literature. Scanlon, for instance, makes a distinction between a
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'broad' and a 'narrow ' conception of rationality, Parfit talks of 
'substantive' and 'procedural' conceptions of rationality,'^® and Rawls 
distinguishes between 'reasonableness' and 'rationality ' (a 
distinction, he claims, that traces back to Kant).'^^ Although these 
distinctions do not exactly match each other, for our purposes we 
can say that Scanlon's broad conception of rationality, Parfit's 
procedural conception, and Rawls' sense o f'ra tiona l' are fairly close 
versions of the formal conception I have just been discussing.
Before we take a look at the substantive and formal 
conceptions of rationality, it will be useful first to consider the 
question 'what things can be said to be rational?' Well, quite a few 
it seems: actions, persons, dispositions, rules, norms, and 
institutions (to name but a few) all seem to be 'things' to which we 
sometimes attach the predicate 'is rational'. For instance, when 
someone asks us for advice about what to do we sometirnes answer 
by saying that the rational thing to do is such and such. Similarly 
we often say of someone who acts in a certain way that she is a 
rational person. In both cases the predicate 'is rational' is invoked, 
but the kinds of objects this predicate is (or can be) true of are 
different.
Although we commonly attribute rationality to all sorts of 
things, I think that, on reflection, we should say that the primary 
'bearers' of rationality are agents; more accurately we should say 
that agents are rational in so far as they possess, and to some
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adequate degree, exercise certain capacities -  namely the capacity 
to form normative judgements and the capacity to act 
(intentionally) in accordance with these judgements. Actions are in 
turn rational if they are caused by an agent's exercising these 
capacities. There are of course several kinds of normative 
judgements, and rationality and irrationality cannot simply be a 
matter of acting in accordance with any old normative judgement. 
Suppose Sue judges that she has a reason to Here it m ight be 
tempting to say that Sue would be acting rationally if she (j>-ed, but 
this is not necessarily so. Suppose Sue also judges that she ought 
not (|) (which, I take it, is a 'stronger' normative judgement than the 
judgement that she has a reason to ())). In this case, if she were to 
act in accordance with her judgement that she has a reason to cj)
(I.e. if she c|)'s), then given that she also judges that she ought not 
(j), she is not acting rationally.
So the required connection between her normative 
judgements and her actions (or, more accurately perhaps, her 
intentions) must be that she acts on her 'strongest' normative 
judgement. The word 'strongest' here is deliberately vague because 
I do not yet want to commit myself to any particular story about 
what the content of these judgements must be. I should however 
point out that 'strongest' here does not mean 'most firm ly held' or 
something similar. Rather, an agent's strongest normative 
judgement should be understood as that judgement of the agent
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whose content has the strongest normative modality: to act 
rationally Sue must act in accordance with her judgements about 
what she ought to do; about what she has decisive reason to do; 
about what she has most reason to do etc. Of course it m ight be 
the case that the contents of these judgements are the same. To 
judge that one ought to (j) m ight simply be the same thing as 
judging that one has sufficient reason to (j> etc. Since I will discuss 
these issues in some detail in chapter four, I shall simply leave the 
idea of acting in accordance with one's strongest normative belief 
intuitive at this stage. We may call this the 'form al' conception of 
rationality: an agent is rational if and only if she acts in accordance 
with her strongest normative judgement. The reason why the term 
'form al' is apt here is that this conception of rationality says that 
rationality is, essentially, nothing over and above consistency. 
There are no constraints imposed on, or related to, the normative 
judgements themselves.
There are a few complications here however. First, a person 
may occasionally act irrationally without thereby deserving to be 
called an irrational person. I may have been weak willed on a few 
occasions (i.e. I may have failed to act in accordance with my 
strongest normative judgement), but this is not sufficient to make 
me an irrational person. Rational persons sometimes act 
irrationally. However, someone who acts irrationally on a sufficient 
number of occasions cannot, in any ordinary sense of the word, be
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called a rational agent. Whether or not this means that 'rational' is 
a vague concept I shall leave unexamined as it is of no great 
importance in the present context.
Second for the formal conception of rationality to be plausible 
- Indeed, for any conception of rationality to be plausible - we also 
need to add that the connection between an agent's normative 
judgments and her actions (or intentions) is not merely accidental. 
Consider the following case (due to John Broome). Suppose you 
believe (for whatever reason) that the hotel you're in is on fire.
This belief (along with a desire to stay alive perhaps) m ight lead 
you to believe that you ought to jum p into the canal outside the 
window. Suppose however that '[y jo u r belief that you ought to 
jum p might perversely cause you to sing happily, so that you start 
to skip about on the windowsill and by accident jum p into the 
canal.'®® In this case your action is consistent with your strongest 
normative belief (that you ought to jum p), but this would not be an 
example of a rational action. In order for an act to be rational, the 
action must come about as a result of, or because of, the 
(strongest) normative belief.®^ In other words, there must be some 
non-accidental connection between the agent's strongest normative 
belief and his subsequent behaviour. I shall take this 'non- 
accidental' rider as read in what follows.
Third, although I have said that the formal conception of 
rationality demands that there be a non-accidental connection
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between an agent's strongest normative judgement and her 
action(s), this is, strictly speaking, not true. Suppose Anne believes 
that she ought to study for her exam but she doesn't do it. The fact 
that she failed to study for exam cannot by itself be enough to 
warrant a charge of irrationality. Perhaps she was prevented from 
studying by some 'external' force like an earthquake.
Considerations like these should force us, I think, to say that a 
person is rational only if she forms the intention to do that which 
she believes she ought to do.®  ^ However, since we are so used to 
talking about rational actions as if they are overt bodily motions, I 
shall continue to do so, even if it is, strictly speaking, not true.
The formal conception of rationality is, however, open to a 
fairly common objection. The objection to the formal account of 
rationality (and the sim ilar ones jus t mentioned) is brought out by 
the following quote from Scanlon:
Beyond [acting in accordance with one's strongest 
normative judgement], are there also more substantive 
standards that it is irrational to violate? Is it sometimes 
irrational to fail to accept certain considerations as 
reasons? I t  seems to me that philosophical usage, but 
perhaps not "ordinary" usage, is divided on this point.®®
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This brings us to what we might call the 'substantive' conception of 
rationality. According to this conception of rationality, an agent's 
acting in accordance with his or her strongest normative belief(s) is 
a necessary but not a sufficient condition for an agent's being 
rational. On the formal conception, Sue's (|)-ing constitutes a 
rational act if and only if her (|)-ing Is consistent with her strongest 
normative belief regardless o f what the content (o r degree o f 
warrant) o f that normative belief is. This is the feature of the 
formal conception of rationality that those who favour a substantive 
conception object to. To illustrate the difference between the two 
conceptions, consider a version of a famous example from Hume: 
The world is about to be blown up and Anne can prevent this from 
happening (and Anne knows that she can do this). Anne, however, 
believes she has most reason to scratch her little finger and that 
she has only a very weak reason to prevent the world from being 
blow up. On the basis of these beliefs, she stands there watching 
the world being destroyed while scratching her little finger. Is Anne 
acting rationally?
According to the formal conception of rationality Anne is 
acting rationally; her actions are consistent with her strongest 
normative beliefs (and, we may suppose, her actions are properly 
connected with those beliefs). I f  we should criticise Anne for 
anything, on the formal conception of rationality, the appropriate 
criticism is that she is (seriously!) substantively mistaken about
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what she ought to be doing: how could it possibly be true that she 
has more reason to allow the destruction of the world than she has 
reason to refrain from scratching her finger?
According to the substantive conception, however, anyone 
who is as grossly substantively mistaken as Anne cannot avoid a 
charge of irrationality by simply pointing out that her action is 
consistent with her strongest normative judgement. Anyone in 
their right mind should recognise that there is more reason to 
prevent the destruction of the world than there is to scratch one's 
little finger. A failure to see this is plainly irrational. So even if 
Anne is acting consistently with her strongest normative judgement, 
the content of her judgement is so incredible that it warrants a 
charge of irrationality: believing that one has more reason to 
scratch one's little finger than to prevent the planet from being 
destroyed is simply crazy.
So what exactly is the substantive conception of rationality? 
This is a very hard question to answer since there is considerable 
disagreement (even among those who reject the formal conception 
of rationality) about what further conditions, beyond consistency, 
have to be satisfied in order for an agent to act rationally. For our 
purposes, and for reasons which will become clear presently, we 
need not answer this question. We can say that on a weak version 
of the substantive account, an agent's strongest normative 
judgement has to be warranted to some degree in order for her
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action to be rational. On a stronger version of the theory, the 
agent's strongest normative judgement has to be true (and, 
plausibly, warranted) in order for her action to be rational.
Of the three accounts of rationality, or of rational action, I 
have jus t (briefly) discussed, the weak version of the substantive 
conception of rationality seems the most plausible to me. I t  simply 
sounds implausible that in order to act rationally, our strongest 
normative judgement has to be true. I f  I have a high degree of 
warrant for my belief that I ought to ^ and I (j) as a result of this, 
surely this is sufficient to make my action rational! To insist that I 
cannot act rationally unless my strongest normative judgement is 
true is simply too demanding; this is not what we mean by 
'ra tionality ' or 'rational action' in everyday talk. On the other hand, 
merely acting consistently with one's strongest normative belief 
does not appear to be sufficient for rational action either. However, 
I th ink the strong version of the substantive conception of 
rationality gives us exactly the sense o f'ra tiona l' philosophers have 
had in mind when they have been trying to secure a rational 
foundation for morality.
I f  we mean by 'rational' something similar to that denoted by 
the formal conception of rationality, we should not expect there to 
be a rational foundation for morality in the requisite sense. I f  
'rational' means, roughly, 'acting consistently with one's strongest 
normative judgement', then the connection between morality and
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its demands and rational agents will be precarious at best. Morality' 
would have a rational foundation only for those whose normative 
judgements (and subsequent intentions and actions) are consistent 
with the demands of morality. However, since this is so, the 
question of whether or not morality has a rational foundation is 
largely terminological. I f  rationality is nothing over and above 
consistency between one's normative judgements and one's actions, 
morality's supposedly inescapable and overriding normative force 
will not be threatened by the fact that it would be Irrational for 
some people to act contrary to the demands of morality. I f  being 
rational is essentially being consistent, the word 'rational' is not a 
particularly weighty normative term.
Things look rather different if we think that the sense of 
'rational' in 'a rational foundation of morality' is more like the sense 
given by the substantive conception of rationality. Recall that 
according to this conception, it is not sufficient for acting rationally 
that one acts consistently with one's strongest normative belief.
To act rationally in the weak sense of this conception, the agent's 
normative beliefs must have at least some degree of warrant. On 
an even stronger conception of rationality the agent has to have 
true strongest normative beliefs. Someone who acts consistently, 
or in accordance with, his strongest normative belief and who has 
true beliefs can be said to be acting fu liy (practicaiiy) rationaiiy.^^
An agent who satisfies these criteria can be said to be acting in full.
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or complete, accordance with the demands o f practical reason; this 
person is fully practically justified in doing the thing in question. To 
say that morality has a rational foundation, on this way of 
understanding things, then, is to say that it is always irrational in 
the strong substantive sense to fail to act in accordance with the 
demands of morality.
But if this is so, the interesting question becomes 'What 
makes a strongest normative belief true?'. This question, in turn, is 
equivalent to asking 'in virtue of what, if anything, is it true that an 
agent should (ought, has decisive reason to, has most reason to, 
etc.) do X?' I f  I am right about this, questions of consistency (and 
of rationality in the formal sense) simply aren't that important with 
respect to answering 'Why should I be moral?'. I f  we can show that 
it is true that we ought to act morally, then any agent who acts 
contrary to the demands of morality is either acting inconsistently 
with his strongest normative judgement (and thus irrationally on 
any plausible conception of rationality) or his strongest normative 
judgement is false. To show that morality has a rational foundation 
in the requisite sense, then, it will be sufficient to show that it is 
true that we ought to, or have most reason to, or have decisive 
reason to (etc.) act morally -  i.e. we must show that practical 
reason demands that we act morally.
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1.7 Practical reason versus practical reasons?
What is the connection between practical reason and practical 
reasons? Although the concept of a (practical) reason is important 
to ethics and, more broadly, to the theory of normativity. It is not 
clear whether it is as important as some people m ight think. 
Although the metaphysics, semantics, and epistemology of practical 
reasons (and reasons more generally) are worthwhile topics to 
study in their own right, the central question of ethics must surely 
be 'What ought I do?' (a question which of course has a direct 
bearing on the question we are interested in). I think most people 
who write about ethics and who think about these issues tend to 
agree that this is indeed the central question in ethics. But if this is 
so, why is it then so fashionable to talk about reasons if the central 
question of ethics is concerned with how we ought to act? After all, 
the normative concept o f 'a  reason' is not equivalent to the 
normative concept 'ought' (since it could be the case that we ought 
to do something and have a reason for doing something else). I 
think the explanation is that many philosophers believe that the 
importance of reasons emerges once we become convinced that the 
concept of a reason, or its plural version, reasons, provide the 
fundamental building blocks of a sound theory of practical reason.
In one sense of 'practical reason' this is true enough. In so 
far as practical reason (or theories thereof) is concerned with what 
there is a reason to do, it would be very odd indeed if the concept
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of a reason played little, or no role at all. But why should we think 
that this is what a sound theory of practical reason must consist in? 
We could certainly hold that answers to questions like 'How ought I 
live my life?' and 'What ought I do?' can only be found in practical 
reason, w ithout thereby committing ourselves to thinking that these 
answers must be found in a correct theory of practical reasons!
This would be the case only if a correct theory of practical reason 
simply is a correct theory of practical reasons. But it is far from 
obvious that this is the case.
To be sure, there might be a connection between the two; 
indeed it might even be the case that they are identical. But 
although it is possible that a sound theory of practical reason could 
simply be, or simply consist in, a sound theory of practical reasons, 
this must be established through argument. After all 'reason' does 
not mean the same as 'a reason'. Whether or not the two are 
necessarily connected in some way seems to me to be a substantive 
issue. To show that this is a substantive issue rather than a 
conceptual one, let me say something about the meanings of 
'reason' and 'a reason' (I shall say more about these concepts in 
chapter four). I think it is obvious that the two notions have 
different meanings and that this is signalled in part by the fact that 
the former includes the indefinite article 'a ' whereas the latter does 
not.
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I t  seems clear that there Is a sense of ’practical reason' in 
which the significance o f'a  reason' (or of the plural 'reasons') is, at 
least on the face of it, not nearly as prominent as it would be In a 
theory of practical reasons. I have in mind here a sense of 
'practical reason' in which 'reason' should be read with a capital 'R' 
so to speak. In this sense of the word. Reason is a 'facu lty ' (to use 
a rather old fashioned term) akin to, say, the faculty of sight 
(although there are of course obvious differences between the two). 
I t  is, as some philosophers have put it, the faculty of rational 
intuition.
Although it is very hard to come up with a precise definition of 
this sense of'Reason', one way of characterising Reason is to view 
it as that which imposes constraints on our beliefs, actions, and 
feelings. In this respect. Reason can be compared to the law 
(although the law cannot meaningfully be called a faculty). Just like 
we are used to being told that the law demands that we do this or 
that, so too does Reason demand that we believe, act, or feel in 
such and such a way. Although there are similarities between the 
demands of the law and the demands of Reason, there are 
important differences as well; and these differences are instructive 
in the way of providing us with a characterisation of what Reason is. 
Here I shall only mention one such difference.
When we are aware of the fact that the law demands that we 
(j)on pain of penalty of imprisonment or monetary fines, it is still
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conceptually possible that we should be justified in refusing to (j) 
(because of various moral and prudential considerations perhaps). 
However, if we are aware that Reason demands that we (j> it is not 
conceptually possible that we should be justified in refusing to 
comply with this demand. The idea is that legal demands are not 
necessarily justifiable in the sense that demands issued by Reason 
clearly are; after all, there are such things as unjust laws.
To better understand what I am talking about here, let me 
provide some (purported) examples of this constraint-imposing 
sense of 'Reason'. Perhaps the most famous is Kant's categorical 
imperative. Because it is so easy to overlook the constraint 
imposing sense of reason this has led some people to 
misunderstand what Kant is saying. In an unpublished paper about 
Kant's ethics Derek Parfit says: 'Since [the categorical imperative] 
is a command, it is not normative and could not be either true or 
false. But Kant ignores the difference between commands and 
normative statements, claiming that all commands are expressed 
with an "ought" and says that some act would be good.'®® I think 
this comment shows that Parfit has misunderstood Kant. Although 
the categorical imperative is indeed an imperative, it's not jus t any 
imperative - it is demanded by Reason - or so Kant claims.
Although Parfit Is correct in saying that imperatives simpliciter 
cannot be true or false (and hence not normative), Kant, to my 
knowledge anyway, never makes that the categorical imperative is
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an imperative simpliciter. Compare 'The Colonel demands "stand to 
attention!"' and 'Reason demands "do X!"'. Both sentences are 
capable of being true or false. Although there is nothing normative 
(or at least nothing obviously normative) about the firs t sentence, 
the second sentence, if true, is as normatively loaded as you can 
get. A fuller version of what Kant is saying will read as follows: 
Reason demands that you act only on maxims which you can at the 
same time will to be universal law. How much more normativity 
can we ask for? I f  pure reason (whatever that turns out to be) 
demands that we (j), then (j)-ing is 'as normative' as anything we 
could come up with.
Another example of this sense of Reason is John Broome's 
'normative requirement'.®® Roughly, it says that we ought to be 
such that we Intend to do that which we believe to be a necessary 
means to the end we intend. Again, intending the means we 
believe to be necessary to our ends in this way is something Reason 
demands that we do; it is a constraint on our actions (or in this 
case, intentions) imposed by Reason.
My final example comes from John Skorupski. He says:
When I judge that p , I enter a commitment that inquirers 
who scrutinised the relevant evidence and argument 
available to them would agree that p unless I could fault 
their rationality or their evidence.®^
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What forces this commitment? Well, Reason does! I t  would be 
unreasonable (or, contrary to Reason) for an agent to judge that p 
while falling to fault either the rationality or the evidence of those 
who hold not-p.
'Practical Reason' thus construed consists of a set of demands 
or constraints that Reason imposes on actions. A theory of practical 
reason, in this sense, will correspondingly consist of some story 
about what those demands or constraints are, and it would be 
premature, at this point, to think that the notion of a reason will 
play a crucial role in this kind of theory. I think we should view 
Reason as being roughly that which Kant talks about in the 
Groundwork when he talks about 'Pure Reason' and 'Pure Practical 
Reason'. I t  is significant that although Kant obviously takes 
himself, at least in part, to be outlining a theory of practical reason, 
he does not, to my knowledge anyway, make any references 
whatsoever to the concept of a reason. Many philosophers of 
course believe that Kant's theory of practical reason is mistaken, 
but very few of these philosophers, I think, are prepared to say that 
the mistakes Kant made were conceptual mistakes.
Even though, according to this conception of practical reason, 
the notion of a reason is not obviously so important, there are other 
(more orthodox perhaps) conceptions of practical reason according 
to which the concept of a reason is central, crucial even. For
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Joseph Raz 'The normativity of all that Is normative consists in the 
way it Is, or provides, or is otherwise related to reasons/®®
Similarly, Skorupski claims that
The concept of a reason seems fundamental to all thought.
I t  is pervasive - actions, beliefs, and feelings (i.e. 
sentiments) all fall within its range; it is prim itive - all 
other normative concepts are reducible to it and no other 
normative concept has that status; and it is constitutive - a 
being thinks if and only if it is sensitive to reasons.®®
And Scanlon says:
I will take the idea of a reason as primitive. Any attempt 
to explain what it is to be a reason for something seems to 
me to lead back to the same idea: a consideration that 
counts in favour of it. "Counts in favor how?" one might 
ask. "By providing a reason for it" seems to be the only 
answer.®®
According to this conception of practical reason (or practical 
normativity), since the concept of a reason is the most fundamental 
or even primitive concept, what we ought to do m ust be determined 
in some way or other by what we have most reason to do or what
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we have sufficient reason to do. And what we have most reason to 
do, in turn, must somehow be determined by (a function of?) 
'single' reasons.
1.8 Reasons
In the theory of practical reason it is commonplace to distinguish 
between at least two kinds of reasons that are connected to (or 
concerned with) Intentional action: explanatory reasons and 
normative reasons. I shall have more to say about this distinction 
in chapter two. As the name suggests, an explanatory reason is 
what we usually cite (or give) in order to explain something. Taken 
at face value this sort of reason is not something mysterious or 
problematic. The most fam iliar example of an explanatory reason 
will be that of a cause. The explanation of the fact that the grass is 
wet is that it rained five minutes ago; the rain caused the grass to 
get wet. The explanation of the fact that the Titanic sank is that it 
hit an iceberg; the Titanic's hitting the iceberg caused it to sink. In 
a similar way the explanation of the fact that a certain action took 
place will be provided by the cause of that action: The reason Bob 
went to the match is that he believed he would enjoy it. I t  was for 
this reason Bob went to the match; this is what, in the relevant 
sense, caused him to go.
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This picture is rejected by Humeans who think that beliefs 
are, in themselves, never capable of motivating (and thus 
explaining the action of) an agent. Humeans claim that this belief 
must be complemented by some non-cognitive attitude (such as a 
desire) in order to produce a motivational state. Here the relevant 
desire would be the desire to do what one finds enjoyable. I will 
return to these Humean considerations in chapter three. Although a 
complete causal account of Bob's going the match will undoubtedly 
have to include facts about Bob's physiology and, perhaps, his 
surroundings, among other things, I don't think that is relevant to 
the present discussion. An explanatory reason, we might say, is 
that consideration in light of which an agent did what he did.
There are however some ambiguities we need to be aware of 
here. Sometimes it is tempting to ask of someone whose behaviour 
we find peculiar why he did what he did. I f  someone who is, 
unbeknownst to us, suffering from, say, Tourette's Syndrome 
suddenly starts yelling obscenities we might wonder why on earth 
he is doing that. What, we might ask, made him act in tha t way? 
This question is, given our ignorance of this person's affliction, a 
reasonable one. However, if we learn that this person is suffering 
from Tourette's Syndrome we should not expect to receive an 
explanation of his action. There is no action to be explained. Once 
we realise that the obscenities we jus t heard were not the product 
of a conscious decision to yell them out, we should conclude that in
75
this case the yelling of obscenities was not an action. This case is in 
principle no different from a person suffering from hiccups.
Although there are explanations to be given in both cases, neither 
of them will be explanations of actions. With the risk of begging 
serious questions in philosophy of action and mind, I th ink we 
should refer to both these cases as 'mere happenings' - not actions. 
On this (insufficiently argued for) account, a necessary condition of 
an event's being an action is that the event was consciously 
originated, that it was, in some sense or other, under the agent's 
control (whatever that turns out to mean).
I think the idea Is relatively clear: hiccups, sleepwalking, 
yawning etc. are not actions (although, again, there is of course 
some explanation of why these things happen). Although there are 
clear examples of actions - as well as clear examples of mere 
happenings - it is, I believe, consistent with the position jus t 
sketched that the concept of an action is in itself vague. Consider 
the case of intoxication. A person who drinks one pint of lager is 
(usually) quite capable of performing actions. This person, when he 
leaves his seat at the table to order the next round at the bar, is 
certainly performing an action. Compare his doing so with the 
same person several hours later when he has consumed twelve 
pints. He is now so intoxicated that he literally has no control over 
his actions. Although his body is capable of moving (just!) he is no 
longer performing an action. At some point between the first and
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the twelfth pint, this person stopped performing actions; at some 
point his bodily movements (including his slurred speech perhaps) 
became mere happenings. I do not intend to say anything about 
what a possible solution to this problem might be. Here I simply 
want to point out that the concept of an action (and/or agency) 
might be, and probably is, a vague concept: there may not be a 
definite moment after which a person's actions become mere 
happenings.
We should also take notice of another feature of explanatory 
reasons (or causes). The following passage is from Jonathan 
Dancy:
What explains why so many people buy expensive perfume 
at Christmas is the barrage of advertising on the television. 
What explains why he didn't come to the party is tha t he is 
shy. In none of these cases are we specifying 
considerations in light of which these things were done.
But in all of them we are explaining why they were done.
I t  seems, therefore, as if there is a wide range of things we 
think of as capable of giving answers to the question 'Why 
did he do that?' These answers range from specifying the 
things in the light of which the agent chose to do what he 
did [...] to something that is not a reason at all, really, but 
rather a cause....
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Unfortunately, as Dancy points out, calling those reasons that are 
contrasted with normative ones 'explanatory' can cause some 
unnecessary confusion. By contrasting normative reasons with 
explanatory reasons, the reasons thus labelled might seem to be, in 
some sense or other, mutually exclusive. This is not so however. 
First of all, there is a sense in which some, or perhaps all, 
normative reasons are explanatory. In this sense, when normative 
reasons are explanatory reasons they need not be explaining why 
an agent did what he did; they can be explanatory in another way. 
Normative reasons, can explain why, say, an act has this or that 
much 'going for it'.®^ The reason why there is something to be said 
for a particular act is that there is a normative reason to do it.
Sometimes (more often than not one would hope) agents act 
for good reason. Suppose an agent has a very strong normative 
reason to c|). I f  the agent acts because he recognises this fact, the 
explanatory reason of why he did what he did will simply be his 
recognition of this normative reason he had.^^ This is not to say 
that normative and explanatory reasons cannot come apart. 
Although we can provide an explanatory reason for Bob's going to 
the match by citing his belief that he would enjoy it, it m ight be the 
case that Bob has no normative reason to go the match; perhaps 
the match (unbeknownst to Bob) has been cancelled. I f  the match 
is cancelled, then, all things being equal, there is no normative 
reason for Bob to go to the match. I t  may be tempting to think that
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although Bob has a false belief about the match not being cancelled, 
his belief that it would be enjoyable to go to match nonetheless 
gives him some reason to, say, start walking toward the football 
ground. This is not so however. I f  we think that Bob's false belief 
about what he has a reason to do gives him a reason to actually do 
this thing, Bob's false belief would be 'bootstrapping' a reason into 
existence from nowhere. I shall return to, and explain the 
significance of, this objection later.
The normative concept of a reason (or reasons) is not specific 
to the practical sphere (i.e. to action). I t  also applies in the 
epistemic and emotive spheres as well. Thus we can have (good) 
normative reason(s) to believe that such and such is the case; we 
can also have (good) normative reason(s) to feel a certain way. In 
all three cases a certain 'reasons relation' holds between facts, 
agents, and actions or beliefs or feelings. Another very important 
feature of normative reasons is that they can be weighed against 
each other; and, as we shall see, this weighing dimension of 
reasons is sometimes said to be essential to them. In fact, some 
authors claim that this is in part how they should be defined. 
Although an agent can have a (normative) reason to (j>, he or she 
could have more (normative) reason not to (Some authors make 
the further claim that if you have most reason to ^ then you ought 
to (j). I will return to this and related Issues later.)
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We should also note that 'more reason' here is a bit - 
ambiguous. There are, as I see it, two possibilities here. Suppose, 
all things being equal, there are two considerations (facts) such that 
one of them gives S a reason to (j) while the other gives S a reason 
not to (j). Since we have only two reasons here, if one outweighs 
the other that must be because one is stronger ('weightier') than 
the other. On the other hand, suppose, all other things being 
equal, there are three considerations such that one of them gives S 
a reason to (j> while the other two give S reason not to (j). Suppose 
further that neither of the reasons S has not to (j> is by itself capable 
of outweighing S's reason to.(|). I f  the two reasons not to ^ together 
are capable of outweighing the reason to (j), then it is their combined 
weight that does the outweighing. So 'more reason' can be 
understood in at least two ways. In a situation where one has more 
reason to <j) than one has not to (|), the weight of the reason or 
reasons for (|)-ing must always be greater than the weight of the 
reasons for doing the alternative. But this greater weight can be 
constituted either by one 'big' ('weighty') reason, or it can be made 
up of an aggregate of a number of 'smaller' (less weighty) reasons.
Of course it can also be the case that for a proposed course of 
action, it is not the case that there is more reason to (j> than to not-(j) 
while at the same time it is not the case that there is more reason 
not to (j)than there is reason to (j). In a case like this the reason(s) 
to - and not to- perform the actions are equally balanced; it is not
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the case that one has more reason to perform either act. Again, 
this can happen in a number of ways. For example, the reason to (j) 
has a certain weight, w say, and the reason not to (j) also has weight 
w. Or, the reason to (j> has weight W3 and the two reasons not to * 
have weights wz and w, respectively, then the combined weight of 
the reasons not to (}> is W3  (wz + w = W3 ) .
I also need to say something about the relation between 
'more reason' and 'most reason'. In a situation where one has only 
two (mutually exclusive) actions available, if one has more reason 
to pursue one option over the other, then one has most reason to 
pursue that option. Having more reason to pursue a certain option 
rather than another does not by itself imply that one has most 
reason to pursue that option. Perhaps S has most reason to pursue 
some third option. This could not, however, be the case in a 
situation where S has only two options available. In this case, 
having more reason to pursue one option rather than another 
implies that one has most reason to pursue that option.
According to some authors, whether or not an agent has more 
reason, as opposed to most reason, to pursue a particular course of 
action sometimes simply depends on how we specify the options. 
Suppose one specification of an agent's options is that he has three 
(and only three) actions ((j), %, ip) available to him, and these actions 
are all mutually exclusive. According to these authors, another way 
of describing the situation would be to say that he has two options
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available: X-ing and not X-ing (where X-ing jus t is not %4ng and not 
ip-ing). But if we describe the situation as consisting of only two 
options then it does follow that if S has more reason to X than he 
has not to X then he has most reason to X. If, on the other hand, 
we describe the situation as consisting of three options, then from 
the fact that S has more reason to ({) than he has to ip, we cannot 
infer that he has most reason to c|) - perhaps he has most reason to 
% '
I f  there is some controversy surrounding the question of how 
to weigh reasons properly (a controversy I shall return to in chapter 
four), the question 'when can it tru ly be said of an agent that he 
has reason to (|)?' is even more contentious. There are, roughly, two 
different lines of thought on this matter: reasons are either 
'internal' or 'external' (two terms to be explained presently). Since 
any adequate discussion about whether reasons are 'internal' or 
'external' must at some stage include a discussion of Bernard 
Williams' famous (notorious, some would say) article 'Internal and 
External Reasons'^^, this will be topic of the next chapter.
1.9 Summary and conclusion
'Why should I be moral?' is one of the oldest questions in moral 
philosophy, and contrary to the opinions of some philosophers, it is 
also a legitimate question. The kind of scepticism about morality
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most commonly thought to be expressed by the fam iliar 'Why 
should I be moral?' should be seen as a scepticism about the 
normative status of moral considerations: are moral considerations 
really categorical and overriding? The task of providing an 
affirmative answer to these questions has traditionally been 
interpreted as consisting in, or involving, a demonstration that 
morality has a rational foundation. I have tried to show that in one 
sense o f'ra tiona l' this is correct. However, in the sense o f'ra tiona l' 
in which this is correct, the project of finding such a foundation for 
morality consists in nothing more(!) than a showing that moral 
considerations are genuinely categorical and overriding. The fact 
that it would, on some theories of rationality, be irrational for 
certain agents to act in accordance with moral demands presents no 
threat to the idea that moral considerations are categorical and 
overriding. I f  It can be shown that the conditional ' I f  (|)-ing is wrong, 
then there is sufficient reason to not to cj)' really is true for all 
agents, then why should it matter that on some theories of 
rationality it would be irrational for some agents to refrain from (j)- 
ing? The task at hand, therefore, is to show that the conditional Is 
indeed true. This in turn requires an investigation of when it can 
tru ly be said of an agent that he or she has a reason to, or ought 
to, act in a particular way. This is of course the subject matter of 
the theory of practical reason; it is also the subject m atter of the 
rest of this dissertation.
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^Kant in Guyer (ed.), p . l.
^Quoted by Geoffrey Sayre-McCord in Vallentyne (ed.), p. 105. 
^Darwall (1990), p. 258.
^See Mackie, Ch. 1.
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^See Gauthier.
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^°Smith, pp. 39-41.
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four.
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^^Van Cleve, p. 247.
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famously argued in The Possibility o f Altruism  that all reasons for 
action must, in the end, be viewed as agent-neutral (and thus 
falling into Prichard's second category). Applying Nagel's thought to 
the case before us, we could argue that the supposedly agent- 
relative reason X has for pursuing his happiness cannot be
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X's happiness. In other words, we could claim that the increase in 
X's happiness simply is the good which would be 'realized either in 
or by the action'. ( I t  should be pointed out that Nagel is now more 
pessimistic about the possibility of a reduction of agent-relative 
reasons into agent-neutral ones.)
% p .  at
^^Parfit (1997), p. 111.
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Sen (2000).
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are actually mental actions.
^^Op. at., pp. 4-5.
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"^^Ibid., p. 5.
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An action done from duty has its moral worth not in the purpose to 
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object of the action, but solely on the principle of volition in
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desire, the action has been performed. {Groundwork, p. 399-400) 
Crucially, however, this does not mean that only actions that have 
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that the action be caused in the right way is redundant since 'the 
event' simply wouldn't be an action unless it was caused in the right 
way.
^^See Broome (2001b).
^^Scanlon (1998), p. 25.
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^^Parfit (unpublished), p. 1.
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®^Dancy (2000), p. 6.
^^Ibid., p. 7.
®^This is perhaps not as straight forward as I have here presented 
it. A substantial part of Dancy's latest book (2000) addresses the 
following worry; Suppose an agent has strong normative reasons 
to X. Suppose further the agent recognises this fact and acts for 
this reason. What is the appropriate explanatory reason here?. Is it 
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agent believed (in this case correctly) that he had good reason to x? 
I f  we choose the former explanation, it will be difficult to explain 
how 'normatively unsuccessful' actions come about. What if there 
were no good reason for the agent to x? In this is so it cannot be 
the case that he did x because he recognised that he had good 
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good reason to x. On the other hand, if we choose the latter
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explanation (i.e. the one proceeding via the agent's beliefs), how 
can an agent be said to act for good reasons if the reason for which 
he acted was that he believed he had good reason to x? This 
dilemma Is in part forced upon us by Williams' very plausible claim 
that 'The difference between false and true beliefs on the agent's 
part cannot alter the form  of the explanation which will be 
appropriate to his action.' (Williams (1981), p. 102). See Dancy 
(2000), especially Chs 4-8.
"^^ See Broome (forthcoming).
^^Reprinted in Williams (1981).
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CHAPTER TW O: 
IN TER N A L REASONS
2.1 Introduction
This chapter is concerned with Bernard Williams' discussion and 
defence of what he has called 'the internal conception' of reasons 
for action. In his 'Internal and External Reasons'^ Williams 
distinguishes two interpretations of the claim 'A has reason to cj)' 
and argues that all true reasons statements about an agent must 
be given an internal interpretation. In a later article Williams says:
The central idea is that if B can say tru ly of A that A has 
reason to ((), then...there must be a sound deliberative 
route to (j)-ing which starts from A's existing motivations.^
Internalism, then, is the doctrine that all reasons for action are 
grounded In agents' motivations. Externalism, on the other hand, 
denies that reasons must be connected to one's motivations in this 
way. Since this chapter is about internalism and not externalism 
(or at least not directly about externalism) I will have little to say 
about externalism here. For present purposes we can think of 
externalism as, simply, the denial of internalism.
With the risk of overlooking other, possible versions of 
internalism, I am simply going to assume that internalism about
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reasons simply is Williams' internalism (I shall distinguish this kind 
of internalism from other kinds of internalisms shortly). As far as I 
know, it was Williams who first used the terms 'in terna l' and 
'external' in the theory of reasons for action. Williams is still the 
leading internalist and anyone who is interested in defending or 
rejecting internalism must do so by confronting the issues first 
raised by Williams.
To introduce the issues we shall be considering in this 
chapter, let me begin by briefly addressing an issue raised by John 
McDowell: if all reasons for action are internal in Williams' sense, 
then this will bear
on a fam iliar problem that arises about ethical reasons in 
particular, in view of the evident possibility of being left 
cold by them. The implication of Williams' scepticism is 
that ethical reasons are reasons only for those for whom 
they are internal reasons: only for those who have 
motivations to which ethical considerations speak, or can 
be made to speak.^
Although I agree with McDowell, I will have very little to say about 
morality (or moral reasons) in this (and the next) chapter. Here it 
will suffice to acknowledge that a vindication of the apparently 
categorical nature of moral reasons (which, of course is our ultimate
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aim) does seem to require the rejection of Williams' internalism."^
On Williams' conception of reasons for action, sufficiently ruthless 
and sadistic amoralists would have no reason not to torture, maim, 
or kill others.^ This is nothing new, of course. So although the 
potential problem highlighted by McDowell constitutes the backdrop 
against which the current discussion takes shape, I shall not be 
discussing this matter any further in this chapter. Instead of talking 
about morality, I want to focus on matters more internal, so to 
speak, to internalism.
I f  one wants to argue against internalism, there are, as 
Jonathan Dancy has recently pointed out, at least four ways of 
doing so: a) by counter-example; b) by showing that internalism is 
internally inconsistent; c) by establishing that desires are based on 
reasons, not reasons on desires; d) by appeal to some view in the 
theory of motivating reasons (triangulation).^ In this (and the next) 
chapter I shall be employing a mixture of all four methods.
In general, the plausibility of any given theory is inversely 
proportionate to the number of counter-intuitive implications that 
theory has. I f  we accept Williams' account of internalism in the 
theory of reasons, we shall find that apart from the (perhaps?) 
counter-intuitive implications this theory has for morality (or moral 
reasons), there are several other areas in which the theory runs 
afoul of some of our strongly held intuitions. However, since my 
aim in this dissertation is to defend the idea that moral
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considerations are categorical and (normatively) overriding, it would 
be question begging to assume that Williams account of reasons is 
false because moral reasons are categorical and overriding. As a 
result I will try  to show instead that internalism is more ambiguous 
than people might previously have thought it to be, and that the 
ambiguity of internalism is not merely a superficial deficiency of the 
doctrine; on the contrary, the ambiguity of the various models of 
internalism that have so far entered the philosophical debate signals 
a deep problem which lies at the root of the internalist idea.
Given that internalists endorse the idea that explanatory and 
normative reasons are interrelated (as we shall see tha t Williams 
does), they will find it hard, if not impossible, to provide an account 
of reasons which on the one hand must not be grounded in 
counterfactual or Idealised versions of what agents are or would be 
motivated to do, and which, on the other hand, must not merely tell 
us what a particular agent is currently motivated to do. In 
conjunction with this discussion, several other problems will also be 
discussed. But before we can begin to examine and assess 
internalism, we need to distinguish the kind of internalism this 
chapter is concerned with from other philosophical doctrines that 
are also labelled internalist.
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2.2 D ifferent internalisms
The following taxonomy of internalist theories in ethics is borrowed 
almost in its entirety from Stephen D arw all/ To begin with, we 
should distinguish between two kinds of internalisms: judgement 
internalisms and existence internalisms. The former kinds of 
internalisms are put forward as theories concerning the nature of 
our normative thought and language while the latter forms of 
internalisms are views about the necessary (and possibly sufficient) 
conditions for the existence of normative reasons. The following 
three internalist theses are judgement internalisms:
(1) Morality/reasons judgem ent internalism
Necessarily, if S judges (or believes, or sincerely asserts) that 
S is morally obliged to (j), then S judges that S has a reason to
4) '
(2) Moral judgem ent/m otivation internaiism
Necessarily, if S judges (or believes, or sincerely asserts) that 
S is morally obliged to cj), then S is motivated (to some 
degree) to
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(3) Reasons judgem ent/m otivation internalism
Necessarily, if S judges (or believes, or sincerely asserts) that 
S has a reason to (|>, then S is motivated (to some degree) to
4>*
The following theses are existence internalisms:
(4) Morality/reasons existence internalism
Necessarily, if S is morally obliged to (j), then there is a reason 
for S to (}).
(5) Morality/motivation existence internalism
Necessarily, if S is morally obliged to (j), then S is motivated 
(to some degree) to cj).
(6) Reasons/motivation existence internalism
Necessarily, if p is a reason for S to (j), then S can have, and 
under suitable conditions would have, some motivation to cj) 
by virtue of a suitable awareness of p.®
I will not be discussing (1) and (2) at all, and I shall express some 
doubts about (3) in chapter three. (4) is of course closely related to 
the moral question that this dissertation seeks to address, and (5),
I think, can be dismissed out of hand. I t  makes no sense to say
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that we should be motivated by facts that we might not even be 
aware of. Wiliiams' internalism should be seen a qualified version 
of (6), and it is this kind of internalism that this chapter will be 
concerned with. I take it that from (4) and (6) we can derive 
something like
(7) Necessarily, if S's being morally obliged to (j) gives S a reason 
to (j), then S can have, and under suitable conditions would 
have, some motivation to (j) by virtue of a suitable awareness 
of his being morally obliged to cj).
However, on Williams' internalism, if S is aware that he is morally 
obliged to yet fails, even under suitable conditions (as Williams 
sees them), to be motivated to any degree by this recognition, then 
S has no reason to (|>. So Williams' internalism is incompatible with
(4), and this is the main reason why we need to investigate and, 
hopefully be able to, reject internalism.
2.3 W illiam s' Internalism
I should begin by pointing out that Williams has returned to 
internalism on at least three occasions since 'Internal and External 
Reasons'^, and on each of those occasions Williams offers us slightly 
different formulations of the internalist idea. Consequently,
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outlining and assessing Williams' internalism is made somewhat 
difficult given that there is no standard formulation of the theory's 
most general form. Despite differences in the formulations of 
internalism, one core idea remains constant:
Basically, and by definition, any model for the internal 
interpretation must display a relativity of the reason 
statement to the agent's subjective motivational s e t . . } ^
This introduces us to a key component of internalism: the agent's 
subjective motivational set (S). Williams is quite happy to term all 
elements in an agent's S 'desires', but he is careful to remind us 
that 'desire' should here be interpreted in a strictly philosophical 
way so as to encompass such elements as 'dispositions of 
evaluation, patterns of emotional reaction, personal loyalties, and 
various projects, as they may be abstractly called, embodying 
commitments of the a g e n t . S o  whatever an agent has reason to 
do, this reason must be anchored in, derived from, or somehow 
related to, one or more of the elements of that agent's subjective 
motivational set. However, Williams says, '[w ]e  should not...th ink 
of 5 as statically given. The process of deliberation can have all 
sorts of effects on S, and this is a fact which a theory of internal 
reasons should be very happy to accommodate.'^^ Thus we 
encounter another key component of (at least some versions of)
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internalism: the idea of a 'sound deliberative route'. Although this 
idea is somewhat Indeterminate, in 'Internal and External Reasons' 
Williams says that sound deliberation goes beyond mere means- 
ends reasoning. Sound deliberation can include
...[coming] to the conclusion that one has reason to cj) 
because c|)-ing would be the most convenient, economical, 
pleasant etc. way of satisfying some element in S, and this 
of course is controlled by other elements in S, if not 
necessarily in a very clear or determinate way. But there 
are much wider possibilities for deliberation, such as: 
thinking how the satisfaction of elements in S can be 
combined, e.g. by time-ordering; where there is some 
irresoluble conflict among the elements of S, considering 
which one attaches most weight to (which importantly, 
does not imply that there is some one commodity of which 
they provide varying amounts); or, again, finding 
constitutive solutions, such as deciding what would make 
for an entertaining evening, granted that one wants 
entertainment.^^
In 'Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame' Williams expands 
the list of possible activities involved in sound deliberation:
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...[deliberation] does not merely involve perceiving means 
to an end that has already been formulated. There are 
many other possibilities, such as finding a specific form for 
a project that has been adopted in unspecific terms.
Another possibility lies in the invention of alternatives.
One of the most important things deliberation does, rather 
than thinking of means to a fixed end, is to think of 
another line of conduct altogether, as when someone 
succeeds in breaking out of a dilemma. Yet another line of 
deliberative thought lies in the perception of unexpected 
similarities. Since there are many ways of deliberative 
thinking, it is not fully determinate in general, even for a 
given agent at a given time, what may count as 'a sound 
deliberative route'; and from this it follows that the 
question of what the agent has a reason to do is itself not 
fully determinate.^"^
Williams also builds into his conception of deliberation tha t every 
agent has a 'general interest in being factually and rationally 
correctly i n f o r m e d . T h u s  Williams' internalist can (rightly) deny 
that desires based on false beliefs give rise to reasons. Consider the 
case he presents us with:
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The agent believes that this stuff is gin, when it is in fact 
petrol. He wants a gin and tonic. Has he reason, or a 
reason, to mix this stuff with tonic and drink it? ...it is just 
very odd to say that he has a reason to drink this stuff, 
and natural to say that he has no reason to drink it, 
although he thinks he has.^®
For Williams, then, it is not only odd to say that this person has a 
reason to drink the stuff before him, it is false. And the reason why 
it is natural (and correct) to say that the agent has no reason to 
drink the stuff before him is that this desire is prompted by a false 
belief: the belief that the stuff before him is gin. However, and this 
will turn out be very important, if the agent does drink the stuff we 
could then correctly cite the reason why he did it. This brings out 
the explanatory dimension of reasons: the reason he drank the stuff 
was that he believed it to be gin and he wanted a gin and tonic. 
However, the sense in which it is natural to say that he has no 
reason to drink the stuff is the normative sense. And it is this sense 
of'reason ' Williams' paper is mainly about. Crucially, however, 
Williams claims that there is an important relation between these 
two dimensions:
I t  must be a mistake simply to separate explanatory and 
normative reasons. I f  it is true that A has a reason to ({),
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then it must be possible that he should (j> for that reason; 
and if he does act for that reason, then that reason will be 
the explanation of his acting.
Let us call this the 'interrelation thesis' or (IT) for short. In 
'Internalism and the Obscurity of Blame', Williams claims that the 
truth of (IT) provides one of the fundamental motivations behind 
the internalist a c c o u n t . T h i s  is a very important principle and we 
shall have good cause to return to it later. Let me end this 
summary of Williams' internalism by listing four statements that 
are, according to Williams, true of Internalism:
(i) An internal reason statement is falsified by the absence of some 
appropriate element from S.
(ii) A member of S, D, will not give A a reason,to (j> if either the 
existence of D is dependent on false belief, or A's belief in the 
relevance of (|)-ing to the satisfaction of D is false.
(iii) (a) A may falsely believe an internal reason statement about 
himself, and (we can add)
(b) A may not know some true internal reason statement about 
himself.
(iv) Internal reason statements can be discovered in deliberative 
reasoning.
This brings my summary of Williams' internalism to an end.
All that remains for me to do is to state, in its most general form.
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the theory itself. As I said earlier, since Williams has produced 
various versions of this general form over the years, one should 
perhaps be careful in stating the general form of internalism. 
However, given the information we have assembled throughout this 
summary, I believe the version of internalism that best captures 
these elements is the one Williams puts forward in 'Internalism  and 
the Obscurity of Blame'. Internalism about (practical) reasons for 
action says:
(IR) A has reason to (j) if and only if A could reach the
conclusion to (|) by a sound deliberative route from the 
motivations A already has.^°
However, before we can proceed to critically investigate whether 
this account of reasons is plausible, there is an important ambiguity 
in (IR) that we need to attend to first.
2.4 Disambiguating In ternaiism
We should begin by noting that although (IR) provides us with what 
Williams takes to be the necessary and sufficient conditions for its 
being true that someone has a reason to do something, Williams 
sometimes writes as if thinks that (IR) reveals more than this. At 
one point he asks 'What are we saying when we say someone has a
100
reason to do something?'^^ Similarly, he says "A  has reason to (^ ' 
means more than 'A is presently disposed to and 'I  th ink the 
sense of a statement of the form 'A has reason to cj)' is given by the 
internalist m o d e l . T h e s e  quotations strongly suggest that 
Williams is, perhaps Implicitly, trying to explain the meaning of 
reasons statements.
I f  we take (IR) to be (at least a partial) analysis of the 
meaning o f ' A has reason to (j)', the analysis is hampered by the fact 
that the analysans is grammatically flawed. Since '(()' stands for 
some verb of action, the wording of the analysans does not sit well 
with our ordinary use of English. In English the verb 'conclude' 
always takes on a noun clause and not an Infinitive clause as in 
Williams' sentence. Thus we say 'he could conclude t h a t ...' So 
why is this important? Well, since English grammar does not permit 
this kind of formulation, it is hard to understand exactly what 
Williams' formula is supposed to mean. And this is of course an 
especially unwelcome result if (IR) is (in part) suppose to reveal the 
meaning of 'A has reason to No problem, we m ight think, let's 
jus t substitute an unproblematic phrase for the problematic 'reach 
the conclusion to'. Here, however, problems arise. What do we put 
in its place? Here are a few suggestions:
(i) 'conclude that A has reason to '
I f  this is what the phrase 'reach the conclusion to ' meant, (IR), 
although not perhaps implausible with regards to the necessary and
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sufficient conditions for someone's having a reason, would be 
useless from the point of meaning analysis. The analysans cannot 
make use of a term appearing in the analysandum. This should be 
fairly obvious; we cannot use the idea of a reason to explicate the 
idea of a reason. Nor can we replace the phrase with
(ii) 'conclude that A ought to (should)'
Williams actually suggests this reading at one p o i n t . I f  this is 
what (IR) means, (IR) is almost certainly false. I t  would be too 
restrictive. A could very well have a reason to do something 
without it being the case that A could conclude that he ought to do 
that thing. In one sense o f'cou ld ' it is arguably true that for any 
reason A has, that reason could have been his strongest reason, 
and that, consequently, A could conclude that he ought to act on 
that reason. But this would be an odd condition to impose on an 
agent's having a reason. Why should it be a necessary condition for 
the obtaining of a reason that that reason could be stronger than it 
is? Here is yet another suggestion:
(iii) 'decide to'.
Although this suggestion might initially seem plausible, it should be 
rejected on the same grounds as (ii). A cannot (rationally) decide 
to go for a walk and stay at home at the same time. The problem 
with (ii) and (iii) is that they cannot adequately account for the 
existence of reasons that pull in different directions so to speak 
(except of course in that limited sense o f'cou ld ' I mentioned
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earlier). But this, of course, is something an adequate theory of 
reasons must be able to do. Furthermore, anyone who accepts (ii) 
or (iii) will be unable to account for, or make sense, of'outweighed ' 
or 'defeated' reasons. I will have more to say about these kinds of 
reasons and internalism's treatment of them in subsequent 
sections. The final, and, I believe, most plausible suggestion is
(iv) 'be motivated to '
I suspect that this is essentially what Williams takes IR to mean; 
although, as we shall see, IR can be interpreted in a way that does 
not make any reference to what the agent would actually be 
motivated to do. The current proposal, though, runs as follows:
A has reason to (j) if and only if A could be motivated to (j) by a 
sound deliberative route from the motivations A already has.
Unfortunately, this formulation is not entirely satisfactory either. 
Sound deliberative routes do not, in and of themselves, motivate; 
nor do they lead agents to become motivated to, say, (j). However, 
sound deliberation might. Obviously, what the internalist needs to 
capture here is the idea that motivation can result from engaging in 
sound deliberative reasoning. However, it is not clear whether A, 
himself, has to engage, or be able to engage in this type of 
reasoning in order for him to have the reason(s) in question. I t  
might be enough for it to be true of A that he has reason to (j> that a
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sound deliberator (other than himself) who has full knowledge of A's 
S informs him that 'there is something to be said for (|)-ing' given his 
S. Suppose for instance that A has a motive that would be served 
by his giving the correct answer to a multiple choice question about 
a difficult mathematical problem. Suppose the right answer is 'c ' 
but A is not able to figure this out for himself - perhaps because he 
is very bad at maths. His friend, who is a good mathematician (and 
who recognises that 'c ' is the correct answer) and who has 
knowledge of (at least some of) the elements of A's S, could 
nonetheless correctly say of A that he has a reason to pick 'c'. As 
Williams puts it, 'What we can correctly ascribe to him in a third- 
personal internal reason statement is also what he can ascribe to 
himself as a result of deliberation...'.^^ Keeping this 'third-person 
proviso' in mind, my final suggestion for the best formulation of 
internalism (at this stage) is:
(IR *) A has reason to <j) if and only If A could become
motivated (to some degree) to (j) as the result of having 
engaged in sound deliberation on, and from, the 
motivations he already has.
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2.5 Two Further Distinctions
The first thing we should note about (IR *) Is that It too is 
ambiguous. What does it mean to say of someone that he or she 
could be motivated to ())? As far as I can see, there are two ways of 
interpreting this claim. On the one hand it can be read as a 
psychological claim about what A would, as a matter of fact, be 
motivated to do if he deliberated correctly. I think this 
interpretation is the most natural one. According to this 
interpretation, there are two individually necessary and jo in tly  
sufficient conditions for its being true that A has a reason to (j), 
namely:
1) A has some motive in his S which would served by his c|)-ing. 
and
2) I f  A were to become aware of (1) he would be motivated to cj).
I t  is important to keep in mind that A could well be motivated to 
without having acquired that motivation through deliberation. A's 
motivation to (j) could simply be a sui generis (so to speak) element 
in his S - a 'basic' desire. I shall call this view actuallsm.
(A) A has reason to (j) if and only if A would be motivated to 
(|) after having deliberated soundly on, and from, the 
motivations A already has.
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According to the other Interpretation, what we need to 
determine is whether A could be motivated to (j) after having 
deliberated soundly from his S; whether or not A will In fact be 
motivated to (j) is irrelevant to its being true that A has a reason to 
(j). According to this interpretation, the possibility of A's being 
motivated to (j) is, irrespectively of what he would actually be 
motivated to do, guaranteed by the existence of some motive in his 
S which is such that it would be satisfied or promoted by his (|)-ing. 
On this interpretation, it will be necessary and sufficient for A's 
having a reason to ^ th a t he has some motive that would be 
satisfied by his < -^\ng. Let us call this view posslblllsm.
(P) A has reason to ^ if and only if A has some motive which
will be served by his (j)-ing..
Both actualism and possibilism thus hold that (1) is a necessary 
condition for A's having a reason to <j). Possibilism makes the 
further claim that (1) is sufficient as well. Actualism denies this.
So which approach does Williams favour? Is he an actualist 
or a possibilist? Answering this question would require a level of 
exegetical exposition which would take us too far afield for present 
purposes. Since it is not crucial for the rest of my argument, I shall 
not try  to establish whether Williams is an actualist or a possibilist -
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although, I suspect that he would be more inclined to endorse 
actualism. Let us look at possibilism first.
2.6 Possibilism and motives
The possibilist wants to say that although (IR *) is true, it is 
potentially misleading. What the modal locution 'could be 
motivated to ' in the right-hand side of the biconditional really 
means is simply ^there Is some motive in A's S that would be served 
by his (|)-ing - full stop'l^® However, an agent can have a motive 
that either consists in, or which would be served by, his (|)-ing 
without being motivated to (|). (And, we might add, an agent can be 
motivated to (j) w ithout its being the case that (|)-ing serves some 
motive of his. Just like in Williams' example of the would-be petrol 
drinker, an agent can be motivated to do something because he 
falsely believes that doing this thing will serve a motive of his.) So 
the possibilist will stress the Importance of separating motives from 
motivations. So what is a motive? The most natural suggestion is 
that motives simply are desires. When we say that A has a motive 
which would be served by his (j)-ing, we normally mean tha t A has a 
desire which would be satisfied by his so doing.
However, although desires are obviously members of an 
agent's motivational set (and are thus motives), this does not imply 
that all elements of an agent's motivational set (i.e. his motives)
107
either are, or can be reduced to, desires. As we shall see in the 
next chapter, Williams sometimes writes as if he thinks that beliefs 
can be elements of an agent's motivational set as well.^® However, 
for convenience I shall simply assume that all elements in an 
agent's S can be reduced to a desire or a desire-like state. I think it 
is fairly safe to call the elements of an agent's S 'desires' as long as 
we keep in mind
that S can contain such things as dispositions of 
evaluation, patterns of emotional reaction, personal 
loyalties, and various projects, as they may be abstractly 
called, embodying commitments of the agent.^°
So how should we understand these elements? I th ink we can 
begin by making a distinction between two broad kinds of desires: 
occurrent and non-occurrent desires. To have an occurrent desire 
to (j) (i.e. to be aware of the fact that one desires to <^) involves, at 
least In part, experiencing certain psychological feelings, analogous 
to bodily sensations, towards c|)-ing.^^
The connection between having an occurrent desire and 
experiencing certain psychological feelings Is not, I think, merely 
contingent in the sense that we could have the form er while lacking 
the latter. In other words, the having of an occurrent desire is 
necessarily accompanied by a certain phenomenology - to have an
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occurrent desire is, in part, to feel a propensity or aversion towards 
that which one desires to do or to avoid. But this, of course, is 
nothing other than being motivated to do or avoid the thing in 
question.
This should be contrasted with the having of a non-occurrent 
desire which necessarily lacks these phenomenological properties 
(because if it did not, then it would simply be an occurrent desire). 
But if non-occurrent desires necessarily lack these 
phenomenological properties, what licenses us to call these things 
desires in the first place? I t  m ight be objected that non-occurrent 
desires simply aren't desires at all. According to what Michael 
Smith has called 'the strong phenomenological conception' of 
desires, 'desires are, like sensations, simply and essentially states 
that have a certain phenomenological c o n t e n t . I  agree with 
Smith that this conception of desires is mistaken. There is a clear 
sense in which A can have a desire to (j> w ithout feeling a propensity 
toward (|)-ing in exactly the same way someone can have a motive 
that would be served by {j)-ing without being motivated to (j>. I f  we 
reflect on the matter, I think we should all agree that we retain our 
desires even when we are not experiencing them. I t  certainly 
seems correct to say that we retain our desires even when we are 
asleep, absent-minded, or hard at work on some project that 
requires our undivided attention. Even if we don't experience 
certain desires under these circumstances, this does not mean that
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the desires aren't there; they are, but they're dormant, we might 
say. But being dormant jus t Is being non-occurrent.
On the current (non-phenomenological) proposal, then, what 
does it mean to say of A that he has a desire to (j>? Well, since we 
can have a desire without experiencing certain psychological 
feelings, the experiencing of these psychological feeling cannot be 
the distinguishing feature of desires as such. I think we should 
understand the claim that A has a desire to (j) as the claim that A is 
disposed to act in a certain way under certain conditions. Thus A's 
desire to eat an ice cream consists in its being the case that A 
would eat an ice cream in circumstance C. The specification of C 
will quite often have to include counterfactuals about the absence of 
stronger desires and, in this case, the availability of ice cream 
among other things. Thus to say of A that he desires to eat an ice 
cream is to say that were it the case that A had no stronger desires 
to the contrary and were it the case that there were some ice cream 
about, then A would eat it. We can represent this thesis as
(D) A's desire to (j) consists in A's being disposed to (j) in
circumstance C (where the specification of C contains 
the relevant counterfactual conditions).
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A dispositional account of desires also allows us to make sense of 
the idea that some desires are accompanied by a feeling of 
propensity toward the object of the desire. As Smith puts it:
...according to this conception, desires have 
phenomenological content just to the extent that the 
having of certain feelings is one of the things that they are 
dispositions to produce under certain conditions. Some 
desires may be dispositions to have certain feelings under 
all conditions: these have phenomenological content 
essentially. Other desires, though they are dispositions to 
behave in certain ways, may not be dispositions to have 
certain feelings at all: these lack phenomenological content 
altogether.^^
Although this is a fairly rough and ready account of what it means 
for someone to have a desire, I th ink it is adequate for my purposes 
here.
I should point out that by accepting this theory of desires, I 
am not thereby accepting Humeanism about motivation. I have 
said that desires are dispositions, but this does not mean that only 
desires dispose us to act. Beliefs may be capable of doing so as 
well. But since this is so, the counterfactual conditions mentioned 
in (D) may have to include such conditions as 'A does not believe
I l l
that he ought not (j)' etc. Given this analysis of desires (which I 
think we should accept), it turns out that (P) is not easily reconciled 
with certain other internalist theses.
2.7 Counterexamples to possibilism
Recall that Williams says that a necessary condition for the 
obtaining of a reason for action for A is that this reason is 
potentially explanatory of A's action:
(IT): I f  A has a reason to (j), then it must be possible that A
should (|) for that reason.
Williams says that (IT) expresses an important truth about 
normative reasons, and that the truth of (IT) presents a serious 
challenge to the external reasons theorist. As I said earlier, 
Williams actually goes so far as to say that (IT) is one of the 
'fundamental motivations of the internalist a c c o u n t . T h e  idea, 
spelled out in more detail, is this:
I t  must be a mistake simply to separate explanatory and 
normative reasons. I f  it is true that A has a reason to 
then it must be possible that he should ^ for that reason; 
and If he does act for that reason, then that reason will be
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the explanation of his acting. So the claim that he has a 
reason to (j> - that is, the normative statement 'He has a 
reason to ())' - introduces the possibility of that reason 
being an explanation; namely, if the agent accepts that 
claim (more precisely, if he accepts that he has more 
reason to (j> than to do anything else). This is a basic 
connection. When the reason is an explanation of his 
action, then of course it will be, in some form, in his S, 
because certainly - and nobody denies this - what he 
actually does has to be explained by his S.
So why does this push us in the direction of internalism? Derek
Parfit has suggested that Williams may have the following argument
in mind:
(1) Normative reasons must be able to be motivating reasons. I t  
must be possible that we should act for these reasons.
(2) Motivating reasons must be internal, since our acts must be in 
part explained by our desires, or other motivating states.
Therefore,
(3) Normative reasons must be internal.
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Although Parfit acknowledges that Williams may not have intended 
this argument, he says, correctly in my mind, that this argument is 
suggested by Williams' remarks in Williams (1981), pp. 102 and 
106-7, and in Williams (1995), p. 39 (see Parfit, p. 112).
Regardless of whether Williams intended this argument or not, it 
should be rejected because it is invalid. What follows from (1) and
(2) is not (3), but
(3*) Normative reasons must be able to be internal.
I can see no obvious reason why externalists could not accept (3*). 
The distinctive externalist claim, as I understand it, is not that true 
reasons statements are in some way or other'potentia lly evidence 
transcendent' (which may be the central claim of certain kinds of 
realism); rather, externalists reject the claim that true reasons 
statements are made true by being related to various features of 
our motivational sets.
Now A's having a reason to (j) can never by itself be sufficient 
to explain his (|)-ing if he ^'s. As part of his argument against the 
external reasons theorist, Williams says:
...nothing can explain an agent's (intentional) actions 
except something that motivates him so to act. So 
something else is needed besides the truth of the external
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reason statement to explain action, some psychological 
link; and that psychological link would seem to be belief.
But this point is equally applicable to internal reasons statements. 
Since, as Williams puts It, 'A may not know some true Internal 
reason statement about himself'^^ (and, we may suppose, this lack 
of knowledge is attributable to the fact that A has no beliefs about 
the reason statement in question - as opposed to believing it but 
not being justified in believing it), it would be incredible if internal 
reason statements could, by themselves, do all the explaining. So 
the internalist must also accept that a 'psychological link' between 
the true reason statement and the agent must figure in a correct 
explanation of intentional a c t i o n . T h e r e  is also another problem 
with the idea that 'A has reason to introduces the possibility of A's 
acting for that reason. In non-philosophical, everyday explanations 
of actions, it is perfectly fine to say that the reason why A did what 
he did was that he believed that he had a (good) reason to do it, 
but from a philosophical point of view this kind of explanation is at 
best incomplete. A more philosophically robust explanation must 
also take into account that when A (|)'s intentionally he does so, as 
Williams puts it,
not because he believes only that there is some reason or 
other for him to but because he believes of some
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determinate consideration that it constitutes a reason for 
him to
I think Williams is right here and it seems that this point can be 
generalised to cover not only action explanations but reasons 
statements as well. Thus if it is true that A has a reason to (j), then 
there must be some consideration, p, in virtue of which he has a 
reason to This much should be admitted by everyone, 
externalists included. I f  we apply this consideration to the 
interrelatedness of explanatory and normative reasons, we get the 
following picture. I f  the fact that the tickets are selling out fast is a 
reason for A to get on the phone now, then it must be possible that 
A should get on the phone now because the fact that the tickets are 
selling out fast gives him a reason to do so. In other words, it must 
be possible that A's getting on the phone now could be explained by 
the fact that the tickets are selling out fast and that this gives him a 
reason to do so. Thus we get
(IT *): I f  the fact that p gives A a reason to (j), then it must be
possible that A should c|) because the fact that p gives A 
a reason to (j>.
But, as we have seen, A can (j) because the fact that p gives him a 
reason to do so only if he believes that, or is aware of, the fact that
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p gives him a reason to (j). Again, there is no reason for the 
externalist to disagree with any of this. This wiil turn out to be of 
some significance later.
Consider next the following case: A has with great enthusiasm 
and excitement witnessed the pomp and circumstance of various 
military parades on television. He too wants to parade around with 
medals, in uniform, in front of the Queen. Call the content of this 
desire '(j)'. Now, suppose that in order for A to parade in front of the 
Queen he must complete a certain amount of m ilitary training, and 
that a necessary component of his military training consists in his 
going through boot camp (call this > ') .  Thus ip-ing is a necessary 
means to satisfy the desire to (j>. According to (P), A has reason to 
ip (i.e. A has a motive which would be promoted by his %p-ing). Boot 
camp, however, is not an enjoyable experience. Suppose that when 
A finds out that he has a reason to op, this causes A to lose his 
desire to (p. Assuming that A has a reason to ip only because of the 
relation between %p-ing and his desire to (p, then since A no longer 
desires to (p he has no reason to ip. In other words, A's recognition 
that he had a reason to ip contributed to making it the case that he 
has no reason to %p.
This little story, I think, shows that possibilism Is at least 
prima facie incompatible with (IT). According to (IT), if A has a 
reason to (p, then it must be possible that he should (p for that
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reason. But in the example I have just described this does not 
seem to be possible. Since it was A's recognition of the fact that 
[his going through boot camp is a necessary means for his parading 
in front of the Queen] that caused him to lose the desire to parade 
in front of the Queen, the (supposed) reason A had to go to boot 
camp could never have been the explanation of why A went to boot 
camp, and hence it could not have been a reason for A to go 
through boot camp.
Of course the possibilist could say that certain reasons (like 
certain dispositions perhaps) are 'finkish' - i.e. that it was true of A 
that he did have reason to go through boot camp up until the point 
just before he recognised that he had a reason to do so. But his 
recognition of this fact makes it the case that he (now) has no 
reason to go through boot camp."^° But why would this help the 
possibilist? Finkish reasons, if there are any, would have to be 
defined, at least in part, by their failure to meet the (IT) criterion: 
finkish reasons are such that they could never figure in a correct 
explanation of A's acting fo r that reason. And if that (supposed) 
reason could never have explained A's action, it follows according to 
(IT) that it was never a reason in the first place. The existence of 
finkish reasons is incompatible with (IT).
The possibilist might dig in his heels and respond by saying 
that A really does have a finkish reason to $ and that finkish 
reasons are not a threat to (IT). He might argue that what is
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important here Is not whether A would act for that reason, rather, 
what is important is whether it is possible that he could act for that 
reason. In other words, the possibilist couid maintain that there are 
finkish reasons, and, more Importantly, that finkish reasons do not 
provide a counterexample to (IT) - ft Is possible that A should go 
through boot camp because he recognises that he has reason to do 
so; the counterfactual isn't Impossible, it just wouldn't happen 
because of the contingent make up of A's motivational set. The idea 
is this. Had A retained his desire to parade in front of the queen 
after he found out what this would require of him, the reason to go 
through boot camp would have been sustained after deliberation. 
And surely, the thought goes, this is possible. And if this is possible 
it is also possible that A should have gone through boot camp 
because he recognised that he had reason to do so. Thus he could 
have acted for that reason; and therefore the existence of this 
reason does not violate (IT).
I don't think this is right. In one sense i t  is possible that A 
should go through boot camp - there is a possible world in which A 
would do so. However, I don't think this move is open to the 
possibilist, or indeed to any internalist. In his reply to John 
McDowell's suggestion"^^ that what an agent has reason to do is 
whatever an Aristotelian phronimos would do, Williams says:
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...in considering what A has reason to do, one thing that A 
should take into account, if he is grown up and has some 
sense, are the ways in which he relevantly fails to be a 
phronimos. Aristotle's phronimos...was, for instance, 
supposed to display temperance, a moderate equilibrium of 
the passions which did not even require the emergency 
semi-virtue of self-control. But if I know that I fall short of 
temperance and am unreliable with respect even to some 
kinds of self-control, I shall have good reason not to do 
some things that a temperate person could properly and 
safely do."^ ^
This passage suggests that internalists (of any persuasion) should 
be very reluctant to ground an agent's reasons in counterfactually 
idealised version of that agent or his S.
I think internalists are committed to holding that what is 
possible and impossible in the present context must be determined 
or controlled by A's actual S. The elements in A's actual S 
(including his dispositions) lim it the range of possible action 
explanations, and this in turn limits the range of reasons that apply 
to him. Of course, it is logically possible that A's S could have been 
different (i.e. it could have been such that A retained his desire to 
parade in front of the queen), but since there are no restrictions on 
what sort of S A could have had (except certain logical restrictions),
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there are no restrictions on which action explanations are possible, 
and, consequently, no restrictions on what could be a reason for A. 
But if there are no restrictions on what could count as a reason for 
A, (IT) becomes more or less vacuous - nothing, except certain 
logically impossible actions, would be ruled out by it. This is of 
course an unwelcome conclusion for the possibilist as he wants to 
say that (IT) is not vacuous - that it is an important principle with 
real cutting-power which provides a 'fundamental motivation behind 
the internalist account of reasons'. To avoid this conclusion, then, 
possibilists (and internalists more generally) must stress the 
necessity of grounding the possible reasons an agent could have in 
that agent's actual S. I am going to call this the 'actualist 
constraint':
(AC) What is possible and impossible w ith respect to
explanations of A's actions is determined by A's actual 
S.
Let us be clear about a few things here. I said earlier that an 
agent's having a desire must be analysed in terms of certain 
counterfactuals, including counterfactuals about the agent's S itself. 
On this analysis, A's desire to eat an ice cream consists in his 
disposition to eat ice cream in circumstance C, where C is specified 
in terms of its being the case that were A to have no stronger
121
contrary desires and were there some ice cream around, A would 
eat It. But this analysis seems to be incompatible with (AC). How 
can we retain (D) after we have introduced (AC)? Suppose A 
desires to eat ice cream but that he also has a stronger desire to do 
something other than eating ice cream, would the analysis of A's 
desire to eat an ice cream then not involve the sort of 
counterfactual analysis of A's S that (AC) says is illegitimate? The 
answer is no. The counterfactual analysis we looked at earlier, (D), 
is an analysis of an agent's having a desire. (AC), on the other 
hand, is a constraint on what could be an explanation of A's action. 
I t  should be clear that we need two different analyses here; one for 
desires and one for explanations of actions. Unlike reasons or 
action explanations (given (IT) and (AC)), it seems that desires can 
be finkish. That this is a genuine possibility should come as no 
surprise since the phenomenon of finkishness is usually associated 
with dispositions (whether it be dispositions of inanimate objects or 
agents) and we have provided a dispositional account of desires. 
Suppose A's desire to (j) is such that whenever he becomes aware of 
the fact that he has that desire that very awareness produces in 
him an even stronger desire to avoid (j)-ing. This would be an 
example (I think) of a genuinely finkish desire given our analysis of 
desire. However, even in the light of the possibility of there being 
such desires, we can still retain our original analysis of desires. A's 
desire to consists in his disposition to cj) in circumstance C (where
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A has no stronger desires to the contrary). Since it is possible that 
circumstance C should obtain (i.e. there is a possible world in which 
circumstance C obtains), it is also possible that A should (j). As 
before, the counterfactual is not impossible, it's jus t that it would 
never be realised in the actual world (because in the actual world, A 
is such that whenever he becomes aware of the fact that he desires 
to (j) he desires even more strongly not to (j)). So although it is 
possible that A should (j), this sense of'possib le ' is of little or no use 
to Williams and his fellow internalists. Williams needs a sense of 
'possible' that is stronger than the one we have been employing so 
far.
(AC) says that the modal term 'possible' must be restricted in 
such a way that it does not apply to the agent's S itself. The 
agent's actual S must be fixed. The internalist must insist that we 
think of the relevant possibilities in terms of A's actual S, not in 
terms of an S that A could have had. So if (IT) is constrained by 
(AC) we can reformulate (IT) (and thus (IT *)) by substituting the 
word 'feasible' for 'possible':
(IT *f): I f  the fact that p gives A a reason to (j), then it must be
feasible that A should (|) for the reason that the fact that 
p gives him reason to
123
I t  simply cannot be the case that a refutation of (IT *) requires a 
showing that
The fact that p gives A a reason to ^ but it is not possible 
that A should (j> because the fact that p gives A a reason to
4) '
Nobody could meet this requirement since this would require us to 
show that
I t  is not possible that A should because the fact that p 
gives A a reason to (j).
But how could we show this? I t  simply cannot be a necessary truth 
that A should fail to (j> because the fact that p gives A a reason to 
But if it is impossible to show that the consequent of (IT *) is false, 
then (IT *) is irrefutable. However, consider the contraposed 
version of (IT *):
(IT*c): I f  it is not possible that A should (j> because the fact that
p gives A a reason to (j), then it is not the case that the 
fact that p gives A a reason to cj).
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I think it is fairiy ciear that Williams wants to be able to derive the 
conclusion
It  is not the case that the fact that p gives A a reason to 
from (IT*c) and the proposition
I t  is not possible that A should (j) because the fact that p gives
A a reason to
But this derivation would also require a showing that it is impossible 
that A should because the fact that p gives A a reason to (j); which, 
again, is something that cannot be shown. For this reason, then, I 
think Williams intends the word 'possible' not to be read as 
'metaphysically possible'. I have suggested that we introduce 
'feasible' to denote this weakened sense of'possible'. How we 
should interpret 'feasible' I shall leave unexamined.
Suppose next that A has, in his actual S, a disposition to 
refrain from doing that which he believes involves getting sweaty 
and dirty, and that he believes (plausibly enough) that going 
through boot camp entails that he will get sweaty and dirty. In this 
case, the combination of A's disposition and his belief will prevent 
him from going through boot camp. So now we have a disposition 
in A's actual S which would (along with the relevant beliefs) prevent
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him from acting on the supposed reason he has to go through boot 
camp. Importantly, however, this does not mean that A could not 
retain his desire to parade in front of the queen after deliberating 
about the necessary means to satisfy that desire. Whether he does 
or does not retain his desire to parade in front of the queen is a 
contingent psychological matter which is presumably going to be 
determined by other features in his S and (perhaps) various other 
features that make up his over ail psychology.
The problem for the possibilist, then, is this. I f  A has a 
disposition of such a kind that it prevents him from acting in a way 
that he believes entails him getting dirty, then although A might 
have a motive which would be served by his performing an action 
that will result in his getting dirty, it is not feasible (i.e. possible - in 
the relevant sense) that A should go through boot camp, and 
therefore it cannot be the case that A has a reason to go through 
boot camp. But this is incompatible with (P). According to (P), A 
does have reason to go through boot camp. How can the possibilist 
respond to this difficulty? Should he perhaps suggest that A's 
desire to parade in front of the queen gives A a reason to try  to get 
rid of his disposition? or that A's desire gives him reason to acquire 
certain false beliefs about what going through boot camp involves 
perhaps? Questions multiply....
The problem with possibilism is the right-to-le ft implication in 
(P). Given (IT) and (AC) it is simply false that A's having a motive
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which wiil be served by his (j>“ ing is sufficient for A to have a reason 
to (j). The opposite implication, from left-to-right, does however 
seem to capture an important element of the internalist doctrine. 
But what is the argument for this implication? The only one I know 
of is the one suggested by Parfit on Williams' behalf. As I have 
said, we need not accept this argument.
To get round this problem, perhaps the possibilist should 
instead focus on the fact that although A's desire to parade in front 
of the Queen was not formed on the basis of a false belief, his 
desire to parade in front of the Queen was formed on the basis of 
incomplete information. The possibilist needs to take a more 
holistic approach to specifying what reasons statements are true 
given (AC) and (IT). As Williams suggests: had A been better 
informed, 'he may [have] come to have some more concrete sense 
of what would be Involved, and [as a result] lose his desire for it...'. 
In other words, had A known the relevant facts (such as ((j) ip)) 
he might not have desired to ^ in the first place.
The obvious question for the possibilist is 'how do we specify 
the 'relevant facts'?' Clearly he must be able to rule out facts that 
are irrelevant to a particular deliberative situation. I f  we are 
investigating, say, whether A has a reason to go to the cinema 
tonight, it would be very odd Indeed if the fact that [Ulan Bator is 
the capital of Mongolia] should play a role in determining whether A 
has this reason or not. So by what criteria could the possibilist sort
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the irrelevant facts from the relevant ones? I t  seems to me that 
the only way to do this would be to say that the relevant facts are 
those facts, the awareness of which, would affect, or make a 
difference to what A would (actually) be motivated to do. But this, 
of course, is nothing short of actualism. In the end, then, I think 
that in light of these considerations the internalist wili do better (for 
the time being anyway) by rejecting possibilism in favour of 
actualism.
2.8 Actualism and accidie
According to actualism, then, the two (individually necessary) 
conditions
(1) A has some motive which will be served by his (j>-ing; and
(2) I f  A were aware of (1) he would be motivated to cj).
together constitute a sufficient condition for its being the case that 
A has a reason to cj). So, taking this approach we must ask 'would 
A, given his current psychological and motivational make up, after 
sound deliberation, actually be motivated to (j)?' I f  the answer is no, 
then, even though sound deliberation could reveal that some motive 
of his would be served by his cp-ing, it is not true of A that he has a 
reason to (p.
128
I think there are several problems with this view, the most 
serious of which is presented by the phenomenon of accidie. Before 
I discuss accidie, I want to briefly mention two other cases in which 
we cleariy want to say that an agent has a reason to do something 
although he is, in the relevant sense, incapable of doing It.
(i) Buridan's ass cases
Suppose A has deliberated soundly on all relevant facts concerning 
the actions currently available to him and as a result he is equally 
motivated to (j) and to ip (where it is not possible to do both) and 
there is nothing else he is more motivated to do. In other words, A 
is equally most motivated to (p and to %p. Being a staunch 
internalist, this leads A to believe that he has most reason to (j> and 
he has most reason to %p. Finally, suppose also that A has a 
disposition, (R), such that he never acts contrary to what he 
believes himself to have most reason to do (i.e. he is rational in at 
least the formal sense discussed in section 1.6). A thus finds 
himself in the company of Buridan's ass, being equally most 
motivated to perform two incompatible actions. But if he should 
find himself in this unfortunate situation where his motivations are 
exactly balanced and if his actuai S contains this particuiar 
disposition, then he will be incapable of performing either action.
But if this is so, then neither reason is potentially (in the relevant
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sense) explanatory, and hence he has no reason to perform either 
action.
In the iiterature, the case of Buridan's ass is usualiy 
presented as a case in which the unfortunate animal's reasons are 
exactly balanced and it starves to death as a result of being 
rational. Most commentators suggest that the moral of that 
particular story is that we should not accept that rationality consists 
simply in being disposed to act in accordance with one's (first- 
order) normative beliefs. Whether or not this is the moral of the 
story, the obtaining of the reasons for the ass to eat either bale of 
hay is not (or not usually anyway) In question. For present 
purposes, however, this is the very question. According to 
internalism (in its actualist guise), it would appear that A really has 
no reason a t all to perform either action as neither one of them is 
potentially explanatory. I take it that it would be tempting for the 
internalist (as indeed it would be for anyone) to say that the ass 
does have a reason to plump for an option in this case. The 
principle appealed to here might be stated as follows:
(T) I f  A is faced with two incompatible actions, (p-ing and o p ­
ing) and the strength of the reason to (p  is exactly equal 
to the strength of the reason to o p ,  and A has no 
stronger reason to do anything else, then A has (good) 
reason to plump for either action.
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This seems to be true even for someone who has no disposition 
whatsoever to piump; and who, on the current internalist proposal, 
has no reason to plump. (T), it seems, is true of everyone, 
regardless of what they are or would be motivated to do. In other 
words, in so far as an agent has something in his S - regardless o f 
what those elements are - he has good reason to plump for a 
particular option in situations where he is equally most motivated to 
perform two incompatible actions.
So if we think that this agent has a reason to plump, then in 
so far as the agent is not actually motivated to plump (perhaps 
because he believes that the decision is so important that it would 
show a lack of appreciation for the seriousness of the case to let a 
simple coin toss settle the matter), we must think that there is 
something wrong with actualism. I t  is of course true that some 
motive of A's would be satisfied by his tossing a coin and 
subsequently actually doing that which the coin decides he should 
do, and in this sense possibilism seems to get it right.
(ii) Weakness o f will
Suppose that after having deliberated soundly on all relevant facts, 
A concludes that, all things considered, he has most reason to 
By (|)-ing, A would come to realise a long term goal he has been 
pursuing for a very long time; he would please all his friends and
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family by <t)-ing, which is something he considers highly valuable; 
and he would also achieve several short term goals by ^4ng - you 
get the idea. However, A is weak willed. Although he believes that 
he has most reason to (j), he is so tempted to go the pub (which is 
incompatible with (|)-ing) that he cannot resist doing so. To be sure, 
A is irrational. Although there can be little doubt that some of A's 
desires would be satisfied by going to the pub, the question we 
must ask the actualist is whether A has any reason whatsoever to 
(j)? I f  the actualist takes (ITf) seriously, I cannot see how the 
answer could be anything other than 'no'!
I think it would be unwise for the actualist to suggest here 
that A's not being motivated to ^ is evidence of the fact that A did 
not deliberate soundly in the first place. Were he to subscribe to 
this view, then it would be very hard to see how he could make 
sense of Williams' claim that
Unless a claim to the effect that an agent has a reason to ^ 
can go beyond what that agent is already motivated to do 
- that is, go beyond this already being motivated to cj) - 
then certainly the term will have too narrow a definition.
'A has a reason to (j)' means more than 'A is presently 
disposed to
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This of course brings out again the problem of getting the modality 
right in (IT) (and its various other formulations). On the one hand, 
the internalist must conceive of (IT) in such a way that it actually 
provides some way of ruling out certain actions as not being 
possible without making this a matter of metaphysical possibility.
On the other hand, the internalist must, conceive of'possib le ' in 
such a way that it allows him to say that it is possible that A should 
(|) even though he is weak willed. Again, this may not be an easy 
thing to do (it may not even be possible), but it is something an 
adequate internalist theory must provide; especially since (IT) is 
supposed to provide one of the fundamental motivations behind 
internalism.
This brings me to the problem of accidie. Now the 
phenomenon of accidie is not new to the philosophical scene, but as 
far as I am aware it has mainly been presented as a threat to 
another kind of internalism. This kind of internalism, which I earlier 
called 'moral judgement/motivation internalism', is a theory about 
the supposedly necessary connection between moral Judgements 
and motivation. Here, however, we are concerned with the 
implications of accidie for the connection between reasons and 
motivation. Jonathan Dancy characterises accidie as follows:
People who suffer from accidie are those who jus t don't
care for a while about things which would normally seem to
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them to be perfectly good reasons for action; this is so 
whether the reasons are morai reasons or more ordinary 
ones. Depression can be a cause of accidie. The 
depressive is not deprived of the relevant beliefs by his 
depression; they Just ieave him indifferent. He knows that 
if he doesn't act now he will lose the opportunity he has 
been working for for two years, but he can't see that this 
matters.
So if we ailow that accidie is possible, what implications does 
this have for actuaiism? Weii if A is suffering from accidie, then he 
is not motivated to do anything. And if this is the case there is 
nothing A (or anyone else - deliberating on the behalf of A) could 
arrive at through sound deliberation - there is no motivation to 
deliberate from. Hence A has no reason to do anything. As a 
response to this problem, the actualist might suggest that what A 
has reason to do is determined (or at least controlled), in part, by 
A's pre-accidious S. But this merely puts off the problem.
Actualism, as defined above, makes essential reference to 
what the agent would, as a m atter o f fact be motivated to do after 
having deliberated. So although A may have some motive which 
would be served or furthered by his (|)-ing, the problem is that, as a 
m atter o f fact, A Is not motivated to (j>. What would the actualist 
say about a case like this? Does A have a reason to (j)? Since,
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according to actualism, it is a necessary condition of A's having a 
reason to ^ th a t A would (after deliberation) be motivated to c|) it 
cannot be the case that A has a reason to (j). And, since an appeal 
to A's pre-accidious S wiil not do the trick, some other strategy 
must be employed.
Another way for the actualist to get around this problem 
would be to amend the formula by adding the proviso that the 
agent in question not be accidious. A somewhat clumsy formulation 
of this idea would be:
(A*) A has reason to (j) if and only if A would. Insofar as A Is
not accidious, be motivated to ({> after having deliberated 
soundly on, and from, the motivations A already has
Some actualists might think that the necessity of this proviso is 
precluded by the very idea o f'a  sound deliberative route'. This 
would be a mistake however. As I (or rather, Dancy) described 
accidie, it is an affliction associated with motivation, not 
deliberation. So the possibility remains: if an agent is accidious, he 
could, although perfectly capable of engaging in sound deliberation 
(unless, of course, this ability has also been affected by his 
accidious affliction), find himself in the position of not being 
motivated to do that which he would be motivated to do were he
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not accidious. Actualists cannot therefore claim that the inclusion of 
the proviso is redundant.
But even with the proviso, the problem with this particular 
actualist strategy is that it employs a counterfactual analysis of 
what reasons an agent has - and this is, as we have seen, ruled out 
by (AC). An opponent of actualism could thus claim (with some 
justification) that the introduction of the proviso (in (A *)) seems not 
only arbitrary, but self-defeating from the actualist point o f view. 
After all, the inclusion of the proviso just amounts to an idealisation 
of the agent's S: were A not accidious A would have reason to....
But if we are in the business of analysing the agent's S 
counterfactually, why stop at ruling out accidie? Why not follow 
McDowell's lead and claim that, counterfactually, had the agent had 
a 'proper' upbringing he would have been a phronlmos, and that 
therefore what the agent has reason to do is what the phronlmos 
would be motivated to do? Even if the internalist could show that 
some counterfactual analyses are legitimate by internalist standards 
(which I doubt) I don't think there is a non-arbitrary way for the 
internalist to specify which counterfactual analyses are legitimate 
and which ones aren't. On what non-arbitrary grounds can the 
internalist dismiss accidie without dismissing other seemingly 
relevant facts about, say, an agent's (perhaps traumatic) 
experiences as a child?
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The actualist may respond to this challenge by pointing out 
that (A*) is, for all practical purposes, equivalent to
(A **) A has a reason to.c}) if and only if A would, insofar as A 
has any motivations a t all, be motivated to (|) after 
having deliberated soundly on, and from, the 
motivations A already has.
However, if this is so, the actualist can claim to have provided a 
non-arbitrary, principled reason for why we should accept actualism 
and reject McDowell's suggestion: the principled reason is that 
(A **) merely requires the agent to have some motivations (i.e. it 
merely requires that the agent's motivational system be 
functioning) whiie McDoweli's proposal requires that the agent have 
particular motivations - i.e. the motivations he would have had if he 
had been given a proper upbringing.
I don't think this proposal will help the actualist. I t  may be 
correct to say that a person who is suffering from a term inal form of 
accidie really has no reason to do anything because this person has 
simply ceased to be an agent. But accidie, as Dancy characterises 
it, is a temporary a f f l i c t i o n . T h e  question under considerations is 
whether an agent who temporarily fails to be motivated by what 
would normally motivate him still has a reason to do the thing in 
question. Suppose that at time t i . . . t4 and te...tn A is such that he
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would be strongly motivated to <|) if the opportunity presented 
i t s e l f . T h e  opportunity to presents itseif at tg when A is 
accidious. Does A have a reason (at ts) to at ts? I t  seems that 
even with (A **) in place, the actualist will have to deny this. Even 
if we concede the possibility that an agent can be accidious whilst 
retaining some of his motivations (it is certainly possible to read 
Dancy's characterisation of accidie in this way), the actualist will not 
be able to recover the common sense conviction that those 
considerations that don't motivate him (but which wouid normally 
motivate him, were he not accidious) still retain their normative 
force. To iliustrate this, consider the following exampie.
A is fanatical about football. He lives for the game and he is 
especially passionate about his iocal Sunday league team. 
Unfortunately, he is not a very good footballer and he has never 
actually been selected to play for the team. It's  the last game of 
the season and the team bus is getting ready to leave for the away 
game against their deadiiest rivals. Disaster strikes: the team's 
star striker has broken his leg and the team is one man short. In 
desperation the team captain phones A and teiis him to hurry down 
to the club house (where the bus is jus t about to leave) and to 
bring his football boots with him. This is the chance A has been 
waiting for for two years. Unfortunately, for some reason or other, 
A Is accidious. At the moment, A is only motivated to stay home 
and watch game shows on TV. A is not weak willed - it is not as if
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he recognises (or believes) that the best thing for him to do is to 
get on the bus, but that he is more motivated to stay home and 
watch TV - rather, his team captain's pleas just leave him cold.
Does A have a reason to get on the team bus?
According to (A **) he does not. His motivational set is 
functioning alright: he is highly motivated to stay home and watch 
TV, but he is not in the ieast motivated to get on the team bus, and 
therefore he has no reason to get on the bus. But this sounds 
extraordinary! Suppose A's accidious affliction lasted only for one 
minute. Had the team captain called before or after this time, A 
would have jumped at the chance to play for the team and rushed 
down to club house to catch the bus. Had the team captain made 
the call at any time between t i . . . t 4  and t e . . . t n  A wouid have had a 
reason at any of those times to get on the bus. However, at t s ,  he 
did not have a reason to get on the bus at ts. Why not simply say 
that for any time between t i  and tn, had A received the call at that 
time he would have had a reason to get on the bus, it's jus t that he 
wouldn't have been motivated to do so at ts?
For those who are not persuaded by these considerations, 
consider next the following case. Suppose A has been informed 
that he has been selected to play for his team later this afternoon, 
and that the bus is leaving at ts. Consequently, A is, at time ti...t4, 
highly motivated to get on the team bus at ts . However, at some 
time before ts ,  A's evil brother, B, slips him a pill which causes him
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to be such that at ts he has no interest whatsoever in getting on the 
bus. I t  seems ciear to me that B has harmed A in some fairiy 
obvious (and, I take it, uncontroversiai) respect, but it is hard to 
see how actualists could agree with this. Since, according to 
actualism, A has (at ts )  no reason to get on the bus at ts , how can it 
be that B's having prevented A from getting on the bus at ts 
constitutes a harm to A? Actualists can at best say that all that's 
happened is that A's S has changed -  not that it's changed for the 
worse -  even from A's perspective! I t  may be objected that this 
argument begs the question against actualists since it presupposes 
something of the form 'I f  x is harmful to A, then there is a reason 
for A to avoid x (because x is harmful)' which actualism denies. But 
this only serves to highlight yet another respect in which actualism 
clashes with common sense.
This bring me to another, and final, point: can actualism 
make sense of accidie being an affliction - i.e. something which an 
agent is suffering from? Can actualists show that accidie is 
something we all have good reason to try to avoid? I suppose the 
actualist wiil say that we have reason to avoid accidie if and only if 
we would be appropriately motivated to avoid accidie. Fair enough. 
But what could possibly motivate us to avoid accidie if not the idea 
that accidie is a bad thing precisely because it  prevents us from  
being motivated to do that which we have (perhaps very good) 
reason to do? This consideration may in fact invite an even
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Stronger challenge to the actualist: can actualists make sense of the 
phenomenon of accidie at all (let alone that accidie is a bad thing)? 
How can actualists make sense of claims like 'I  know that I have 
good reason to (j), but I am just not motivated (at all) to do it'?
A final response to the problem of accidie would be to simply 
deny the existence of accidie. For example, one might argue that 
the purported phenomenon is relevantly similar to that of akrasia; 
and that as such it can be explained away by employing a broadly 
Socratic strategy. The potential success of this approach obviously 
depends not only on the two purported phenomena being 
sufficiently similar, but also on the plausibility of the Socratic 
strategy employed to deny the existence of akrasia. I do not think 
that this is an attractive strategy; there seems to be overwhelming 
empirical evidence that accidie is a real phenomenon.
2.9 Actualism and reasonable regret
I f  the actualist is right about A's not having a reason to get on the 
bus at ts because he was accidious at the time, it is hard to see how 
A could later reasonably regret having done something he had no 
reason to do at the time."^^ I t  seems plausible to say that A could 
reasonably regret not having gotten on the bus (at least in cases 
where he could have gotten out of his accidious state by sheer will
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power). Intuitively, and as a first approximation, the foiiowing 
principle concerning reasonable regret seems roughly correct:
(R) A's regretting (at t) not having ^-ed at some earlier
time, t _ n ,  is reasonable only if there was a reason for A 
(at t - n )  to <j) at t - n .
Actualists wiil no doubt reject (R). In what follows I shall not be 
arguing that (R) is correct, or that it is reasonable for A to regret 
not having gotten on the bus; rather, I want to focus on what 
actualists have to say about reasonable regret.
Since actualists believe that what an agent has a reason to 
do is completely determined by what he is or wouid be motivated to
Î
do, actualists must, I think, hold that the correct principle governing 
reasons for regret is
(R*) A's regretting (at t) not having (|)-ed at some earlier
time, t - n ,  is reasonable (if and) only if A is, or would be, 
motivated (at t) to regret not having cj)-ed at t - n .
I assume actualists are committed to (R*) (or something very 
similar) in virtue of their general account of reasons. My question is 
whether (R*) is a plausible account of reasonable regret?
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The first thing to note about (R*) is that there's something 
odd about the idea of being motivated to regret something. We 
rarely, if ever, come to be motivated to regret something. Regret is 
a prepositional attitude -  usualiy, if not always, directed at some 
proposition about a past action of ours -  which we normally 
spontaneously acquire after having judged or accepted that a 
previous action of ours had some undesirable property or 
properties. I say 'normally' because there may be cases of non- 
spontaneous, or 'instrumental' regret. I f  someone offered A a large 
sum of money for regretting having (|)-ed, A might as a result find 
himself motivated to regret (|)-ing (even if he never actually (|)-ed!).^^ 
However, even if A manages to bring himself to regret having (j)-ed 
(through hypnosis or psychotherapy perhaps), the resulting regret 
(if it deserves to be called that) can hardly be called spontaneous.
In the case just described, A is motivated to regret having ^-ed 
because he is motivated to get his hands on the large sum of 
money and he recognises that a necessary means to get the money 
is to become motivated to regret having (|)-ed. Although 
spontaneous regret is never motivated in this way, this does not 
mean that spontaneous (non-instrumentai) regret cannot be 
reasonable or unreasonable. If, for instance, I were to 
spontaneously regret having ^-ed although I recognised that I was 
warranted in believing that (|)-ing was the best thing I could have 
done given the circumstances at the time, my regret would be
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unreasonab le .Or ,  to take another example, even though I am 
not in the least motivated at present to regret having abandoned 
my French studies in school, whenever I think about it I do regret 
having done so. I believe my regret is reasonable. On the actualist 
account, however, an agent can have a reason to (j) only if (j> is 
capable of being the 'object' of A's motivation. Since spontaneous 
regret can never be motivated -  i.e. spontaneous regret can never 
be the object of someone's motivation -  spontaneous regret can 
never be reasonable according to actualism. This, I believe, is 
deeply counterintuitive.
The actualist may respond by saying that regret (spontaneous 
or otherwise) simpiy Is a motivational state. A's regretting having 
(|)-ed simply Is A's being motivated In a particular way (to, e.g., hide 
the fact that he (j)-ed, apologise for having $-ed, ensure that he 
won't (j) again etc). But if this is so, actualists can easily 
accommodate the claim that spontaneous regret can be reasonable. 
Actualists can claim that if A's spontaneous regret is, or would be, 
sustained after having deliberated soundly on all relevant facts, A's 
regret is reasonable.
This cannot be right, however. I t  is a mistake to equate 
regret with being motivated. As I said earlier, (spontaneous) regret 
is a prepositional attitude (if not obviously so) whereas motivation 
is not. When we say 'I  regret having (j>-ed', what we are saying is 
equivalent to the 'prepositional' 'I  regret that I (j>-ed'. There is no
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such equivalence for 'I  am motivated to Hence regret cannot 
consist simpiy in being motivated in a certain way. I t  is no doubt 
true that A's regretting having ^-ed can produce in him the 
motivation to do certain things, but this is of no use to the actualist 
since such a motivation is a consequence of A's regret.
But maybe this is all the actualists needs. Suppose that 
(necessarily?) an agent's spontaneously regretting having #-ed 
entails his being motivated in certain ways. I f  regret is always 
(necessarily?) accompanied by motivation, does this not imply that 
if an agent regrets having ^-ed, then he has a reason to regret 
having ^-ed? I don't think that it does. What the agent regrets is 
one thing, and what he is motivated to do is another. A's regretting 
having been rude to B may produce in A the motivation to apologise 
to B, but this cannot, on the actualist account, show that A's regret 
is reasonable. At best it can show that A has a reason to apologise 
to B.
In the end, I think we should reject the actualist account of 
reasonable regret; and since this account seems to be implied by 
the actualist account of reasons simpliciter, I think the preceding 
argument provides us with yet another reason to reject actualism.
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2.10 A final argum ent
I said earlier that Williams says that the supposed truth of the 
interrelation thesis provides one of the fundamental motivations 
behind the internalist account. I want to end this chapter by 
considering what Williams takes to be the second fundamental 
motivation of the internalist account. Williams says:
There are many things we can say to people who lack 
appropriate items in their S. Suppose for instance, I think 
someone (I use 'ought' in an unspecific way here) ought to 
be nicer to his wife. I say, 'You have a reason to be nicer 
to her'. He says, 'What reason?' I say, 'Because she is 
your w ife.' He says - and he is very hard case - 'I  don't 
care. Don't you understand? I really do not care.' I try 
various things on him, and try  to involve him in this 
business; and I find that he really is a hard case: there is 
nothing in his motivational set that gives him a reason to 
be nicer to his wife as things are.^^
There are many things I can say about or to this 
man: that he is ungrateful, inconsiderate, hard, sexist, 
nasty, selfish, brutal, and many other disadvantageous 
things. I shall presumably say, whatever else I say, that it 
would be better if he were nicer to her. There is one 
specific thing the external reasons theorist wants me to
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say, that the man has a reason to be nicer. Or, rather, the 
external reasons theorist may want me to say this: one of 
the mysterious things about the denial of internalism lies 
precisely in the fact that it leaves it quite obscure when' 
this form of words is thought to be appropriate. But if it is 
thought to be appropriate, what is supposed to make it 
appropriate, as opposed to (or in addition to) all those 
other things that may be said? The question is: what is 
the difference supposed to be between saying that the 
agent has a reason to act more considerately, and saying 
one of the many other things we can say to people whose 
behaviour does not accord with what we think it should be? 
As, for instance, that it wouid be better if they acted 
otherwise.
An obvious and elegant response to Williams' question is supplied
by Parfit. He says:
We might answer: 'The difference is that, if we merely said 
that it would be better if this man acted more 
considerately, we wouid not be claiming that, as we believe 
and you deny, he has reason to do so.'^^
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I think it will be instructive to pause for a bit and consider in slightly 
more detail Parfit's response to Williams. According to Parfit, 
Williams seems to think that in order for a reason statement to be 
true it must be the case that 'such reasons would have to get 
leverage on people, by motivating them to act differently.'^"^ But, 
Parfit says, this conception of external reasons is 'too utilitarian'. 
When we believe that other people have reasons for caring, or for 
acting, we do not have these beliefs as a way of affecting those 
people. Our aim is, not influence, but t r u t h . C o n s i d e r  Williams' 
question about what external reasons could do to people who are 
not responsive to them:
Unless we are given an answer to that question. I, for one, 
find it hard to resist Nietzsche's plausible interpretation, 
that the desire of philosophy to find a way in which 
morality can be guaranteed to get beyond merely 
designating the vile and recalcitrant, to transfixing them or 
getting inside them, is only a fantasy of ressentiment, a 
magical project to make a wish and its words into a 
coercive power.
Consider next Parfit's response:
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Williams assumes that ciaims about reasons could achieve 
only two things. I f  such claims cannot get inside people, 
by inducing them to act differently, they can only 
designate these people. On the first alternative, these 
ciaims wouid have motivating force. On the second, they 
would be merely classificatory, since their meaning would 
be only that, if these people were not so vile, or were in 
some other way different, they would act differently. 
...however, there is a third possibility. Even when such 
claims do not have motivating force, they could be more 
than merely classificatory. They could still have normative 
force. Perhaps these people should act differently.^^
I t  is easy to appreciate what Parfit is aiming at here although I 
believe he may have overshot his target; indeed his last comment 
only obscures the issue. Saying that A had a reason to act 
differently is one thing; saying that he should have acted differently 
is another. Reason statements (true ones, anyway) have normative 
force in their own right - that's part and parcel of what it is to be a 
(true) reason statement and It is unwise to try  to highlight this fact 
by introducing the word 'should'. I t  can certainly be true that A had 
a reason to act differently while it is false that he should have acted 
differently. Although these people may have a reason to act 
differently, more needs to be said in order to show that the stronger
149
claim 'they should have acted differently' is true or appropriate. 
Externalists can of course maintain that moral considerations 
provide ail agents with reasons for action, but this does not mean 
that these externalists are committed to the view that, necessarily, 
all agents should act morally. Perhaps the same externalists also 
believe that considerations of prudence may outweigh moral 
considerations. So again, perhaps the agent in question did what 
he should have done, but there was some consideration in virtue of 
which he had a reason to act differently although this reason was 
outweighed by other considerations. At this stage we should be 
careful to keep reasons statements firm ly separated from 'should' 
or 'ought' statements. These issues will be of crucial importance in 
chapter four. With these considerations in mind, let us return to 
Williams' challenge.
Why is it appropriate to say to the insensitive husband that he 
has a reason to treat his wife better? A very compelling answer to 
this question is provided by Scanlon. He says:
The supposition is that...there is nothing in the man's 
"subjective motivational set" that would be served by 
changing his ways. He is, however, the kind of person 
about whom Williams would allow us to say that he Is 
inconsiderate, cruel, insensitive, and so on. These 
criticisms do involve accusing him of a kind of deficiency.
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namely a failure to be moved by certain considerations 
that we regard as reasons. (What else is it to be 
inconsiderate, cruel, insensitive, and so on?) I f  it is a 
deficiency for the man to fail to see these considerations as 
reasons, it would seem that they must be reasons for him. 
( I f  they are not, how can it be a deficiency for him to fail to 
recognize them?) Why not conclude, then, that the man 
has reason to treat his wife better....
Williams responds to this criticism as follows:
Let [N] stand in for some normative term: if the critic 
expresses himself by saying "There is a reason for this 
man to behave differently to these people", then what he 
says is of the form "there are considerations about these 
people's welfare, interests, and so on such that it is [N] 
that this man should treat those considerations as 
reasons." What can we take [N] to be? I t  does not seem 
to me that there is anything in this way of putting the 
situation which takes us beyond understanding [N] as - 
very roughly speaking - "better." We can make this 
significantly more determinate by explaining that the 
improvement would lie in the agent's coming to count as 
reasons considerations which we, other citizens, humane
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people in general, count as reasons, but while this may 
help to explain why we, as critics, express ourselves by 
saying that "There is a reason for A to behave differently", 
it does not make that statement, or the [N] that it 
implicitly contains, any more a matter of A's reasons.
I cannot see how this response in any way meets Scanlon's 
challenge. What is this mysterious normative term [N] supposed to 
add to the story? For Williams to insist that such a term is implicit 
in the claim that this person has reason to act differently seems to 
be nothing but a rather desperate attempt to save his theory. To 
say of someone that he has reason to behave differently toward 
these people does not involve the introduction of some new and 
mysterious normative term. Williams asks 'What can we take [N] to 
be?' - the correct answer, I believe. Is that [N] is nothing other than 
'true'! To say of some proposed action that it would be better that 
it be performed than some alternative, is to say that there is more 
reason to perform it than the alternative.
This term [N] may or may not be contained (explicitly or 
implicitly) in the claim we are considering. The natural, and, I 
believe, correct way of interpreting the claim is simply to say there 
are considerations about these people's welfare and interests such 
that they give this person a reason (or reasons) to treat them
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d ifferently. There is no mystery here. This is ali that is meant by 
saying that this person has reason to act differently.
This response also suggests a way to respond to Williams' 
more general challenge to the externalist:
What is it the agent comes to believe when he comes to 
believe he has a reason to (|)? I f  he becomes persuaded of 
this supposedly external truth, so that the reason does 
then enter his S, what is that he has come to believe? This 
question presents a chalienge to the external reasons 
theorist.
Here Williams is presenting a challenge to the external reasons 
theorist in the form of a sceptical question about the meaning of 
external reason statements (as opposed to the truth or falsity of 
such statements). The challenge consists in the claim 'tha t the 
sense of external reason statements is [not] in the least clear....
But why should the externalist take this challenge seriously? Again, 
there is no mystery here. As John Skorupski puts it, the content of 
beliefs about external reasons 'seems perfectly clear. I t  does not 
cry out for analysis in terms which eliminate the concept of a 
reason. O f  course, it is a substantive issue whether particular 
external reason statements are true or false, but their meaning 
seems clear enough. When A comes to believe the external reason
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statement that he has a reason to (j), he comes to believe nothing 
more than, simply, that he has a reason to (j).
2.11 Summary and conclusion
I think the points discussed in this chapter give us good reason (as 
it were) to reject internalism. Given the complexity and limitations 
of our individual psychologies and the vagaries of our actual 
motivational make up, the internalist model is simply not very 
attractive. Externalists, it seems to me, do better in every respect. 
They can quite happily admit that A can have a reason to (j) at the 
same time as he has a reason to not-(|); if A is weak willed, 
accidious, or indecisive, then that's one thing - what he has a 
reason to do is another. The psychological or motivational state of 
a particular agent has very little, if anything, to do with what he has 
a reason to do (although, as Scanlon puts it, external reasons may 
have 'subjective conditions'). For externalists, the truth of a 
particular reasons statement does not (in general) entail (and nor is 
it entailed by) the agent's having a desire that would served by his 
(j)“ ing.
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^Reprinted in Williams (1981).
W illiam s (1995b), p. 186.
^McDowell (1995), p. 68. This passage obscures an important 
issue. McDowell's use of the word 'ethical' is, in this context, 
somewhat misleading. Williams has never, to my knowledge 
anyway, doubted the existence of eth ical reasons. What he is . 
suspicious of are moral reasons. I t  Is after all m orality that is the 
'peculiar institution' (see Williams (1985), Ch. 10). For Williams, 
moral considerations (or, more accurately, moral obligations) form 
a subset of ethical considerations and their peculiarity consists in 
their apparently built-in claim to categoricity, to a supposed ability 
to outweigh or perhaps even silence all other ethical considerations. 
^It could be argued that this is actually not so. I t  may be the case 
that those who are simply unable (whatever that turns out to mean) 
to see moral considerations as being reason-giving, simply fall 
outside the scope of morality because of, or in virtue of, the ir very 
inability to see moral considerations as reason-giving. There is 
something to be said for this view, but I cannot take it into 
consideration in this dissertation. For an important discussion of 
this topic, see Skorupski (forthcoming).
^Unless of course they have some derivative, or 'proleptic' (as 
Williams puts it) reason to refrain from doing such things. The 
sadistic amoraiist would have a reason not to torture some potential 
victim if his doing so would lead to something he is averse to (like 
the withdrawal of respect from people whose respect he desires for 
example). See 'Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame' in 
Williams (1995).
 ^See Dancy (2000), p. 31.
^See Darwall (1997).
®In Darwall's taxonomy, the necessity operators have a narrow 
scope, i.e. they govern only the consequents of the conditionals. I 
think this is an oversight on Darwaii's part. These principles must 
be taken to have wide scope necessity operators, i.e. the necessity 
operators must be taken to govern the whole conditional. 
^'Internalism and the Obscurity of Blame' in Williams (1995); and 
'Replies' in Aitham and Harrison (eds); and 'Postscript: Some 
Further Notes on Internal and External Reasons' in Millgram (ed.) 
“^Williams (1981), p. 102.
^^Ibid.f p. 105. I t  is far from clear whether Williams thinks that all 
elements in an agent's S must be, in some sense or other, non- 
cognitive. Suppose cognitivism about value is correct, where does 
that leave an agent's 'disposition of evaluation'? I f  there are truths 
about values, in the sense that we can be wrong about what is 
valuable, then someone's being disposed to value things (actions.
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persons, ideals etc.) in a certain way seems be redundant with 
respect to determining what he has reason to do. I shall return to 
this point in the next chapter.
^^Ibid.f p. 104.
^%illiams (1995), p. 38.
^^Jb/c/., p. 37.
^^Williams (1981), p. 102.
^% illiams (1995), pp. 38-9.
% /d . ,  p. 38.
% ll ia m s  (1981), pp 102-4.
^°See Williams (1995), p. 35.
^^Ibid. My italics.
^^Ibid.f p. 36. My italics.
^^Ibid., p. 40. My italics.
have benefited greatly from Parfit's discussion of this matter.
See Parfit (1997). In that paper Parfit claims that Williams, in the 
end, actually rejects what Parfit calls 'Analytical Internalism ' - see 
p. 110n21.
^^Even if Williams is not trying to analyse the meaning of reasons 
statements, we still need to know what it means to say of someone 
that he or she 'could reach the conclusion to (j)'.
% i l ia m s  (1995), p. 35.
% li ia m s  (1981), p. 103.
^^Possibilism is essentially a slightly expanded version of what 
Williams calls 'the sub-Humean model' of practical reason. See 
Williams (1981), pp. 101-2.
2^See Williams (1981), p. 107.
% /d . ,  p. 105.
^^See Smith, p. 105.
% /d .
% /d . ,  p. 114.
^^'Should' should here be understood non-normatively.
% ll ia m s  (1995), p. 38.
% ll ia m s  (1981), p. 107.
% /d . ,  103.
^^The problematic implication of this apparent truth has recently 
been highlighted by Jonathan Dancy (2000). In so far as A (j)'s 
intentionally, a satisfactory explanation of his doing so must also, as 
Williams points out, include the fact that he accepts (or believes) he 
has a reason to c|); how else could his c|)-ing be intentional? But if it 
is necessary to include A's acceptance of the fact that he has reason 
to (|) in the explanation of his (j)-ing, then it is far from clear what 
role the fact that A has a reason to (j> is supposed to play in the 
explanation of A's (|)-ing. Does it even play any role in the 
explanation of his action? I t  seems that what does the explaining is
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A's acceptance of a certain proposition rather than the truth of that 
proposition. Consider the case where A ^'s because he mistakenly 
believes he has reason to (j>. What is the proper explanation of A's 
(j)“ ing in this case? Well, whatever the correct explanation is, it 
cannot include the fact that A had a reason to cj), because ex 
hypothesi there was no such fact. Rather, the correct explanation 
of A's ([)-ing seems to be that he (mistakenly) believed he has 
reason to (j>. But if it is the fact that A (correctly or incorrectly) 
believed himself to have a reason to do something that explains his 
doing it, then, as Dancy rightly points out, it is hard to see how 
somebody could ever be said to act fo r a good reason rather than 
because he believed there to be good reason to do it.
^^Williams (1981), p. 107.
owe this point to Hugh Mellor.
"^ ^See McDowell (1995).
"^^Williams (1995b), p. 190. I t  is not exactly clear what Williams' 
target is here. On the one hand Williams can be read as saying that 
whether or not the phronimos would (j) in circumstance C is 
irrelevant to whether A has a reason to (j> in circumstance C. The 
passage could also be read as saying that if the phronimos would (j> 
in circumstance C, then A has some reason to ^ in circumstance C, 
but, given that A relevantly fails to be a phronimos, he also has 
some reason not to ^ in circumstance C. I suspect that the former 
interpretation is the correct one.
"^^From now on, I shall not always make a distinction between (IT) 
and (IT *) but use them - and their amended versions - 
interchangeably depending on context.
^^Williams (1995), p. 36.
% a n cy  (1993), p. 5.
"^%e can see how questions about vagueness might creep in here, 
but I shall not address this concern.
"^ I^n what follows, whenever I speak about motivation, or an agent's 
being motivated, I shall take 'a fter having deliberated soundly on, 
and from, his existing motivations' as read.
"^^Reasonable' is quite an elusive term. According to some authors, 
it is reasonable for A to c|) if and only if (|)-ing Is what A has most 
reason to do. Others think that it is reasonable for A to (|) if and 
only if A believes he has most reason to ({>. Others still have argued 
that it is reasonable for A to (|) if and only if A is warranted in 
believing that he has most reason to (j). To this extent, 'reasonable' 
shares the same features as 'rational'. By 'reasonable' I mean 
nothing more than 'is supported by a reason'. Thus, 'A's regret is 
reasonable' should be read as 'A's regret is supported by a reason'. 
This is mere stipulation on my part and it is done merely for the 
sake of ease of exposition.
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%  this is correct, (R) must be false. I should also note that some 
philosophers would deny that A really has a reason to regret having 
(|)-ed in the case I have jus t described (even though he is highly 
motivated to do so). These philosophers think that A's being 
(appropriately) motivated to regret having ^-ed gives him a reason 
to try  to get himself to regret having 4»-ed. This, they argue, is 
different from having a reason to regret having (|)-ed. I shali not 
pursue this iine of thinking.
^°There is a sense in which my regretting having acted in particular 
way could still be reasonable even though I am warranted in 
believing that what I did what was the best thing I couid have done 
at the time. My regret could be directed 'a t the world' so to speak, 
and not at my own action. Roughly, my regret in such a case 
should be seen as an expression of my belief that it was 
unfortunate that I had to do what I did. This is not a criticism of 
my own action; rather it is a criticism of the circumstances in which 
my act was performed: ' I t  regret having slapped him, but he was 
hysterical...'.
^^I take it that Williams intends to say 'there is nothing in his 
motivational set which would be served or furthered by his being 
nicer to his w ife.' To say that there's nothing in his S tha t gives him 
a reason to be nicer to his wife seems out of place here. I f  that 
remark is supposed to mean that there simply is no reason for him 
to treat his wife better, then this would obviously be question 
begging against the externalist.
^^Williams (1995), pp. 39-40.
^¥a rfit (1997), p. 109.
% /( / . ,  p. 111.
% /( / .
^^Williams (1995b), p. 216.
^^Parfit (1997), p, 112.
^^Scanlon (1998), pp. 366-7.
^% illiams in Millgram (ed.), p. 96.
®°Williams (1995), p. 39.
^^Ibld., p. 40.
^^Skorupski (forthcoming).
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CHAPTER THREE:
BELIEFS, DESIRES, AND M O TIV A T IO N
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter I presented some arguments which I 
believe seriously undermine the plausibility of internalism. Some of 
these arguments were designed to show that simply having a 
motive that consists in, or which would be served by, (|)-ing is not 
sufficient to provide an agent with a reason to ^ - even when that 
motive is not the product of false belief. Other arguments were 
constructed to show that A's being motivated to <j) is not a necessary 
condition for its being the case that A has a reason to (j). The 
internalist can of course maintain that the core idea of internalism 
has not yet been shown to be false. In a recent comment on the 
internalism/externalism debate, Williams says:
The formulation of the internalist position which I now 
favour is: A has a reason to 0  only if there is a sound 
deliberative route from A's subjective motivational set...to 
A's 0-ing. Whether this is also a sufficient condition of A's 
having a reason to 0  is a question which I have left aside; 
the essence of the internalist position is that it is a 
necessary condition.^
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The internalist might thus be content with the idea that internalism 
is merely a negative doctrine - that internalism should be thought of 
merely as specifying a necessary condition for the obtaining of a 
reason (for any agent). To this extent, then, since we have already 
dismissed the idea that being motivated to provides a necessary 
condition for the obtaining of a reason to <|), if the internalist still 
insists that he is in the business of specifying the necessary 
conditions for the obtaining of reasons, it seems he is committed to 
the idea that the necessary condition consists not in the agent's 
being motivated to but in the agent's having some motive which 
would be satisfied by his <|)-ing.
I have two aims in this chapter. First, I want to investigate 
whether internalists can allow the idea that beliefs can, in 
themselves, be elements (i.e. motives) of an agent's motivational 
set. I shall then proceed to show why I think this is not the case. 
Second, since I believe internalists are ultimately committed to the 
thesis that an agent's motives simply are his desires (or desire-1 ike 
states), I shall try to put some pressure on the idea that desires are 
reason-giving, and suggest that desires can themselves be 
reasonable or unreasonable. Let us begin by looking at the role of 
beliefs in internalism.
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3.2 The role of beliefs in internalism
Sometimes Williams writes as if he thinks that beliefs can motivate 
in their own right; and if they can do this, there seems to be no 
prima fade  reason for denying that beliefs are 'motives' - i.e. that 
they can be elements in an agent's S. But how should we 
understand 'm otive ' here? Here I shall follow John Skorupski:
Let us say that a motive is whatever could be adduced, in 
our everyday explanations of intentional action, as 
explaining why the action was done. The question 'What 
was A's motive in doing this?' and 'What was A's reason for 
doing this?' are effectively the same question.^
Slightly reformulated, then, the question is: can beliefs be motives? 
Again, Williams seems to think that they can be. The problem for 
Williams is that he cannot accommodate this intuitively plausible 
thought into his version of internalism; or so I shall argue anyway.
I hope to show that if Williams wants to hold on to the idea that 
beliefs can generate reasons, he will be forced to reject, or at least 
substantially revise, some of the more important claims that 
underwrite his internalism. We should also remember the 
motive/motivation distinction. I t  seems clear enough that Williams 
believes that beliefs can motivate, and I think we should grant him 
that this is true. However, if beliefs can motivate, does that also
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make them (i.e. the beliefs, or, more accurately, the ir content) 
motives?
Williams writes:
Does believing that a particular consideration is a reason to 
act in a particular way provide, or indeed constitute, a 
motivation to act? ... Let us grant that it does - this claim 
indeed seems plausible, so long at least as the connexion 
between such beliefs and the disposition to act is not 
tightened to that unnecessary degree which excludes 
akrasia. The claim is in fact so plausible, that this agent, 
with this belief, appears to be one about whom, now, an 
internal reason statement couid truly be made: he is one 
with an appropriate motivation in his S.^ (Cali this passage 
a)
I think the inclusion of the akrasia proviso is misplaced here, but I 
shall defer my discussion of why I think so until later. For present 
purposes however, let us ignore this point and apply this passage to 
the story about Owen Wingrave.
In the original story by Henry James, Owen has no desire 
whatsoever to join the army despite his family's insistence on the 
fact that family tradition requires him to do so. In 'Internal and 
External Reasons' Williams uses the case of Owen Wingrave to
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illustrate the difference between internalism and externalism.
When Owen's family insist that he has a reason to join the army 
despite the fact that Owen has no desire whatsoever to jo in the 
army (which of course they are fully aware of), they take an 
externalist view of reasons. Suppose we change the story so that 
Owen has now come to believe that considerations of family 
tradition and honour provide him with a reason to jo in the army. If 
we take Williams' suggestions in a seriously, it would now appear to
be true of Owen that he does have reason to join the army. But in
virtue of what is it now true that he has reason to jo in the army? - 
in virtue of what is Owen's motivation (now) 'appropriate'?
Consider the following argument"^:
(1) Owen (O) believes that [the fact that family tradition bids O to 
jo in the army gives O a reason to join the army]. (Call the 
contents of this belief 'p ') (Assumption)
(2) O's belief that p provides him with a motivation to jo in the 
army. (From a)
(3) I f  O is motivated to join the army then 0 has a reason to join 
the army. (From a)
From (1), (2), and (3) Williams may want to conclude
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(4) 0  has reason to join the army.
I find this argument puzzling. There seem to be a number of ways 
in which it is faulty. The first thing we should note is that despite 
initiai appearances, (2) is not very plausible - not if we read it as a 
conceptual truth about the connection between believing oneself to 
have a reason to do something and being motivated to do that 
thing. I t  certainly seems possible that an agent can believe (and, 
indeed, know) that he has some motive which consists in, or which 
would be served by, his (|>-ing without being motivated to (j) even 
though he is presented with an opportunity to cj). Even more 
importantly, this lack of motivation can persist w ithout there being 
anything wrong with the agent; i.e. the lack of motivation does not 
have to be explained by the agent's being accidious or akratic. 
Consider the following case. Suppose A believes that he has a 
motive that would be served by his (j>-ing and that he has a motive 
that would be served by his ip-ing. I t  seems possible, and in certain 
circumstances very likely, that A would not be motivated to, say, ip 
even though he believes he has a reason to ip. Suppose A's (|)-ing 
consists in his cashing in his winning lottery ticket (thereby winning 
a million pounds), and that ip-ing consists in his going jogging 
(thereby promoting his health). Does it follow that if A were aware 
of this he would be motivated to return his winning lottery ticket as 
well as to go jogging? I cannot see that it does. I believe it is
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perfectly possible that although A believes (and indeed knows) that 
he has a reason to return his lottery ticket and that he has a reason 
to go jogging he is not at all motivated to do the latter. And, as I 
said, A can lack the motivation to go jogging without thereby 
arousing the suspicion that he is suffering from some motivational 
disorder.^
So if we interpret (2) as a supposedly conceptual truth about 
the connection between normative beliefs and motivation, then 
since (2) (thus interpreted) is false, the argument in unsound. To 
give Williams the benefit of the doubt however, we can allow that 
Owen's belief c/oes motivate him, while retaining the conviction that 
it is a contingent matter whether or not an agent is actually 
motivated by his or her normative beliefs. But this brings out an 
important question: how important is the fact that Owen's belief 
actually motivates him? Would Owen still have a reason to jo in the 
army if his belief that he had reason to do so left him cold? I shali 
return to this question later.
So although I believe that (2) is pretty weak, the weakest link 
in this argument is (3). In virtue of what is (3) true? Williams 
seems to suggest that the reason why we can derive (4) is that 
Owen's motivation is (now), in some sense or other, appropriate. 
What does he mean by this? How, or in virtue of what, is Owen's 
motivation appropriate? We can agree with Williams that the 
internalist should hold the following to be true:
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(3.5) I f  O's motivation to join the army is of the appropriate 
kind then O has a reason to join the army.
I take it that this is what it means (on the internalist view) to say of 
someone that he has 'an appropriate motivation in his S'. However, 
it is far from ciear whether this move actually adds anything to the 
story. What does it mean, on Williams' account, to say of someone 
that she is appropriately motivated? Weli, presumably it means 
that this person has a reason to do the thing in question. What else 
could it mean? To say of someone that she is appropriately 
motivated to do something is to say that she has a reason to do 
that thing. However, Owen's being motivated to ^ and Owen's 
being appropriately motivated to (|> are not the same thing. So how 
does Williams get to the conclusion that Owen has reason to (j>?
What Williams needs to show is why it is that Owen's motivation is 
appropriate (i.e. why he has a reason to join the army) - not just 
assert it.
More importantly, (3) is false if the belief that gave rise to 
Owen's motivation is false. Remember Williams' claim that if an 
agent's motivation to (j) is the result of his holding a false belief, I
then that motivation cannot make it the case that he has a reason j
to (p. Let us put this as I
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(5) I f  O's motivation to join the army is the product of a false 
belief, then {ceteris paribus) it is not the case that O has a 
reason to join the army.
The inclusion of the ceteris paribus clause is intended to serve 
merely as a reminder that we are (at this stage, anyway) 
presupposing that Owen has no other motive besides his belief that 
p to join the army. So the antecedent in (3) is not strong enough 
to guarantee the truth of the consequent. What (3) needs, if it is to 
guarantee the truth of its consequent is that Owen's belief that p is 
true. But no such strengthening of the antecedent has been 
offered. (1) simply says that Owen believes that p - It says nothing 
about whether he truly or falsely believes that p. Now, since, 
according to (2), Owen's motivation to join the army was provided 
by his be//ef that p, and according to (4), Owen does have a reason 
to jo in the army, we can now (via (5)) derive
(6) I t  is not the case that O's belief that p (which motivated him 
to join the army) is false. (From 2, 4, and 5)
But from (6) it must surely follow that
(7) O's belief that p is true.
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And from (7) it must equaiiy sureiy follow that
(8) p is true.
In other words, it is true that the fact that family tradition bids 
Owen to join the army gives Owen a reason to join the army. The 
crucial question now becomes: in virtue of what is p true? As far as 
I can see there are only two possibilities. Either
(9) p is true independently of any elements in O's motivational 
set.
or
(10) p is true in virtue of some element(s) in O's motivational set
Clearly Williams cannot accept (9). According to (9), the 
proposition 'the fact that family tradition bids O to join the army 
gives O a reason to join the army' is true independently o f any 
elements in O's motivational set. But this, of course, is nothing 
short of externalism! So Williams must reject (9), and accept (10).
The next question we need to consider is whether the element 
in O's motivational set referred to in (10) is a belief or a desire.® 
Thus we have
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(11) The element in O's motivational set which makes p true is a 
belief
or
(12) The element in O's motivational set which makes p true is a 
desire
Let us investigate the merits of (11) first. The first question we 
need to ask with respect to (11) is which belief it is that makes p 
true. Again, there are two possibilities:
(13) I t  is O's believing p that makes p true 
or
(14) I t  is some belief of O's, other than O's belief that p, that 
makes p true.
I f  (13) is true, then beliefs about what we have reason to do are 
either infallible, self-verifying, or In some other way 'extension- 
determining'. Since our having these beliefs is what makes them 
true, we could never have false beliefs about what we have reason 
to do (at least in cases where ali our-relevant non-normatlve beliefs 
are correct). Thus it seems beliefs about what we have reason to 
do are of the same kind as beliefs about our own sensory states: if I 
believe that x appears red to me, then x appears red to me; if I 
believe that I am in pain then I am in pain etc.. However, we
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should be careful to point out that there is an important disanaiogy 
between the case we are currently discussing and the case of the 
mistaken belief about the glass containing gin (which we 
encountered in chapter two). In the gin case, the agent has no 
belief about what he has reason to do; he simply has a false belief 
about the contents of the glass before him. In that case, his desire 
(or motivation) to drink the stuff in the glass before him does result 
from a false belief. As a result he has no reason to drink the stuff 
before him. In the present case however, the content of this 
agent's belief is a proposition about what reasons he has - and this 
is the crucial difference.
However, Williams explicitly (and rightly) rejects the idea that 
our normative beliefs are self-verifying: '[O ] may falsely believe an 
internal reason statement about himself...'^ Let us add this 
proposition to the argument:
(15) O may falsely believe an internal reason statement about 
himself.
This rules out (13): if we can falsely believe internal reasons 
statements about ourselves, then it cannot simply be our believing 
ourselves to have a reason that makes it the case that we actually 
do have a reason to do the thing in question. Then, in so far as 
Williams wants to hold on to (11), he will have to accept (14): it is
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some belief of O's, other than O's belief that p, that makes p true. 
The question now becomes: what could this belief possibly be? 
Remember what p stands for: thé fact that family tradition bids O to 
join the army gives O a reason to join the army. What other belief 
of O's could make this belief true? One strategy would be to say 
that there is some other, more 'fundamental' belief of O's that 
makes p true. For example, the belief that makes p true is O's 
belief that O has reason to do whatever family tradition bids him to 
do (call the content of this belief 'q '). But this merely puts off the 
problem. I f  q is false, then, assuming as before that O has no other 
reason to join the army, O has no reason to join the army. So if O's 
belief that p is true in virtue of O's believing q, then q must be true. 
So what makes this belief true? Obviously an infinite regress 
threatens here.
As I see it, there are only two ways for Williams to get round 
this problem. Either he holds that q, or some other, even more 
fundamental normative belief of Owen's is basic; or, alternatively, 
he abandons (11) in favour of (12). I f  he chooses the former, he 
will have to accept that (15) is true only of non-basic (i.e. 
derivative) normative beliefs. Basic normative beliefs (whatever 
they turn out to be), on the other hand, are infallible. Let us add 
this as a premise.
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(15*) O cannot falsely believe a basic Internal reason statement 
about himself.
To investigate the merits of this view, let us introduce the idea of a 
basic normative belief and a corresponding basic normative reason 
and distinguish this kind of belief/reason pair from instrumental 
beliefs/reasons pairs by adding the following to our stock of 
premises:
(16) I f  O's belief that he has a reason to (j> is a basic normative 
belief, then O has a (basic) reason to cj).
3.3 The content of basic normative beliefs
So far I have not said much about the content of these allegedly 
basic normative beliefs. Recall that, according to Williams, if a 
person believes that he has a reason to do something, then there 
must be some determinate consideration in virtue of which he takes 
himself to have that reason. In Owen's case, he believes not only 
that he has a reason to join the army, but he also believes that the 
fact that family tradition bids him to join the army is a (or the) 
consideration which provides him with a reason to join the army.
We must now ask whether this model also applies to basic 
normative beliefs. Is there some determinate consideration In
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virtue of which Owen believes that he has a reason to do whatever 
family tradition bids him to do? Suppose Owen believes that it is 
simply important that family traditions be followed and that this fact 
gives him a reason to do whatever his family tradition bids him to 
do. I f  this is what Owen believes and his belief is genuinely basic, 
then this belief cannot be the product of some other normative 
belief he has.
Now, given our characterisation of basic normative beliefs, if 
Owen's belief that q is basic then q is true. Im portantly however, 
since Owen's belief that q is basic (unlike Owen's belief that p which 
is made true by something else - namely Owen's believing that q), 
q must be made true by Owen's believing it. A brief recap of the 
story so far is in order here. The dialectic up to this point have 
taken us from
(11) The element in O's motivational set which makes p true is a 
belief
to
(14) I t  is some belief of O's, other than O's belief that p, which 
makes p true.
We are now supposing that Owen's belief that p is made true by his 
belief that q. I f  Owen's belief that q is true and this belief is not
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made true by any other belief of Owen's, then q must be made true 
by Owen's believing q. Thus we arrive at
(16*) I f  O's belief that q is basic, then q is made true by O's 
believing it.
The next question we need to consider is what could and could not 
be the content of basic normative beliefs. Can one have basic 
normative beliefs about what other people have reason to do? 
Suppose Owen believes that since it is important that family 
traditions be upheld everyone has a reason to do that which his or 
her family tradition bids him or her to do. Suppose that in Owen's 
family there is a tradition of the oldest son joining the army and for 
the second oldest to join the clergy. Since Owen is the oldest he 
believes of his younger brother. Bob, who has no interest 
whatsoever in doing what family tradition bids him to do, that he 
has a reason to join the clergy. I f  this belief of Owen's is true, then 
Bob has a reason to join the clergy. According to the standard 
internalist picture, however, 'Bob has a reason to join the clergy', is 
false since, ex hypothesi, there is no motive in Bob's S which would 
be satisfied or promoted by his joining the clergy. So it Is simply 
false that the fact that family tradition bids Bob to jo in the clergy 
gives Bob a reason to do so. But if this is false, then Owen's belief 
that there is reason for Bob to jo in the clergy must also be false.
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This in turn shows that Owen's belief that everyone has a reason to 
do that which their respective family traditions bids them to do is 
false. And hence this belief of Owen's cannot be basic.
I think this argument strongly suggests that internalists must 
hold that basic normative beiiefs, if there are any, can at most be 
de se beliefs. I f  by some extraordinary coincidence it so happens 
that all agents share Owen's conviction that considerations of famiiy 
tradition are reason giving, then Owen's beiief would be true. But it 
wouidn't be made true by Owen's believing It; rather it would be 
made true by the contingent fact that everyone agrees that 
upholding famiiy traditions Is important. So if basic beliefs are 
made true by being believed, it would appear that basic beliefs can 
at best only have the believer as their object.
With the de se qualification in mind, let us now return to 
(16*). I f  we, as internal reasons theorists, were to suggest to 
Owen that the content of his belief is made true by his having that 
beiief, I think it is fairly safe to say that Owen would reply that we 
have misunderstood him (or his belief). I think he would be likely 
to say to us: 'You haven't understood what I believe. I believe that 
i t  Is the Importance o f keeping with family tradition that gives me a 
reason to do that which family tradition bids me to do - not that I 
believe it. ' In other words, Owen is expressing an externalist 
thought. Again, we could easily imagine him saying 'What I believe 
is that the reason I have to honour family tradition obtains
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independently of my believing it! ' How should the internalist 
respond to this? There seems to be only two possibilities here. 
Either Owen's belief is false, and thus.not basic; or the beiief is 
true, and, consequently, there are external reasons.
Obviously, the internalist must say that Owen's beiief is false, 
thereby denying that Owen's belief is basic. But this seems 
unsatisfactory from an internalist point o f view. Here is a case 
where Owen, in Williams' words, has a 'pattern of emotional 
reaction' such that he is always motivated only by what he takes to 
be bona fide external reasons; or that Owen's 'disposition of 
evaluation' is such that when he believes he has a reason to do 
something, he believes this, at least in part, because he believes 
this reason obtains independently of his being motivated by it; or 
that Owen has a 'commitment' to what we might call 'the externalist 
cause'. So even though all these things are true about Owen, 
internalists are forced, I think, to say that it is false that Owen has 
a reason to join the army.
I t  seems reasonable to think that internalists will have to say 
that most, if not all, basic beliefs are false since it seems equally 
reasonable to believe that the point jus t made can be generalised: 
most (if not all) basic normative beliefs will have the same structure 
as Owen's belief that q; i.e. they all have, as part of their content, 
the idea that the reasons in question obtain independently of
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whether we believe them to - to think otherwise would be to get 
things back to front (at least for a very large class of such beliefs).
I think this is a powerful argument against the possibility of 
internalists having recourse to the existence of basic normative 
beliefs in order to maintain that beliefs can be motives which 
generate reasons. However, as we shall see, there are still a few 
arguments available to the internalist who wants to defend the idea 
that beliefs can be motives. Perhaps it is possible to maintain that 
an agent can have a non-desire-based basic normative reason to (j) 
without occurrently believing this to be so. I f  we allow that there 
are such things as tacit beliefs, then it might be possible for a basic 
normative reason statement to be true of an agent in virtue of his 
having a tacit basic normative belief.
3.4 Basic normative beliefs as tacit beliefs
The idea of tacit beliefs raises some very intricate and difficult 
issues about the epistemology and metaphysics of beliefs and these 
are issues which I cannot go into detail about here. As a result, I 
must lim it this discussion to what I take to be directly relevant to 
the issue under consideration. What does it mean to say of 
someone that he has a tacit basic normative belief? There are 
some philosophers who doubt the very existence of tacit beliefs,® 
while others think that, at best, we are merely warranted in
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ascribing tacit beliefs to others (if not to ourselves).^ However, for 
those who believe there are such things, the first order of business 
must surely be to say what they are. A couple of distinctions are In 
order here. In the literature, philosophers have distinguished 
between different kinds of beliefs; explicit and implicit; conscious 
and unconscious; occurrent and non-occurrent, and so on. So 
where, if at all, do tacit beliefs fit in? Well, the answer to that 
question, I believe, is largely terminological. The main idea is that 
tacit beliefs, if there are any, are such that they have never been 
'entertained'. Let us call a belief that is currently 'before the mind's 
eye' - i.e. one that is presently being entertained - an occurrent 
belief. A non-occurrent belief, then, is a belief that is not presently 
entertained. However, there are at least two kinds of non-occurrent 
beliefs. On the one hand there are beliefs which are not currently 
being entertained but which have, at some point, been entertained 
and perhaps stored in either long-term or short-term memory.
These are the kinds of beliefs we are all familiar with: that 2 + 2 
=4; that 'b ' immediately follows 'a ' in the English alphabet; that 
Monday follows Sunday etc. These beliefs, although non-occurrent 
must be distinguished from other kinds of non-occurrent beliefs an 
agent. A, might hold: that A is less than eight feet ta ll; that 10,329 
> 10,328; and that snow in Stockholm does not instantaneously 
turn bright orange when it hits the ground.^® These beliefs have 
never, we may suppose, been entertained by A. Nonetheless, were
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we to ask A whether he believes that he is less than eight feet tall 
etc. he would immediately reply 'yes' even though he had never 
entertained that particular belief before. These kinds of beliefs are 
the ones we might call 'tacit'.
According to a very tentative analysis, A's tacit belief that q 
consists in A's disposition to assent to q if the occasion arises. 
However, consider the following case (due to Lycan):
The opinionated man. He is a Peircean, in that he abhors 
being agnostic on any subject, but not enough of a 
Peircean, in that in him the 'irritation of doubt' triggers not 
inquiry but a snap judgement. At least, on many occasions 
when he entertains a proposition for the first time, he 
immediately affirms the proposition or denies it, depending 
on what else is going on in his global psychology at the 
time. (Let us take 'global psychology' broadly here, to 
include any mental or neurophysiological condition that has 
psychological influence.) Thus at a time t  our subject has 
countless dispositions to judge - determined by his global 
psychology - but we would not count these as antecedently 
existing beliefs, however tacit.
So the tentative analysis Is inadequate. What we need is some way 
of getting around the arbitrariness of snap judgements; a way of
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showing how A's disposition to judge that q is not merely 
capricious:
An obvious move is to posit what Dennett (1975) caiis an 
'extrapolator-deducer', i.e. a device which operates on 
[previously entertained] stored formulas, o r'co re  beliefs', 
and generates relatively obvious consequences of those 
[previously entertained] beliefs when the occasion arises.
Thus we might suggest that to believe tacitly that P is to 
be disposed to judge that P in virtue of the operation of 
one's extrapolator-deducer in drawing inferences from pre­
existing beliefs.
But this will not do for our basic normative beliefs. Recall that the 
kind of beliefs we are interested in are supposed to be basic, and if 
we are to respect this basicness we cannot allow that they be 
Inferred from other, even more basic beliefs along the extrapolator- 
deducer model. In Owen's case we considered the possibility that 
his belief that p was made true by his belief that q, which in turn 
was made true by being believed. The idea is that the 'making true' 
relation that holds between Owen's beliefs is modelled on a 
syllogism of the following kind:
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Basic belief: I (Owen) have a reason to do whatever family
tradition bids me to do.
Empirical belief: Family tradition bids me to join the army. 
Derivative beiief: (The fact that family tradition bids me to jo in the 
army makes it the case that) I have a reason to 
join the army.^®
According to this model, the major premise (the basic beiief) in the 
syllogism is made true by being believed; the minor premise (the 
empirical belief) is made true by the obtaining of a certain state of 
affairs which obtains independently of Owen's believing it; and the 
conclusion (the derivative beiief) is made true by the truth of the 
major and minor premises. I f  we were to view the extrapolator- 
deducer model of tacit beliefs as providing a way of securing the 
existence of basic normative beliefs, we would end up with the 
wrong structure of the 'making true' relation - the structure would 
be the reverse of the syllogism just described. Since tacit beliefs 
are those 'relatively obvious consequences' of some 'core' beliefs, 
these tacit beliefs, if true, cannot make the 'core' beliefs true. To 
suppose that they could would be to get things back to front.
There are of course other models of tacit beliefs. According to 
Field^^ tacit beliefs are the obvious consequences of one's occurrent 
or non-occurrent-but-have-been-entertained beliefs. The idea here 
is that what is to count as the obvious consequences of a particular
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belief wiii be determined by the person ascribing the beiief to the 
agent in question. Now one could certainly question whether this is 
a genuine attempt at specifying a belief of an agent as opposed to 
merely ascribing it to the agent. Or again, as Lycan points out, one 
could read Fields proposal as a deflationary analysis of tacit belief.^® 
But regardless of which interpretation we find more plausible, this 
model is of no use to us. For our purposes, it is simply a different 
version of the idea expressed by Dennett. I f  a basic normative 
belief is a tacit beiief, it had better be a tacit beiief of such a kind 
that it is not merely a consequence of some other belief, ascribed or 
otherwise. I think we should conclude that if there are basic 
normative beliefs, then we should not think of these as tacit beliefs. 
There may of course be other analyses of tacit beliefs which could 
make better sense of basic normative beliefs, but since I am not 
aware of any such analyses I shall simply leave it at that.
3.5 In ternal reasons and propositionai attitudes holism
Since basic normative beliefs cannot plausibly be thought of as tacit 
beliefs, if one nonetheless wants to retain the idea of basic 
normative beliefs, perhaps we should take more seriously the idea 
that there can be a deflationary account of basic normative beliefs. 
To flesh out this idea, we should begin by noticing that in the 
passage concerning the possibility of beliefs being motives, Williams
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seems to make at least an implicit appeal to a holistic picture of 
propositionai attitudes. Very roughly, holists about propositionai 
attitudes hoid that propositionai attitudes such as beliefs and 
desires do not, and cannot, exist 'in a vacuum'. As Davidson puts 
it:
Propositionai attitudes, in terms of which mental events 
are characterised, cannot exist in isolation. Individual 
beliefs, intentions, doubts and desires owe their identities 
in part to their position in a large network of further 
attitudes: the character of a given belief depends on 
endiess other beliefs; beliefs have the role they do because 
of their relations to desires and intentions and perceptions. 
These relations among the attitudes are essentially logical: 
the content of an attitude cannot be divorced from what it 
entails and what is entailed by it.^®
I think we can separate two different claims in this passage: one 
metaphysical, the other normative (in a quasi- 
semantic/epistemological sense). The normative constraint on the 
correct attribution of attitudes should, I think, be taken as an 
epistemological (or quasi-semantic) constraint: we cannot 
iegitimately attribute  a certain mental state to a person without 
attributing certain other mental states to that person:
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There is no assigning beliefs to a person one by one on the 
basis of his verbal behaviour, his choices, or other locai 
signs no matter how piain and evident, for we make sense 
of particular beliefs only as they cohere with other beliefs, 
with preferences, with intentions, hopes, fears, 
expectations, and the rest/^
Furthermore, according to Davidson, the legitimate attribution of 
one or more propositionai attitudes to another person also requires 
us to not only attribute other beliefs and desires to that person, but 
also to do this in accordance with what Davidson has called the 
'principle of charity'. Roughly, this principle bids us to minimise the 
ascription of false beliefs to a person. Although this principle is of 
great importance to the project of'radical translation' it is of no 
direct concern to us here.
Putting these issues aside, we must now consider what some 
of the other implications of holism are. Davidson says that beliefs 
and desires cannot exist independently of other, 'related' beliefs and 
desires. This would, if true, rule out the possibility of a person's 
having, for instance, only one belief. This certainly seems true. 
However, Davidson thinks that the interdependency of propositionai 
attitudes is a iogical one ('the content of an attitude cannot be 
divorced from what it entails and what is entailed by it'). I take it
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that he does not mean by this that a person who, say, believes p 
must believe all that p entails. This would be to assume too much. 
For instance, if we take every true mathematical proposition to 
entail all other true mathematical propositions, then if I believe a 
true mathematical propositions, it would follow that I believe all 
true mathematical propositions. But clearly this is not the case 
(except perhaps if I believe these propositions tacitly). We should 
therefore think of Davidson's idea as being less ambitious than that. 
The idea might simply be that I cannot have the belief that, say, 3 
+ 3 = 6 without having some other belief about mathematics 
and/or arithmetic. Likewise, John could not believe that a burglar 
jus t entered his house through a window without believing such 
things as 'burglars exist' or 'there are windows in my house'.
Again, John need not have these particular beliefs; the point is 
simply that he cannot have the belief that a burglar has jus t 
entered his house through a window without having some other, 
'related', beliefs. As I understand holism it is Indeterminate what 
other beliefs John has to have In order to have the one jus t ascribed 
to him. But this indeterminacy is no embarrassment to holism. I t  
simply says that a necessary condition for the obtaining of a belief 
(or any other propositionai attitude) is that this belief belong to a 
network of other, interrelated beliefs.
However, and more Importantly for our purposes, the 
interrelatedness of propositionai attitudes can, and does, 'reach
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across', so to speak, different attitude types - e.g. from beliefs to 
desires. This picture is further supported by common-sense 
psychology. As a theory, common-sense psychology consists in a 
body of generalisations relating psychological states to each other, 
to inputs from the environment, and to actions. Here is a sample 
from Churchland:
(x) (p) (if X fears that p, then x desires that not-p)
(x) (p) (if X hopes that p and x discovers that p, then x is 
pleased that p)
(x) (p) (q) ( if X believes that p and x believes that if p then 
q, then barring confusion, distraction etc. x believes 
that q)
(x) (p) (q) (If X desires that p and x believes that if q then 
p, and X is able to bring It about that q, then barring 
conflicting desires or preferred strategies, x brings it about 
that q.^ ®
All of these generalisations should be understood as containing 
ceteris paribus clauses, but the sim ilarity with Williams' picture is 
obvious enough:
A man who does believe that considerations of family 
honour constitute reasons for action is [barring akrasia] a
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man with a certain disposition to action, and also 
dispositions of approval, sentiment, emotional reaction, 
and so forth
What emerges from these considerations is, I think, the idea that a 
person who believes that he has a reason to do that which famiiy 
tradition bids him to do, does so because he In some way or other 
desires to do that which family tradition bids him to do. In so far as 
Owen's belief about what famiiy tradition bids him to do (i.e. to join 
the army) is correct, his beiief that this gives him a reason to join 
the army is made true by the fact that he has a basic desire to do 
that which family tradition bids him to do.
I t  should of course be admitted that no such claim 
(concerning desires) is being made in the passage quoted above.
At best, what we are entitled to conclude from the preceding 
considerations (in conjunction with the quote from Williams) Is that 
since it cannot be Owen's beiief (or its content) that provides him 
with a reason to join the army, it must be his dispositions that 
somehow give him a reason to join the army. However, it is hard to 
see how a person's dispositions can be reason giving. The most 
natural way of interpreting Williams here is to read him as saying 
that a man who has the kinds of beliefs under consideration is a 
man with certain desires (which, as I suggested in the previous 
chapter, should be taken to be dispositional states).
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On this account then, If Owen believes that he has a (basic) 
reason to do whatever family tradition bids him to do, it will be true 
of Owen that he does have a basic reason to do whatever family 
tradition bids him to do. This is consistent with (16). And this may 
be enough to legitimately call Owen's belief basic. However, on the 
view under consideration, Owen's beiief is not made true by his 
believing it; rather, it is made true by his having a basic desire to 
do that which family tradition bids him to do. In other words, if 
Owen's beiief that he has a reason to is basic, then Owen has 
some basic desire to (j) which guarantees the truth of his belief 
(according to internalism). A consequence of these considerations 
is that we could have said right from the start that Owen's belief 
that p is made true not by his believing that q but by his basic 
desire to do whatever famiiy tradition bids him to do; a desire which 
finds an expression in his beiief that he has reason to do that which 
family tradition bids him to do. So we can still legitimately say of 
Owen that his belief that q is a basic normative beiief while holding 
that to have a basic normative beiief is nothing over and above 
having a certain basic desire. Furthermore, the idea of tacit beliefs 
does not seem entirely misplaced here. Perhaps we should say of 
Owen that his basic normative belief that q is a tacit belief which we 
can legitimately attribute to him in virtue of his have a basic desire 
to do whatever famiiy tradition bids him to do.
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In the end, then, the more plausible alternative for the 
internalist is to abandon (11) altogether In favour of (12). On this 
line of thought, the element of Owen's motivational set in virtue of 
which his belief that p is true is his desire to do what family 
tradition bids him to do. In other words, the reason why (4) is true 
is that Owen desires to do that which family tradition bids him to 
do. But if this is correct it is hard to see what significance Owen's 
belief that p has in the 'reason-generating' process. I f  it is Owen's 
desire to do whatever his family tradition bids him to do that is the 
ultimate source of his having a reason to join the army, then he 
would presumably have had this reason even if he had not had the 
belief that p. But then, of course, it is false, or at least grossly 
misleading, to say that Owen has a reason to join the army because 
he believes that the fact that family tradition bids him to do so 
provides him with a reason to do so. What is really doing ail the 
work here is his desire to honour family tradition. So the simplest 
and, in the end, correct picture is that beliefs do not generate 
reasons, desires do. This is of course assuming that Owen's desire 
to ip is not based on a belief. I f  it is, then we can run the same 
argument ail over again. Therefore, Williams is forced to say that 
what we have reason to do is ultimately grounded in some basic 
desire (i.e. one that is not based on beiief). These basic desires, in 
turn, are ones we have no reason to have and which we also have 
no reason not to have. I f  Owen's desire (or motivation) to ip came
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about because he believes himself to have a reason to op, it follows 
that there must be some other, even more basic desire in virtue of 
which his belief that he has reason to ip would be true. Therefore, 
since this cannot be the case on pain of regress, Owen's desire to ip 
(or something like this desire) must be basic.
According to this picture, the answer to Williams' question 
'Does believing that a particular consideration is a reason to act in a 
particular way provide, or indeed constitute, a motivation to act?' 
might be 'yes', but as it turns out, Owen's beiief that p is merely a 
consequence of having the desire to ip, which in turn is the real 
source of Owen's reason to join the army (if indeed he has such a 
reason). So although, as Williams puts it, 'this agent, with this 
belief, appears to be one about whom, now, an internal reason 
statement could truly be made: he is one with an appropriate 
motivation in his S', it is not because he has that beiief that we can 
make a true reasons statement about him. The inclusion o f'no w ' in 
the passage above seems to suggest that before Owen had the 
belief that p, it was simply false that he had a reason to join the 
army. We can now see that this is not the case. I t  became true of 
Owen (on this picture) that he has a reason to join the army when 
he formed the desire to do whatever family tradition bids him to do.
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3.6 Desire-based reasons
Given the preceding considerations, I think we should conclude that 
internalists are committed to the claim that only desires (or desire- 
iike states perhaps) are 'u ltim ate ' motives. So if we have reason to 
(j) only in so far as we have a motive which either consists in, or 
which would be served by our (p-ing, then since, according to 
internalism, motives simply are desires, we have reason to (p only in 
so far as we have a desire which either consists in, or which would 
be served by our (f-ing. Setting aside the issue of the supposed 
explanatory dimension of normative reasons, and keeping in mind 
the proviso that desires based on false beliefs are not reason giving, 
we can say that on the internalist conception of reasons, reasons 
are desire-based.
There are, broadly speaking, two kinds of desires, 
instrumental desires, and intrinsic (or'basic ') desires. In a sense, 
instrumental desires are rationalised by other desires in a way that 
intrinsic desires are not. As Parfit puts it:
We often have long chains of instrumental desires, but 
such chains all end with some intrinsic desire. Thus, we 
may want medical treatment, not for its own sake, but only 
to restore our health, and we may want that, not for its 
own sake, but only so that we can finish some great work 
of art, and we may want that, not for its own sake, but
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only to achieve posthumous fame. This desire may in turn 
be instrumental, since we may want such fame only to 
confound our critics, or to increase the income of our heirs. 
But, if we want posthumous fame for its own sake, this 
intrinsic desire would end this particular chain.
These intrinsic desires, then, are, on the internalist conception of 
reasons, what ultimately grounds our reasons for action.
Now an important feature of internalism (construed in the 
way we are currently considering) is that our reasons for action are 
ultimately grounded in our intrinsic desires which, in turn, we have 
no reason to have and no reason not to have; because if we did 
have a reason either for or against having a particular basic desire - 
the desire to listen to a particular piece of music, say - then since 
all reasons are supposedly grounded in our desires, the desire to 
listen to this particular piece of music cannot be a basic desire. In 
Hume's terminology, a basic desire is an 'original existence' - either 
we have it or we don't, and there can be no reason either for or 
against having that particular desire. As Hume puts it: "Tis 
impossible...that...passion can be oppos'd by, or be contradictory to 
truth and r e a s o n . . . I  think this view is mistaken. To see why this 
view is mistaken, let us make a slight detour and take a look a very 
closely related issue: the role of desires in motivation.
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According to the standard interpretation of Hume's theory of 
motivation, beliefs are, by themselves, incapable of motivating us 
to act. Without going too deeply into Humean exegesis and to avoid 
the possibility of misrepresenting Hume, we can simply call the 
theory that beliefs are by themselves incapable of motivating the 
'Humean theory of motivation'. According to this theory, ail 
intentional actions are the result of the interaction of two distinct 
mental states: a cognitive state and a non-cognitive state. Many 
contemporary philosophers have found it difficult to draw a 
definitive line between these kinds of states. However, they do 
agree that beliefs and desires are paradigm cases of cognitive 
states and non-cognitive states, respectively. For the Humean, 
then, no beliefs are by themselves capable of motivating; only when 
keyed to a suitable desire will beliefs motivate.
Many philosophers today reject the Humean theory of 
motivation, and, of those who do, many often cite Thomas Nagel's 
distinction between motivated and unmotivated desires as their 
reason for doing so. Without going into too much detail, Nagel's 
account of motivation is compatible with the Humean account in so 
far as both state that motivation involves the existence of a 
'suitable set' of beliefs and desires. But, says Nagei, if we allow 
that there are such things as motivated desires, the significance of 
desires in motivation is significantly diminished^^:
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The claim that a desire underlies every act is true only if 
desires are taken to include motivated as well as 
unmotivated desires, and it is true only in the sense that 
whatever may be the motivation of someone's intentional 
pursuit of a goal, it becomes in virtue of his pursuit ipso 
facto appropriate to ascribe to him a desire for that goal.
But if the desire is a motivated one, the explanation of it 
will be the same as the explanation of his pursuit, and it is 
by no means obvious that a desire must enter into this 
further explanation.... That I have the appropriate desire 
simply foilows from the fact that these considerations 
motivate me....^®
So Nagel agrees that being motivated involves both beliefs and 
desires, but desires play no crucial causal role in the story; the 
resulting desire is a consequence of having the appropriate beiief. 
Jonathan Dancy has recently pointed out that there are at least two 
possible interpretations of this passage of Nagel's:
The first one allows there to be a desire present, as an 
independent existence (in Hume's sense), but insists that it 
is not playing a Humean role. I t  is motivated, not 
motivating; we know that it is there because though we 
know that the beliefs in the case are sufficient explanation
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of the action, we aiiow Hume the point that every action is 
caused by a complex which includes a desire. The desire 
which must be present, then, must be one which is 
explained by the beliefs and which does not explain the 
beliefs' ability to motivate. The second theory maintains 
that though we ascribe a desire to a person motivated 
entirely by his beliefs, for instance a care for his own 
physical well-being, all that is meant by this is jus t that his 
beliefs were sufficient reason for him to act. Here we do 
not admit the need for a desire as an independent 
existence; we cail the belief's motivating the agent 'his 
doing it because he wanted.
For our purposes we don't need to decide which one of these 
interpretations is the correct one (perhaps they are both correct). 
But why is the Humean theory of motivation relevant to the 
question of whether or not desires are reason-giving? The answer 
Is that Nagel has provided us with a very good reason for believing 
that at least some non-instrumental desires are not 'original 
existences' In Hume's sense. Consider the following passage from 
Hume:
Ask a man why he uses exercises; he will answer because 
he desires to keep his health. I f  you then enquire why he
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desires heaith, he will readily reply because sickness is 
painfui. I f  you push your enquiries further and desire a 
reason why he hates pain, it is impossible he can ever give 
any. This is an ultimate end, and is never referred to any 
other object...beyond this it is an absurdity to ask for a 
reason. I t  is impossible there can be a progress in 
infinitum; and that one thing can always be a reason why 
another is desired. Something must be desirable on its 
own account....^®
I think this passage is significant since it reveals, at least in part, 
the real structure of our desires (even if Hume himself would have 
denied it). As Parfit puts it:
I t  is worth noting how, when Hume described such a chain 
of instrumental desires, he forgot his own theory. ... For 
'desirable' Hume should have written 'desired'. Something 
is desirable if it has features that give us reasons to want 
this thing. Hume denied that there could be such 
reasons.^®
Parfit's observation is, I believe, correct. However, this does not 
mean that anyone who wants to oppose Hume is committed to the 
claim that all desire chains must terminate in some object which is
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desirable in itself. I f  this were so, then opponents of Hume would 
have to say that our desires are infallible in the sense that they all 
track what is desirable, and clearly this is not so. What opponents 
of the Humean picture should say instead is that our desire chains 
must terminate in a belief or judgem ent that something is desirable 
in its own right; a belief which, of course, can be either true or 
faise. So although Hume's own account of desires, does not allow 
him to say that some objects are desirable in their own right (or 
that we judge them to be so), Hume may (perhaps unwittingly) be 
expressing something almost all of us take to be true: unless we 
thought that some action or object has some desirable features (i.e. 
that it has properties such that they provide us with reasons to 
desire that object), it would not make much sense to desire the 
thing in question.
To see that this is so, imagine someone, S, who professes to 
desire something for its own sake but who also vehemently (and 
honestly) denies that he takes this thing to be desirable; i.e. he 
denies that there is anything good about this thing. Consider the 
following example from Scanlon (which he in turn has borrowed 
from Quinn):
[Consider] a man who feels an urge to turn on every radio 
he sees. I t  is not that he sees anything good about radios 
being turned on; he does not want to hear music or news
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or even just to avoid silence; he simply is moved to turn 
any radio he sees to be off.
How couid we make sense of such a person? There is certainly 
something odd about saying that this person desires to turn on 
radios. Rather, this person appears to be someone who is suffering 
from some kind of obsessive-compulsive disorder. I t  seems that 
part of desiring something includes an evaluative aspect (i.e. seeing 
something good in, or about, the thing which is desired), and if this 
component is absent from a purported desire, it is more 
appropriate, I think, to describe this 'volition ' as merely an urge.
I think we should say that all those desires which Nagel called 
'unmotivated', are better understood as urges. I f  an agent is 
moved to do something without seeing anything good or worthwhile 
about doing this thing, then although this would be an example of 
an unmotivated desire in Nagel's sense, it is somewhat misleading 
to call it a desire. I want to suggest that ail unmotivated desires 
are, simply, urges. But if an agent is or would be moved to 0 
because of an urge he has (or would have), it is hard to see why we 
should say that he has a reason to (p - even if that urge is not the 
product of a false belief. After all, the agent himself admits that he 
sees nothing good or worthwhile about (f-ing. I t  seems reasonable 
to suppose that such an agent would agree that he has no reason to
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do that which he has the urge to do - and I think that, all things 
being equal, he would be right about this.
In the end, then, I think we arrive at the following picture: 
when we 'desire' an object, an action, or a state of affairs, we do so 
either because we see something good or worthwhile about that 
object, action, or state of affairs, or we do so because we simply 
have an urge to bring about the object of our urge. I f  someone is 
moved purely by an urge, I think we should say that, all things 
being equal, this person has no reason to do that which his urge 
bids him to do. On the other hand, if an agent's desire is motivated 
by some perceived good in or about an object or an action, then 
whether or not this agent has a reason to do the thing in question 
depends on whether his belief (perception) about the goodness of 
this object, action, or state of affairs is true. However, as Raz 
points out, the desire in this case is an endorsement of a reason (or 
a perceived reason) that is independent of the desire, and that 
endorsement does not itself affect the stock of reasons that existed 
before the agent came to endorse or appreciate them.^®
3.7 Desires and instrumental reasons
I think the preceding considerations provide us with the sufficient 
resources to dispel the Humean myth that'Reason is, and ought 
only be the slave of the passions'.^^ According to the Humean
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picture, since ou r'u ltim a te ' desires are not (and, indeed, cannot) be 
based on Reason (or reasons). Reason's only job is to point out the 
various ways in which our ultimate (and derivative) desires can be 
satisfied. But, as Williams points out: 'the mere discovery that 
some course of action is the causal means to an end is not in itself 
a piece of practical reason!ng.'^° So, on the one hand, Hume's 
claim can be interpreted as implying that there can be no such thing 
as practical reason at all. On the other hand, Hume's claim can be, 
and has been, interpreted as saying that, for any basic desire to (j), 
although we can have no reason to have that desire and no reason 
not to have that desire, if we do have a basic desire to (j), and if ip- 
ing is suitably related to $4ng (e.g. by being a necessary means to 
the satisfaction of our desire to (j>), then we do have a reason to ip.
I think there are good grounds for believing that Hume himself held 
the former view; but since it is common place for Humeans to 
assert the latter, I want to say something about this view.
According to these Humeans, then, although we can have no 
reason to have the basic desires we in fact have, we do have reason 
to act in certain ways in virtue of having those basic desires^ The 
view can be represented schematically as follows:
I f  A has a basic desire to (p and if A's ip-ing is suitably related
to A's (j)-ing, then A has a reason to
200
I think we should reject the Humean schema and the philosophical 
picture that underlies it. I have two closely related arguments 
against this view. First, consider the analogous case of beliefs. 
Suppose A believes that p, and A believes that if p then q, but A has 
no reason for believing p. Here we might be tempted to think that 
A has, in virtue of the beliefs he has, at least some reason to 
believe q since q obviously follows from the contents of the beliefs A 
has. But this is a mistake. To see this, imagine that A's belief that 
p is a contradiction and that A believes (correctly according to at 
least some logicians) that everything follows from a contradiction. 
On the current view this would imply that for every proposition 
there is (true and false) A has a reason to believe it. Clearly this is 
not so.
I t  might be objected that the analogy between the practical 
case and the theoretical one is illegitimate. I shall not try  to defend 
the analogy. For those who are not persuaded I will offer the 
second argument (which is due to Jonathan Dancy). I t  is a very 
simple argument, consisting of only one premise and a conclusion:
Premise: A desire to 0 cannot itself give us any reason to 0.
For if 0-ing is silly or even jus t not very sensible, wanting
to 0 does not make it less silly or a bit more sensible.
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Conclusion: I f  a desire to 0 gives us no reason to 0, it can 
give us no reason to do other actions either; in particular, 
it can give us no reason to do those actions that subserve 
0-ing (either as a means to 0-ing as end, or in some other
way).32
Both these arguments are, in effect, different versions of Michaei 
Bratman's 'bootstrapping' o b je c tio n ^ ^  which in turn can be seen as a 
version of Hume's own No 'ought' from an Vs'principle (where, of 
course, we need to replace 'ought' with 'reason(s)'). The main idea 
behind both these arguments is that unless we already have a 
reason to 0 or a reason to believe that p and to believe that if p 
then q, we cannot have a reason to ip or a reason to beiieve that q 
simply in virtue of having certain other desires or beliefs. In other 
words, we cannot bootstrap a reason into existence from nowhere.
For those who are still not persuaded - i.e. for those who 
think that if we have a basic desire to 0, or if we believe that p and 
we believe that if p then q, then in some sense, we must have some 
reason to %p and some reason to believe that q, respectively - let me 
say something about a very persuasive proposal put forward by 
John B r o o m e .3^  ^ Broome agrees with Bratman that it is a mistake to 
think that we can bootstrap reasons into existence from our beliefs 
and desires independently of whether these are already 
'normatively sanctioned' in some way. In the following short
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exposition of Broome's argument I shall follow him in talking about 
intentions rather than desires or beliefs although the same 
argument can be applied to those attitudes as well. Consider the 
following principle:
(I) I f  A intends to 0 and A believes that ip-ing is a necessary
means to 0, then A has a reason to intend to ip.
This principle has a 'detachable' consequent; i.e. the proposition 'A 
has a reason to intend to ip' can be validly detached or derived from 
(I) if A satisfies the conditions in the antecedent. However, says 
Broome, this is an illegitimate move; intending to 0 and believing 
that ip-ing is a necessary means to 0 cannot give you a reason to 
intend to ip even if the belief that ip-ing is a necessary means to 0- 
ing is true. A defender of (I) might say that A has a reason (or 
even more strongly, that he ought) on pain of inconsistency to 
intend to ip. But, says Broome, this is not so. The consistency 
requirement is correctiy captured by the following principle which he 
calls a 'normative requirement':
(NR) A has a reason to (intend to ip If A intends to 0 and A
believes that ip-ing is a necessary means to 0).3^
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Broome's point, then, is that although we might th ink that a 
person who has certain beliefs, desires, or intentions, has at least 
some reason to believe, desire, or intend that which those attitudes 
seem to call for on pain of inconsistency, this is not so. Rather, we 
are normatively required to believe (at least the immediate) 
consequences of our beliefs; to desire to take the necessary means 
to that which we desire; and to intend the necessary means to that 
which we intend. This does not, however, mean that we have a 
reason to believe, desire, or intend these things. As he puts it:
Relations among your beliefs and intentions are regulated 
by oughts that govern these relations - 'wide-scope oughts'
I shall call them. They imply no narrow-scope normative 
conditions on individual beliefs or intentions. ... Intending 
an end clearly stands in some sort of normative relation to 
intending a means. So if the only normative relation you 
think of is the relation of being a reason to, you are likely 
to think that intending an end is a reason to intend a 
means. Then.your view implies that, if you intend an end, 
you have a reason to intend a means. That is to say, if 
you intend an end, then the narrow scope normative 
condition of'having a reason to ' applies to your intending a 
means.
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But this is to misunderstand that structure of 
normativity. Suppose you intend to visit Rum, and the 
only way you can get there is to take the boat. A reason 
to intend to take the boat is that it will carry you to the 
wild and beautiful island of Rum. This reason exists 
independently of your intention to visit Rum. But if this 
intention was also a further reason to intend to take the 
boat, it would be a reason you create yourself by forming 
the intention to visit Rum. I t  is puzzling how you could 
create such a reason in that way....^^
I t  is obvious from this passage that Broome is expressing an 
externalist view of reasons. For present purposes, however, this 
makes no difference. I introduced Broome's views on normative 
requirements for the purpose of convincing those who believe that 
consistency requirements give us reasons to, e.g., believe the 
immediate consequences of what we believe. By accepting 
Broome's normative requirements we can accommodate our 
intuition that we ought to be consistent in such a way that we can 
retain that intuition without thereby committing ourselves to the 
idea that our beliefs, desires, or intentions are, in themselves, 
reason giving.
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3.8 Beliefs as sources of motivation
I have argued in this chapter that Williams cannot plausibly hold 
that beliefs can be motives while at the same time retain his 
internalism about reasons. I have tried to show that Williams is, in 
the end, committed to a Humean, or quasi-Humean view of 
reasons: the reasons we have for acting are given by our desires; 
desires which, in turn, we have no reason to have and no reason 
not to have. I think we should reject the Humean view and, 
consequently, internalism about reasons. To set the stage for the 
discussion about externalism which will follow in the next chapter, I 
want to say something briefly about how and why we should accept 
the thesis that beliefs are motives and that beliefs can motivate by 
themselves.
Earlier I said that we should think of a motive as that which 
can be adduced in our everyday explanation of intentional actions. 
So if beliefs can be motives, it must be possible that we could 
explain a person's intentional action by referring to that person's 
beliefs alone. For everyday explanations of action, I think citing a 
person's beliefs is indeed sufficient, but a more robust philosophical 
explanation of action requires more than this.
Suppose we were to ask why Bob went to Glasgow yesterday. 
The anti-Humean might respond by saying that Bob went to 
Glasgow because he believed that by doing so he could watch Hibs 
play Rangers at Ibrox. The Humean would undoubtedly respond by
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saying that the fact that Bob believed that he could watch Hibs play 
Rangers in Glasgow is at best an incomplete explanation of his 
action. A correct and complete explanation would have to include 
not only the fact that Bob believed that Hibs were playing Rangers 
at Ibrox, but it would also have to include some desire on Bob's part 
to attend the match. The Humean might argue along the following 
lines: Suppose Bob had no desire whatsoever to watch Hibs play 
Rangers, but he nonetheless believed that Hibs were playing 
Rangers in Glasgow. How then could the fact that Bob believed that 
Hibs were playing Rangers explain his going to Glasgow yesterday? 
Surely we need to include some desire of Bob's in a correct 
explanation of his going to Glasgow?
There are, as I see it, a number of answers available to the 
anti-Humean here. First, the anti-Humean shouid concede to the 
Humean that the fact that Bob believed that Hibs were playing 
Rangers at Ibrox is not, by itself, sufficient to explain Bob's going to 
Glasgow; Bob must also have had some kind of'eva luative ' belief to 
the effect that it would be entertaining or worthwhile for him to 
watch the match. However, since to believe that something is 
worthwhile is to believe that there are reasons for doing the thing in 
question (more on which in the next chapter), we can say that Bob 
must have had some belief to the effect that he had good reason to 
attend the match. Bob's belief that Hibs were playing Rangers at 
Ibrox (as opposed to at Easter Road in Edinburgh) should thus be
207
seen merely as a belief about the necessary means to 'promote' or 
'realise' that which he believed to be worthwhile (or that which he 
took himself to have good reason to do) - namely, to attend the 
match.
The Humean might at this point simply repeat his challenge 
by insisting that this only shows that Bob must have a desire to do 
that which he finds worthwhile (or that which he takes himself to 
have good reason to do). In effect, this Humean challenge is simply 
the practical analogue of the tortoise's challenge to Achilles in Lewis 
Carroll's famous s t o r y . In Carroll's original story the tortoise 
challenges Achilles to show why someone who refuses to conclude 
'q ' from 'if  p then q' and 'p ' is making a mistake. The tortoise 
suggests to Achilies that the conclusion follows only if the inference 
from ( I f  [ if  p then q and p] then q) is valid. Achilles agrees that this 
is the case, but then to his dismay he realises that he has just 
embarked on an infinite regress. The moral of the story is that 
Achilles cannot show that someone who refuses to make this 
inference is making a mistake without invoking the very thing the 
tortoise wants to challenge - namely the validity of Modus Ponens. 
This story has recently been modified by Simon Blackburn who 
presents it as a challenge to anti-Humeans in the theory of 
motivation. The moral of Blackburn's story is that
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there is always something else, something which is not 
under the control of fact or reason, which has to be given 
as a brute extra, if deliberation is ever to end by 
determining the will.^®
The 'brute extra' Blackburn is referring to here is of course an 
unmotivated desire. The challenge to the anti-Humean, then, 
consists in his showing that this sort of regress can be stopped 
without invoking a desire as the terminating 'brute extra'. I think 
the anti-Humean can meet this challenge. To begin with, the anti- 
Humean must obviously reject the idea that Bob's belief that it 
would be worthwhile to attend the match really is a desire in 
disguise. This does not mean that the anti-Humean must deny that 
Bob's belief that attending the Rangers v. Hibs match is a 
worthwhile activity motivated him to travel to Glasgow. I f  the 
Humean insists that a desire must be included in the explanation of 
Bob's going to Glasgow, the anti-Humean can quite happily admit 
that it is perfectiy iegitimate to ascribe to Bob such a desire simpiy 
in virtue of Bob's being motivated to do so. Crucially, however, this 
desire is not independent of Bob's beiief that it would be worthwhile 
to travel to Glasgow. On the contrary, Bob's desire to travel to 
Glasgow would be unintelligible without his beiief that it is a 
worthwhile thing to do.
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Of course, for it to be true of Bob that his belief motivated 
him, it must be true of Bob that he has a disposition such that (at 
least some of) his evaluative or normative beliefs motivate him. As 
Parfit puts it (and to repeat a point made in chapter one):
When we come to have some belief - such as the belief 
that some aim is worth achieving - that m ight cause us to 
have some wholly new desire. Such a belief could not all 
by itself cause us to have this desire, since we would have 
to be such that, if we came to have this belief, that would 
cause us to have this desire. But this disposition may not 
itself be a desire. On a variant of this anti-Humean view, 
whenever a belief moves us to act, we can be tru ly said to 
have wanted to act as we did; but this desire may not be a 
distinct mental state, since it may consist in our being 
moved by this belief. In either of these ways, reason 
might have the power that Hume denied. By giving us 
such beliefs, reason might motivate us without the help of 
any independent d e s i r e .
This disposition - being such that if we have certain normative 
and/or evaluative beliefs we are then motivated to act on these 
beliefs - seems to be exactly the kind o f'b ru te  extra' the anti- 
Humean needs to answer Blackburn's challenge. This brings us
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back to the discussion of rationality in chapter one. As we can now 
see, the disposition the Humean has to invoke is nothing over and 
above the very intelligible and non-mysterious disposition of acting 
according to one's normative beliefs, i.e. being rational in at least 
the formal sense (as described in chapter one).
I think these considerations strongly suggest that we can and 
should reject the Humean picture of motivation. However, I want 
to consider one more objection to the broadly cognitive view of 
motivation I have suggested we should accept. This objection is 
also related to issues we have already discussed. I t  stems from the 
observation that an agent might have various evaluative or 
normative beliefs without being motivated to act on those beliefs - if 
he is accidious or weak willed for example. Suppose someone who 
believes that it would be good (in some sense or other) to attend 
this afternoon's lecture fails to do because he is weak willed or 
accidious. Doesn't this simply show that this person lacked the 
requisite desire to go to the lecture? And if the absence of an 
appropriate desire in this case is sufficient for explaining why this 
person didn't attend the lecture, doesn't this show that was right 
after all: motivation (and action) can never take place without the 
presence of suitable desires.
The correct answer to this objection consists in holding that 
the disposition to act in accordance with one's normative or 
evaluative beliefs is such that it doesn't issue in actions under
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certain conditions. Since we can fail to act in accordance with our 
normative or evaluative beliefs, the disposition to act in accordance 
with our normative or evaluative beliefs must be understood as 
containing a 'barring weakness of will and accidie etc.' clause. A 
person who is rational in the formai sense is a person who acts in 
accordance with his or her normative beliefs under normal 
circumstances. However, when circumstances are not normal there 
will some explanation of why this counts as a non-normal 
circumstance. As Dancy points out, there are
no restrictions of the sorts of explanation that we are 
prepared to countenance. Sometimes the reason will be 
carelessness or inattention; sometimes it will be despair; 
sometimes it will be an excess of alcohol; sometimes it wili 
be a neuro-physiological disorder; and sometimes it will be 
clinical depression.
I think we should say, then, for a person who is rational in the 
formal sense, his or her normative beliefs are capable of motivating 
in their own right. But when they fail to do so there will be an 
explanation of this fact; an explanation which will proceed via an 
analysis of what it means to be rational. Normative or evaluative 
beliefs are, as Dancy puts it, 'contingently, but intrinsically 
motivating states'.
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3.9 Summary and conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that internalist cannot plausibly allow 
that beliefs can be motivating states. In general, propositions of 
the form 'The fact that p gives A a reason to 0' (which is the kind of 
proposition Williams considers) must be construed as external 
reasons statements. And as such, they cannot ground internal 
reasons statements - even if they motivate - on pain of 
contradiction. Even if a proposition of the form jus t mentioned is 
true on an internalist reading -  i.e. even i f 'p ' refers to what A is or 
would be motivated to do - and even if such a proposition motivates 
an agent, it is hardly going to be made true by its motivating power 
(if it has any). Rather, such propositions are more likely to be mere 
restatements of the internalist thesis itself. Internalism Is plausible 
only on a Humean theory of motivation. I have provided some 
arguments against this theory. We should reject internalism and 
Humeanism. In the next chapter I shall consider various externalist 
answers to the questions 'why should I be moral?'.
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W illiam s (2001).
^Skorupski (forthcoming).
^Williams (1981), p. 107.
'’Throughout this reconstruction I am going to assume (with 
Williams) that the agent - in this case Owen - is not akratic.
^If this is correct, then we should reject what I called reason 
judgement/motivation internalism in the previous chapter.
®It might be objected that this is a false dichotomy. I t  is possible to 
hold that the feature of G's S in virtue of which p is true is a 
'besire' - a mental state which has both the 'direction of f it ' of a 
belief and the direction of f it of a desire (see Altham (1986), 
McDowell (1978), McNaughton (1988), and Smith (1994)). I must 
however leave this point to the side.
W illiam s (1981), p. 102.
®See Lycan. I should point out that my discussion of tacit beliefs is 
heavily informed by Lycan's discussion, 
sgee Field.
’•°I have borrowed these examples from Lycan, p. 61.
^^Lycan, p. 65.
^^Ibid., p. 66. There seem to be some obvious problems with this 
approach. I take it that Dennett means by 'consequences of those 
beliefs' those propositions which are implied by the content of that 
belief. I f  that is so, suppose that A has somehow stored two 
contradictory beliefs. I f  A's extrapolator-deducer is in good working 
order, then since everything is implied by a contradiction, it should 
generate...what? Every proposition there is? But clearly nobody in 
their right mind would want to say that such an agent tacitly 
believes everything. An obvious way of getting round this problem 
would be to stipulate that one cannot have contradictory core 
beliefs. This move obviously needs to be supplemented by some 
story about what can count as a core belief and what cannot. 
Suppose that one of A's core beliefs is that all extended objects 
have mass. I t  is an obvious 'consequence' of this belief that all 
extended objects have mass or Tottenham play attractive football. 
But what if A would not judge this to be so? Does that mean that 
he does not have the belief that all extended objects have mass; or 
is it perhaps the case that he does have this belief, only it is not a 
core one; or, again, perhaps he doesn't understand the rule o f 'o r-  
introduction'?
^^We can see now that even if we allow that Owen's basic belief is 
true, his derivative belief, as it stands is at best incomplete and at 
worst false. I t  is not the case that [the fact that family tradition 
bids him to join the army] gives him a reason to jo in the army. 
Rather it is the conjunctive fact that [he has a reason to do
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whatever family tradition bids him to do and family tradition bids 
him to jo in the army] which gives him a reason to jo in the army. 
'^’See Field.
^^Lycan, p. 70.
^^Davidson (1994), p. 232.
^^Davidson (2001), p. 221.
’•^Segal, p. 146.
^^Williams (1981), p. 107.
^°Parfit (forthcoming), see Ch. 6.
3^Hume (1978), p. 415.
^^It should perhaps be pointed out that although Nagel's discussion 
of the possibility of a purely cognitive theory of motivation is mainly 
concerned with prudential considerations, other authors, especially 
McDowell, have pressed the need for extending this theory of 
motivation to cover moral considerations as well.
^^Nagel, p. 29.
'^’Dancy (1993), pp. 8-9.
2^Hume (1975), p. 293.
^^Parfit (forthcoming), Ch 3.
^^Scanlon (1998), p. 38.
^3Raz (1986), p. 141.
^^Hume (1978), p. 415.
3°Williams (1981), p. 104.
3% hat should count as 'suitable' here is a matter of controversy. 
Most, if not all, Humeans agree that there is a suitable relation 
between 0-ing and i|)-ing if the latter is a necessary means to the 
former. But this does not mean that 'being a necessary means to ' 
is the only suitable relation. As Williams says 'A clear example of 
practical reasoning is that leading to the conclusion that one has 
reason to 0 because 0-ing would be the most convenient, 
economical, pleasant etc. way of satisfying some element in S ....' 
(Williams (1981), p. 104.)
3^Dancy (2000), p. 32.
^^Bratman, pp. 23-7. See also Broome (1997) and (2001). 
'^’Broome (1997).
3^More precisely, Broome calls this a 'normative recommendation'. 
This is a different normative relation from normative requirements 
which have the stronger'ought' operator governing the conditional. 
The difference need not concern us here.
3®Broome (forthcoming).
32Carroll, pp. 278-80.
3®Blackburn, pp. 695-711.
3^ Parfit (1997), p. 105. On an alternative view, one could hold that 
there's no need to posit such a disposition. On this view (call it 
dispositionalism), all mental states, including beliefs, are 
dispositional. According to this view, A's believing that p consists in
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(among other things) A's being disposed (motivated) to infer q if A 
believes if p then q; A's being motivated to give up his belief that p 
if presented with good evidence for not-p; A's being motivated to 
assert p if sincere etc. Although I think there's quite a lot to be said 
for this view, I shall not defend it here.
'’^Dancy (1993), p. 25.
216
CHAPTER FOUR:
EXTERNALISM AND W H Y  WE SHOULD BE MORAL
4.1 Introduction
In the previous two chapters I provided some arguments against 
internalism about reasons for action. I do not want to suggest that 
these arguments are conclusive but I nevertheless th ink they put 
enough pressure on internalism to make it unattractive as an 
analysis of reasons. I t  is important to stress that I do not think we 
should reject internalism (merely) because it gives a particular 
answer to the question 'why should I be moral?' (an answer which, 
incidentally, I have not confronted directly, though it's générai 
shape should be fairly obvious) - rather, we should reject 
internalism because it provides us with an implausible, and I would 
add, mistaken, account of reasons and normativity. Since I think 
we should reject internalism, I think we should be externalists 
about reasons. But what exactly does externalism about reasons 
amount to? And more importantly, how does externalism about 
reasons relate to the question we are interested in - 'Why should I 
be moral?' In this chapter I will try  to sketch at least a preliminary 
answer these two questions.
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4.2  Externalism, reasons, and value
So far I have said only that externalism denies the central claim of 
internalism -  the claim that a necessary condition for the obtaining 
of a reason for A to 0 is that A either has a motive which will be 
served by his 0-ing or that A would in suitable circumstances be 
motivated to 0. There is however a slight compiication here. 
Strictly speaking, externalists need not deny that if A has a reason 
to 0 then A would, under certain specified circumstances, be 
motivated to (some degree to) 0. Of course externalists who 
endorse this view will have a specific conception of what those 
circumstances are; and this conception is naturally going to be 
different from the one endorsed by internalists. As Susan Hurley 
puts it:
Those who endorse the view that R [('there is a reason for 
A to 0')] entails that M [( 'if  A knew the relevant facts and 
was rational, she would be motivated to 0')] may do so for 
quite different reasons. Their underlying views about the 
relations between reasons and motivation may be very 
different. For example, someone could hold that M is true 
in virtue of R, a modification of the broadly Platonic view 
that you cannot tru ly know the good without loving it. 
Someone else could hold that not-R is true in virtue of not- 
Mf a broadly Humean view that having a reason to act
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consists of no more that some facts about actual or 
hypothetical motivation, so that the reason claim is false in 
virtue of the falsity of the relevant claims about 
motivation. Though both agree that R entails M, they do 
so for opposite reasons/
Another reason why internalists and externalists may agree about 
R's entailing M but for different reasons may stem from the fact that 
they have different conceptions of what is meant by 'rational 
deliberation'. In chapter one, I said that 'rational' was ambiguous 
and I distinguished between a formal and a substantive conception 
of rationality. This ambiguity, it seems, is here exported to the idea 
of rational deliberation. Discussing Williams (qua internalist). Brad 
Hooker says:
The external reasons theorist will...be dissatisfied with 
Williams' conception of rational practical deliberation - in 
contrast to Williams, the external theorist is likely to think 
that (at least some) rational deliberation about reasons for 
action starts not from the agent's own subjective present 
motivations, but from some objective ('external') values or 
requirements, fixed independently of the agent's present 
motivations. So, the external reasons theorist will deny 
that the content of the proposition that there is a reason
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for one to 0 is to be captured by the proposition that, if one 
deliberated rationally according to Williams' conception of 
rational deliberation, one would be motivated to 0 /
On the externalist conception of reasons (and rational deliberation), 
then, since an agent's reasons are not grounded in her motives, 
what then are they be grounded in? A natural, and not entirely 
implausible answer is that, as Hooker suggests, agents' reasons for 
actions are grounded in, derived from, or in some other way related 
to the goodness of the actions in question. A simple version of this 
theory would be: A has reason to 0 if and only if 0-ing is (in some 
sense or other) good. Theories of this kind are usuaily called 
'value-based' or 'teleological' theories of reasons. On this 
conception of reasons, it is because 0-ing is good that we have a 
reason to 0. A natural extension of this theory is the idea that the 
more valuable 0-ing is the more reason we have to do it, and, 
consequently, what we have most reason to do is what is most 
valuable.
As we saw in chapter one, Prichard thought that it was a 
mistake to appeal to value-based reasons in an attempt to supply 
an answer to 'why should I be moral?' This belief was prompted by 
Prichard's scepticism about there being any kind of reasons we can 
appeal to in order to show that we ought to be moral (a scepticism 
which in turn stems from his intuitionism about moral obligation).
220
However,, the view that reasons are value-based has also come 
under pressure in more recent discussions of the topic.
In What We Owe to Each Other^ Scanlon argues that we 
should adopt a 'buck-passing' account of value. According to this 
account, reasons are not based on values; ra the r'fo  call something 
vaiuable is to say that it has other properties that provides reasons 
for behaving in certain ways with regard to it.'^ The sort of 
behaviour that is calied for will vary from object to object (and thus 
from properties to properties); in some cases there will be reasons 
for us to admire the object, in others there will be reasons to 
respect it, to promote its existence and flourishing, to desire it and 
so on. As Scanlon rightly points out: 'Understanding the value of 
something is not jus t a matter of knowing how valuable it is, but 
rather a matter of knowing how to value it - knowing what kinds of 
actions and attitudes are called for.''’
However, this version of the buck-passing account should be 
contrasted with the one Scanlon presents a page later. He says:
...being good, or valuable, is not a property that itself 
provides a reason to respond to a thing in certain ways. 
Rather, to be good or valuable is to have other properties 
that constitute such reasons. ...this account...takes 
goodness and value to be non-natural properties, namely 
the purely formal, higher-order properties of having some
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lower-order properties that provide reasons of the relevant 
k in d /
At first glance, these two accounts may appear to be the same, but 
in fact, they are very different. The first is an account of what we 
mean by the words 'good' and 'valuable'. The second version tells 
us what it is for something to be valuable. The buck passing 
account of value can therefore take two different forms:
Analytically Reductive: When we assert that x is valuable, 
what we mean is that x has other properties that provide 
us with a reason (or reasons) to adopt a pro attitude 
toward x.
Non-analytically Reductive: Though 'x is valuable' and 'x 
has properties that provide us with a reason (or reasons) 
to adopt a pro attitude toward x ' do not mean the same, 
when 'x is valuable' is true that fact is the same as, or 
consists in, the fact that x has properties that provide us 
with a reason (or reasons) to adopt a pro attitude toward
X.
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I t  Is unclear which account Scanlon takes himself to be providing.
He says that he is led to the buck-passing account by reflections on 
the implications of Moore's open question argument about 'good'.
According to Moore, it is a mistake to try to provide a 
reductive analysis of the meaning of 'good'. His argument runs 
roughly as follows. Suppose some philosopher were to suggest that 
'good' means 'conducive to happiness'. I f  these concepts were 
indeed synonymous, then the question 'x  is conducive to happiness, 
but is X good?' would be equivalent to asking 'x  is good, but is x 
good?'. But these two questions are not equivalent: the former is a 
perfectly legitimate question whereas the latter is, if not 
nonsensical, then at least very odd. But since this is so, it cannot 
be the case that 'conducive to happiness' means the same as 
'good'. Importantly, the point can be generaiised: for any proposed 
naturalistic® analysis of'good ', it will always make sense to ask 
whether an object (or an action, or a state of affairs) which 
instantiates this natural property really is good. Hence the meaning 
o f'good ' cannot be analysed in terms of some natural property or 
properties. Moore of course thought that many things are good: 
happiness, friendship, and beauty are all good things according to 
Moore, but these things are good because they all have attached to 
them the unanalysable property of goodness.
However, Moore seems to have failed to distinguish the two 
kinds of analyses mentioned above in his discussion of'good '. I t
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appears Moore thought he could derive substantive conclusions 
about the nature of goodness (namely, that it is sui generis) by 
analysing the meaning of the term 'good'. Many contemporary 
philosophers doubt that this can be done. To illustrate the 
difference between the two kinds of accounts consider the following 
well known example: water is H2O, but 'water' does not mean 'H2O' 
- 'water' means, roughly, 'the tasteless, odour-less, clear liquid that 
falls from the sky and can be found in lakes and rivers'. As it turns 
out this liquid happens to be H2O. That water is H2O is an empirical 
discovery, but this does not mean that people did not know what 
'water' meant before it was discovered that water is H2O.
Moore's 'Open Question Argument', if successful, shows at 
most that 'good' is not analytically reducible to anything else - i.e. it 
shows that the meaning o f'good ' cannot be explicated in terms of 
some other concept or concepts. Even if this is correct, Moore has 
not demonstrated that the property of being good cannot be 
identical to, say, the property of being conducive to pleasure. I t  is 
therefore important to keep semantic and metaphysical analyses 
and/or reductions separate. The buck-passing account of value, 
conceived of as an account of the meaning of 'good' or 'valuable', 
does however put pressure on Moore's account of the 'semantic 
autonomy' of 'good' and 'valuable'. I t  says that the meaning of 
these words can indeed be captured by using the non-natural 
concept o f'a  reason' (and the natural(?) concept of a 'pro
224
a ttitu d e ') / Whether or not the buck-passing account succeeds in 
capturing the m eaning'of'good' or'va luable ' I shall leave 
unexamined.
As a non-analytically reductive account of value, the buck- 
passing account may be put as follows:
For all X, X is valuable if and only if x has other properties 
that provide us with a reason to adopt a pro attitude 
toward x.
I t  is of course true that x can be valuable in different ways: x can 
be instrumentally valuable - that is, valuable as a means to 
something else - or as an end in itself - that is, valuable for its own 
sake (or 'fina lly ' valuable). Thus, x is valuable for its own sake iff x 
has other properties that provide us with a reason to adopt a pro 
attitude toward x for its own sake; and x is instrumentally valuable 
iff X has other properties that provide us with a reason to adopt a 
pro attitude toward x for the sake of its effects.
It  seems uncontroversial that the le ft-to-right implication of 
the buck-passing account is correct: if x is valuable (either finally or 
instrumentally), then x has other properties that provide us with 
reasons to adopt a pro attitude toward x. However, it is not clear 
that the right-to-left implication is correct. There are philosophers 
who have argued that an object might be totally devoid of value
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whilst still possessing properties in virtue of which we have a reason 
to have a pro attitude toward that object. Suppose some object x 
(a bottomless drinking glass say) lacks final value and that some 
eccentric millionaire has made a standing offer to anyone who 
forms a pro attitude toward x for its own sake that he or she will 
receive a million pounds for having this attitude. In this case it 
seems we all have a reason to form a pro attitude toward x for its 
own sake; yet x is, ex hypothesi, not finally valuable.^
Whether or not this is a good objection to the buck-passing 
account of value is for present purposes not very important. What 
is important, however, is the fact that Scanlon thinks that an 
object's being valuable is not itse lf a property of that object which 
gives us a reason to act in a certain way with regard to it. Although 
Scanlon does suggest that an object's being valuable can be 
analysed in terms of that object's having other properties such that 
they provide reasons for having a pro attitude toward that object, 
he is not, he says, providing an account of what it is for something 
to be valuable:
I t  is not a "theory" of value: neither a systematic account 
of which things are valuable, nor an explanation of the 
"source" of value.®
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In light of this, I think we should interpret Scanlon's buck-passing 
account, not as a reductive account of value, but as a redundancy 
theory of value - i.e. as theory according to which reasons are not 
grounded in the value of an object (or action, or state of affairs); 
rather, reasons exist or obtain in virtue of the obtaining of those 
features of an object on which the value of that object supervenes. 
On this theory, the value of an object, event, state of affairs etc. is, 
we might say, normatively epiphenomenal. The idea is that if an 
action is good because it is kind, say, then it is the kindness of the 
action that provides us with a reason to approve of it and to 
encourage others to perform similar actions etc. I t  is not as if the 
kindness of the act makes it valuable and then that the value of the 
action gives us a reason to approve of it. Therefore it is false, or at 
least misleading, to say that reasons are value-basecf. I t  will of 
course be true on this theory that if x is valuable then there is 
reason to form a pro-attitude toward x, so it will be true on this 
theory that reasons are 'value-related'. I believe we should accept 
the buck-passing account of value understood as a doctrine about 
the redundancy (or normative epiphenomenalism) of value(s) with 
respect to reasons for action and reasons for forming pro attitudes 
etc. The only justification I can offer for my accepting the buck- 
passing account of value is that it strikes me as, simply, correct.^® 
So if reasons are not desire-based (as I tried to show in 
chapters two and three), and they are not value-based, then what
227
are they based on? The buck-passing account says that our 
reasons are based on, or stem from, or obtain in virtue of, the 
obtaining of those properties of an action on which that action's 
value supervenes. So what are these properties then? I have no 
general answer to this question, but I suspect no one eise does 
either. I am not saying that such an answer cannot be found, but 
for my purposes in this dissertation I need not supply such an 
answer. Nonetheless, regardless of what the truth is about these 
reason-grounding properties, a serious problem for any attempt to 
answer the question 'why should ! be moral?' still remains, and this 
problem certainly demands an answer. I will refer to this problem 
as 'Scanlon's dilemma'.^^
4.3 Scanlon s dilemma
Scanlon says that the question 'why should I be moral?' can be 
understood as a request for a demonstration that considerations of 
right and wrong are really reason-giving. However, in trying to 
show this, we face an awkward dilemma. As Scanlon puts it:
Attempts to explain how the fact that an action is wrong 
provides a reason not to do it face a difficult dilemma. 
Understood in one way, the answer is obvious: the reason 
not to do the action is jus t that it is wrong. But this is
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surely not the kind of answer that is wanted: it simply 
takes the reason-giving force of moral considerations for 
granted. Suppose, on the other hand, that we were to 
appeal to some clearly nonmoral reason, such as that 
people have reason to be morally good because, taking 
into account the effort that deception requires, the 
likelihood of being found out, and the costs of social 
ostracism, it is in their self-interest to be moral. This 
account might supply a reason for doing the right thing, 
but it would not be the kind of reason that we suppose a 
moral person first and foremost to be moved by.^^
Although Scanlon's dilemma is difficult in its own right, there is an 
additional problem associated with attempts to answer 'why be 
moral?' which is not well brought out in the passage jus t quoted. 
Even if we can supply a reason for taking wrongness seriously, we 
will not have answered the moral question as I understand it. What 
we need to show in order to answer the moral question, is not 
merely that we have a reason to be moral (or to refrain from doing 
that which is wrong). Even if we can show this in a way which 
escapes Scanlon's dilemma, it doesn't follow that we should be 
moral. For all we know, the reason we have for being moral ( if we 
do have such a reason) may be a very weak reason, a reason that
229
can, and perhaps often is, outweighed by reasons of self-interest if 
and when the two types of reasons conflict.
According to Scanlon, when we ask 'why be moral?' we might 
do so for at least two different reasons: the question may be asked 
with the aim of self-understanding, or with the aim of justification.^^ 
He says;
The task of explaining how the fact that an action would be 
wrong provides a reason not to do it can be seen, first, as 
a task of self-understanding: we want to understand the 
reasons we are responding to when we are moved by 
moral considerations.^"^
But as he (in my mind rightly) points out:
...there seems to be more at stake than mere 
interpretation of the reasons we take ourselves to have.
Even from the point of view of those of us who already 
care about right and wrong, a mere portrait of what it is 
we care about may seem to give us less than what we 
want: what we want to know is not merely what we care 
about when we care about right and wrong but why this is 
something we must care about. [...] This might be put 
saying that what the question "Why be moral?" calls for is
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not mere self-understanding but justification: an account 
of why we and others have compelling reason to be 
moral.
However, he says, 'justification' is a misleading term for what is 
needed here. I t  is misleading in two different ways. First,
[ i ] t  is misleading to say that what those of us who already 
care about right and wrong are looking for in our own case 
is a justification, because this suggests that we th ink we 
should abandon our concern with right and wrong unless 
some additional ground for it can be provided.
I must confess that I do not understand why it is misleading to ask 
for a justification for our concern about right and wrong. What does 
Scanlon mean by 'additional' ground here? Additional to what? Our 
caring about right and wrong? I t  is implausible to suggest that our 
caring about a certain institution or practice Is in itself sufficient to 
legitimise or justify our continued concern with that institution or 
practice. Of course, it may be true of those who care about a 
particular practice that they are not concerned with providing a 
justification for it, but this has nothing to do with whether they 
should or should not give up that practice. Even if a self-proclaimed 
Übermensch felt no need to justify his cruel action to some
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unfortunate person, it is stiii an open question whether he is 
justified (in the relevant sense) in engaging in acts of cruelty.
This brings us to Scanlon's second reason why he thinks 
calling this an aim of justification is misleading. Scanlon says:
I t  is also misleading to say that we are looking for a way of 
justifying the morality of right and wrong to someone who 
does not care about it - an "amoralist" - because this 
suggests that what we are looking for is an argument that 
begins from something to which such a person must be 
already committed and shows that anyone who accepts 
this starting point must recognize the authority of the 
morality of right and wrong.
In one sense this is correct. I f  we can, through sound argument, 
justify  morality to someone who is not an amoralist, why shouldn't 
this argument be equally sound for an amoralist? I f  we can produce 
a rationally compelling argument which shows that the normative 
force of moral considerations is such that it trumps all other 
considerations, why should it matter if an amoralist is left cold by 
our argument? I f  justifying morality to an amoralist consists in 
providing him with a psychologically compelling answer (like 
Prichard mistakenly thought), the prospect of finding such a 
justification may be very bleak indeed. On the other hand, why
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should we think that justifying morality to an amoralist must 
proceed via something he already cares about? This would be the 
case, I think, only if some version of internalism about reasons was 
roughly right, but fortunately this is not so.
Since he rightfully doubts that a justification of the former 
kind can always be provided, what should be sufficient to allay our 
'reasonable concerns', Scanlon says, 'is a fuller explanation of the 
reasons for action that moral conclusions supply.' However, 'In  
giving this explanation [...] we must address the problem of the 
moral "m ust" - the seeming necessity of moral concerns....'^® 
Explaining this 'm ust' will then consist in explaining why 
considerations of wrongness always (or almost always) takes 
priority over other values and why failing 'to see the reason-giving 
force of such considerations strikes us a particularly serious fault.'^®
But if an explanation of the moral 'm ust' is a part of what we 
are looking for when our aim is self-understanding, a natural 
question to ask is how the aim of self-understanding differs from 
the aim of justification. I f  we aim to 'understand the reasons we 
are responding to when we are moved by moral considerations', we 
are of course presupposing that there are such things as moral 
considerations (how else could we be moved by them?) and that 
these considerations provide us with genuine reasons (if they did 
not then the aim of understanding them would be an exercise in 
futility). A sceptic could of course deny that are any moral
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considerations; or, alternatively, he could hold that although there 
are such things as moral considerations^ these considerations do 
not provide us with reasons for action. But if we presuppose that 
there are moral considerations and that these considerations 
provide us with reasons to act, what is left of the aim of self- 
understanding? 'To explain why the moral "m ust" always takes 
priority over other values' seems to be the obvious answer. 
However, if we really can explain why moral considerations take 
precedence over other considerations (in a way that escapes 
Scanlon's dilemma) we will, ipso facto, have supplied a justification 
for morality. What else could a justification for morality consist in?
4.4  Scanlon's contractualism as an answer to the dilemma
Before we can assess Scanion's answer to the morai question we 
first need to know what Scanlon's conception of wrongness is. His 
contractualist formula (SC) runs as follows:
An act is wrong if and only if its performance under the 
circumstances would be disallowed by any set of principles 
for the general regulation of behavior that no one could 
reasonably reject {from an individual standpoint) as a basis 
for informed, unforced general agreement.^®
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For the sake of exposition, I shall call the property of being 
'disallowed by any set of principles for the general regulation of 
behavior that no one could reasonably reject {from an Individual 
standpoint) as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement' 
(RR).
So what is this formula supposed to show? On one 
interpretation it is intended to reveal (merely) the nature of 
wrongness - i.e. what it is for an act to be wrong. On another 
interpretation, (SC) purports to show what the ground of wrongness 
is - I.e. what makes an act w r o n g . T o  see the difference between 
these interpretations, consider the case of what it is for something 
to be fragile. An object, x, is fragile if and only if x would break in 
certain circumstances - this is what i t  is for something to be fragile. 
However, the grounds for x's fragility - i.e. what makes x fragile - is 
x's micro-physical structure.
Scanlon vacillates between these interpretations of (SC). 
Sometimes he seems to suggest that (SC) should be given a 
stronger reading according to which it reveals the ground of 
wrongness. He writes:
a defence of contractualism has to argue that the idea of 
justifiab ility to others can be seen to play an important role 
in shaping our thinking about right and wrong, and that 
particular moral arguments seem to establish that an
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action is wrong just when, and Just because, they show 
that so acting could not be justified to others on grounds 
they could not reasonably re ject/^
According to this version of (SC), an act is wrong because it has 
property (RR). There are as far as I am aware at least two 
objections to this interpretation of (SC). We may cail these the 
Euthyphro objection and the Redundancy objection, respectively. 
The first kind of objection is voiced by Judith Thomson who writes
I cannot bring myself to believe that what makes it wrong 
to torture babies to death for fun (for example) is that 
doing this 'would be disallowed by any system of rules as a 
basis for the general regulation of behavior which no one 
could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced 
general agreement.' My impression is that the explanation 
goes in the opposite direction - that it is the patent 
wrongfulness of the conduct that explains why there would 
be general agreement to disallow it.^^
I t  is natural to think of objections of this sort as being motivated by 
a kind of intuitionism about wrongness. According to this kind of 
intuitionism, wrongness is a simple, non-natural, unanalysable 
property similar to the property of goodness that Moore thought he
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had identified. Scanlon obviously - and for good reason - wants to 
avoid this kind of intuitionism. Apart from epistemological worries 
about how we come to know about these properties, since one of 
Scanlon's aims is to 'characterize wrongness in a way that makes 
clear what reasons wrongness provides'^"^ it is obvious why he can't 
accept that wrongness is unanalysable. I shall, however, argue that 
Scanlon's contractualism cannot provide such a characterisation. To 
see why this is so we need to take a look at the redundancy 
objection to (SC).
I f  an act is wrong because it has property (RR), then 
obviously we cannot reasonably reject a principle on the grounds 
that (or because) the action it prescribes is wrong. But this is 
where the charge of redundancy comes in. As Michael Ridge puts 
it:
whenever principles allowing an action are reasonably 
rejectable because such actions have feature F, such 
actions are wrong simply in virtue of having F and not 
because their having F makes principles allowing them 
reasonably rejectable,
So if we can reasonably reject a principle on the grounds that the 
act it prescribes is unfair, say, then it seems that it is the unfairness 
of the act - and not its having the property (RR) - which makes it
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wrong. But If this is so, an act's having the property (RR) is 
redundant with respect to that act's wrongness.
Furthermore, even if having property (RR) should be 
understood as specifying the grounds of wrongness, then 
wrongness must be a separate property from property (RR), and 
the reason-giving force of wrongness itse lf m\\ not have been 
explained. In response to these objections, Scanlon says 
(inconsistently with what he says on p. 11 of What We Owe to Each 
Other) :
The contractualist formula...is intended as an account of 
what it is for an act to be wrong. What makes an act 
wrong are the properties that would make any principle 
that allowed it one that it would be reasonable to reject.
Here Scanlon says that his contractualism should be understood as 
merely specifying the necessary and sufficient conditions (i.e. the 
nature of wrongness) for an act's being wrong which is not the 
same as specifying the ground of wrongness. On this 
interpretation, Scanlon's contractualism is not open to the two 
objections jus t mentioned (or at least not obviously so) since those 
objections arise only if (SC) is understood as aiming to specify the 
ground of wrongness.
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However, even If Scanlon's contractualism should be 
understood merely as an account of the nature of wrongness (as 
opposed to the ground of wrongness), by holding onto his intuition 
that 'the fact that an act is wrong seems itse lf to provide us with a 
reason not to do it'^^ his account is still vulnerable to a version of 
the redundancy objection. Suppose (for reductio) that an act's 
having the property of being wrong provides us with a reason not to 
do the thing in question. I f  the property of being wrong is identical 
to property (RR), then an action's having property (RR) must 
provide us with a reason not to perform that action. But it does not 
seem to. I f  an action has property (RR) because it has feature F, 
then the reason we have for not doing the thing in question is 
provided by the fact that the action has feature F, not that it has 
property (RR). Therefore, having property (RR) seems redundant 
with respect to the reasons we have for not doing the thing in 
question. So if having property (RR) is identical with being wrong, 
then since having property (RR) is not reason-giving, an act's being 
wrong is not reason-giving either. Hence Scanlon cannot explain 
how an acts wrongness provides us with a reason not to do it. And 
the reason why he cannot explain this is (as I am going to argue) 
that an act's wrongness does not provide us with a reason not to do 
the thing in question.
I t  is somewhat surprising that although he endorses a buck- 
passing account of value, Scanlon explicitly rejects a buck-passing
239
account of wrongness. Unlike the property of being valuable, 
apparently, the property of being wrong is in itself reason-giving 
according to Scanlon. However, as Stratton-Lake has recently 
pointed out^®, if he abandons the view that wrongness is in itself 
reason-giving, he can escape both the Euthyphro and the 
Redundancy objection. In other words, Scanion should hold the 
view that (SC) only tells us what the nature of wrongness is 
(thereby avoiding both the Euthyphro and Redundancy objections) 
and adopt a buck-passing account of wrongness (thereby giving 
himself a chance, at least, to explain why considerations that make 
acts wrong also give us reason not to do wrong acts). He could 
reformulate his aim so that it was no longer to characterise 
wrongness in a way that makes dear what reasons wrongness 
provides, but rather to show why considerations in virtue of which 
actions are wrong provide us with reasons.
Scanlon himself hints at what such an account of wrongness 
would look like. He says that on such an account wrongness would 
be 'the higher order property of violating (some or other) important 
standards of conduct and therefore being open to (some or other) 
serious objection.'^® However, even if Scanlon abandons his original 
intuition and adopts a buck-passing account of wrongness, he still 
needs to explain how contractualism can account for the priority of 
moral reasons over other kinds of reasons. In other words, he still 
needs to explain why we should (or ought to) be moral.
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In the remainder of this chapter I will try to provide at least a 
preliminary sketch of what I th ink a successful buck-passing 
account of wrongness will look like. I think a such an account can 
supply the right kind of answer to the moral question. I t  can do 
this in a way which escapes both the dilemma that Prichard 
discussed (i.e. the dilemma which arises if we attempt to give a 
purely teleological justification/explanation of why we should be 
moral) and the dilemma that Scanlon attributes to Prichard. The 
account will be consistent with the metanormative assumptions I 
made in chapter one and it will show that acting morally is rational 
in the strongly substantive sense o f'ra tiona l' identified in chapter 
one; i.e. we are, in fact, fully practically justified in acting morally. 
Although my account shares some features of Scanlon's account, it 
is distinct from it. Unfortunateiy, I cannot provide an iron-clad 
defence of my account in the remainder of this dissertation - some 
questions will have to be left unanswered. Nonetheless, I think the 
particular kind of buck-passing account of wrongness I am going to 
sketch goes a long way toward answering the moral question.
4.5  A buck-passing account of wrongness?
As we have seen, buck-passers about value believe that the 
property of being valuable is not itself a reason-giving property. 
Rather, to be valuable is to have other properties that provide us
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with reasons to respond to valuable things in a certain way. So 
what are the merits of a buck-passing account of wrongness? 
Consider the following generic non-analytically reductive buck- 
passing account of wrongness (an account which is strictly 
analogous to the non-analytically reductive buck-passing account of 
value):
...being wrong, is not a property that itself provides a 
reason to respond to an action in certain ways. Rather, for 
an act to be wrong is for it to have other properties that 
constitute such reasons. ...this account...takes wrongness 
to be a non-natural property, namely the purely formal, 
higher-order property of having some lower-order 
properties that provide reasons of the relevant kind.
I call this a 'generic' account because on the face of it, this account 
seems 'form al' enough to be acceptable to a wide range of moral 
theorists: Kanbans, utilitarians, and virtue ethicists should all be 
able to accept this account. These theorists will of course disagree 
about what the relevant lower-order properties are, but this does 
not mean that they couldn't all accept this generic version of the 
buck-passing account of wrongness.
I f  we accept a buck-passing account of wrongness we have a 
way of avoiding Scanlon's dilemma. Recall that the dilemma was
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supposed to show that all attempts to explain why an act's 
wrongness gives us reason not to do it are either circular or of the 
wrong kind. But now we should be able to see that this is not a 
dilemma for the buck-passing account of wrongness. This account 
does not try  to explain why the fact that an action is wrong provides 
a reason not to do it. This is precisely what the account denies and 
what 'passing the buck' means: the wrongness of an act does not 
provide us with reason not to do the act; rather it is those 
considerations in virtue of which an act is wrong which provide us 
with reason not to do the act in question. On this account, 
wrongness is (like value, or being valuable) normatively 
epiphenomenal: the fact that an act is wrong merely 'signals' that 
this act has properties which provide us with reason not to do it.^° 
But does this not merely postpone the problem? On the one 
hand, the relevant lower-order property of a wrong action in virtue 
of which we have a reason not to perform such an action cannot be 
the property of being wrong - if it were, the buck-passing account 
of wrongness would either be viciously circular or not a buck- 
passing account at all. On the other hand, if the lower-order 
properties of wrong actions (whichever ones they are) are such that 
they give us only some clearly non-moral reason not to perform 
such actions, these properties seem to provide us with the wrong 
kind of reasons - how could an act's wrongness consist in its having
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a property which gives us a non-moral reason for not performing 
such an act?
Fortunately for the buck-passer of wrongness, however, 
although the relevant lower-order reason-giving property of wrong 
acts can neither be the property of being wrong, nor a property 
such that it gives us a non-morai reason for performing acts that 
are wrong, these two kinds of properties do not exhaust the logical 
space of properties (unlike moral and non-moral reasons which 
jo in tly  do exhaust the logical space of reasons). There can still be 
properties - other than the property of being wrong - which provide 
us with reasons of the requisite kind. After ali, there are other 
moral properties besides the property of being wrong.
So what are these properties then? My contention is that the 
relevant properties are those properties that can be accurately 
described by using 'th ick ' ethical concepts like 'cruel', 
'inconsiderate', 'unfa ir' etc.. About such concepts, Williams says:
[Thick ethical concepts] are characteristically related to 
reasons for action. I f  a concept of this kind applies, this 
often provides someone with a reason for action, though 
that reason need not be a decisive one and may be 
outweighed by other reasons.... We may say, summarily, 
that such concepts are "action-guiding."^^
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Two things are of importance in this passage. First, Wiiliams says 
that 'if  a concept of this kind applies [to an action], this often 
provides someone with a reason for action.' This may be taken to 
express scepticism about the categoriclty (or universaiity) of thick 
ethical concepts (and, by implication, of morality). Second,
Wiliiams also claims that the reason provided by considerations 
accurately describable by using thick ethical concepts need not be a 
decisive one and may be outweighed by other reasons. I f  Williams 
is right about this, the buck-passing account of wrongness does not 
seem like it can provide a plausible answer to the moral question.
So these are obviously important challenges, and I shall address 
them both in due course.
For now, we should note that insofar as we think that some 
actions can accurately be described by using these concepts, then 
on the account under consideration, the lower-order reason-giving 
property of an action in virtue of which it is wrong, will not be the 
property of being wrong, so the account will not be circular. On the 
other hand, the reasons which properties accurately describable by 
thick ethical concepts provide us with do seem to be reasons of the 
right kind; they provide us with reasons we can easily see to be 
closely connected with what it means for an act to be wrong. On 
this picture, the buck-passing account of wrongness would run as 
follows: I
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An act's wrongness consists in the purely formal, higher- 
order property of having some lower-order property or 
properties - accurately expressible by, or accurately 
referred to by, thick ethical concepts - that give us reason 
for refraining from performing such actions.
An act would be wrong, then, because it is cruel, or inconsiderate, 
or unfair etc.
Crucially, however, this could be so only if considerations of 
cruelty, inconsiderateness, and unfairness etc. are genuinely 
reason-giving. What reason do we have to believe that these kinds 
of considerations actually provide us with reasons not to do the 
things in question? We can begin to answer this question by 
asking, somewhat defensively, 'what reason do we have to believe 
that such considerations are not reason-giving?'. I f  we dismiss the 
internalist answer to this question (as I have already argued that 
we should), then apart from answers stemming from a general 
scepticism about reasons and 'the normative' - which, in chapter 
one, were shown to be at best implausible and at worst simply 
incoherent - I can't think of any good reasons for denying that 
considerations of cruelty, inconsiderateness, and unfairness etc. are 
genuinely reason-giving. So much for the defensive answer. Is 
there anything more positive to be said about the thesis under 
consideration?
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Well, common sense and everyday usage of these concepts 
certainly seem to support the idea that considerations of cruelty, 
inconsiderateness, and unfairness are reason-giving. From a 
philosophical point of view, however, this may seem inadequate; 
what else may be said in support of this thesis? I believe that 
propositions like
The fact that (|)-ing is cruel gives us reason not to $
The fact that (|)-ing Is unfair gives us reason not to (j)
The fact that (|)-ing is inconsiderate gives us reason not to (j>
are conceptual truths: if B were to say 'A's (|)-ing was cruel, but 
there was no reason for A not to (J)', the correct reaction to B's 
utterance is not that B has made a substantive mistake about A's 
reasons; rather, the correct judgement would be that B is either 
insincere or not a competent speaker of English: anyone who 
understands the meaning o f'c rue l' also thereby understands that 
there is reason not to perform actions accurately described as such.
I t  is of course true that '(j)-ing is cruel' is not synonymous with 
'there is reason not to (j)' - after all we may have reason not to ^ 
because of other considerations besides cruelty - but this lack of 
synonymy is no basis for criticism of this version of the buck- 
passing account of wrongness. For the purposes of offering such an 
account it is sufficient to show only that 'there is reason not to (j)' is
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part o f the meaning of 'c|)-ing is cruel'. 'Unmarried' is not 
synonymous with 'bachelor', but 'unmarried' is nonetheless part of 
the meaning of'bachelor'. On the account under consideration, the 
same is true for 'there is reason not to ' and 'is cruel' - at least in the 
sense o f'c rue l' that we usually have in mind when describing 
certain actions (or persons).
As I have jus t said, those of us who endorse this view must of 
course hold that internalists (who would say that ^the fact that <j)-ing 
is cruel gives us reason not to cj)' is not true) are somehow 
conceptually confused: they do not understand 'cruel' in the same 
way that ordinary, mature, competent speakers of English 
understand that word. Williams, however, suggests that there may 
be a different explanation (other than linguistic incompetence or 
conceptual confusion) for why actions accurately describable by 
thick ethical concepts can fail to provide agents with reasons of the 
relevant kind. He says:
I t  may well be that 'th ick ' ethical concepts are, to an 
adequate degree, both 'world-guided' and 'action-guiding'. 
People who use a given concept of this sort will find their 
application of it guided by their experience, and also accept 
that it gives them reason for and against various kinds of 
action. [...] But this does not mean that a speaker who 
does use a given concept of this kind...can tru ly say that
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another agent who does not use the concept has a reason 
to avoid or pursue certain courses of action in virtue of 
that concept's application. To show this, the speaker 
would need to show that the agent has reason to use that 
concept, to structure his or her experience in those 
terms.
This comment heips us understand what Williams meant by the 
comment that thick ethical concepts are often, but presumably not 
always, reason-giving: they are reason-giving for those, and only 
those who choose to use them, or for those who choose to structure 
their experiences in those terms. We should of course expect 
Williams to say this given his internalism about reasons, but why 
should we accept it? This appears to be nothing but internalist 
dogma. Whether or not a given concept applies to a particular 
action does not depend on whether an agent who performs the act 
in question 'has reason to use' that concept.
I t  may be that, for some odd reason, an agent has good 
reason not to use a particular concept, or good reason not to 
structure his or her experience by using such concepts, but this has 
nothing to do with whether or not the concept applies to the agent's 
action. Words, and the concepts they express, do not cease to 
mean what they mean jus t because some individual chooses not to 
use them (or because he has good reason not to use them). I f  an
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action has the 'world-guided' and 'action-guiding' properties 
required for that action's being correctly described as cruel 
(whatever they may be), then this will be so regardless of whether 
a particular agent chooses not to describe the action in those terms. 
I see no reason why we should accept the claim that thick ethical 
concepts apply (in the requisite sense) only to those who have 
reason to use, or structure their experiences in terms of those 
concepts. In other words, I cannot see that the categoricity of the 
normative force inherent in thick ethical concepts (or, more 
precisely, the property or properties they refer to) is threatened or 
undermined by Williams' comments.
I t  should of course be admitted that we may have to allow for 
the possibility that some speakers of English may be 'conceptually 
impoverished'; e.g. young children and mentally handicapped 
persons may not know the meaning of some thick ethical terms. 
This may lead to some complications for the account under 
consideration, but I cannot consider this issue here as it would take 
us too far afield from our present concerns.
4.6  Scanlon's dilemma revisited
Scanlon believes that his conception of wrongness and the reasons 
that (as he sees it) flow from it"can explain why we should be moral 
in a way which is connected closely enough with our idea of right
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and wrong to avoid the 'wrong kind of reason' horn of the dilemma. 
At the same time, he says, the reason we have for wanting to stand 
in a 'justifiab ility relation' to others is not so closely identified with 
moral reasons that it impales itself on the circularity horn of the 
d i l e m m a . T o  illustrate Scanlon's position it will be useful to quote 
him at length. He says:
Instead of asking "Why be moral?" we might ask "Why be 
loyal to one's friends when this requires sacrificing other 
goods?" Considering the answer to this question will help 
cast light on the general problem of moral motivation. I t  
may seem that in answering the question "Why be loyal?" 
we face an analogue of [Scanlon's dilemma]. The answer 
"Because friendship requires it."  seems to be no response 
at all to the question that is being asked. But if, on the 
other hand, we cite some value other than friendship - if, 
for example, we appeal to the benefits of having friends - 
then this seems the wrong kind of response. A person who 
was "ioyai" for that kind of reason would not be a good 
friend at all.
The right response to this dilemma is, first, to 
characterize the relationship that friendship involves in a 
way that makes it clear why it is something desirable and 
admirable in itself. Given such a characterization, we can
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then see how, on the one hand, being a friend wili also 
bring other benefits (such as enjoyable companionship, 
help, and support) and why, on the other, being a friend 
involves seeing "because loyalty requires it" as a sufficient 
reason for doing something even though it involves a 
sacrifice of other goods. By bringing these two elements 
together as aspects of a single value, such an account 
enables us to see that the analogue of [Scanlon's dilemma] 
is not really a dilemma at all. I t  merely appears to be one 
because it presents two essential aspects of friendship as if 
they were competing answer to the same question.
So, in the case of being morai:
The contractualist ideal of acting in accord with principles 
that others (similarly motivated) could not reasonably 
reject is meant to characterize the relation with others the 
value and appeal of which underlies our reasons to do what 
morality requires. This relation...m ight be called a relation 
of mutual recognition. Standing in this relation to others is 
appealing in itself - worth seeking for its own sake. A 
moral person will refrain from lying to others, cheating, 
harming, or exploiting them, "because these things are 
wrong". But for such a person these requirements are not
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just formal imperatives; they are aspects of the positive 
vaiue of a way of living with others.
I think we should reject Scanlon's 'explanation' of why we should be 
moral. Consider first his analogy with friendship. Although Scanlon 
is absolutely right when he says that it is part and parcel of being a 
(genuine) friend that one sees friendship as having both these 
'pushing' and 'pulling' aspects. But this seems to get us less than 
what we want. The case of friendship shows only that friends see 
(or treat) considerations of friendship as having these two aspects. 
But this is, at best, only an observation about the 'psychology of 
friendship'. Just because friends see considerations stemming from 
friendship as being reason-giving, this does not mean that such 
considerations are, in themselves, reason-giving.^^ The same, it 
seems, is true of the morai person. Of course a morai person wili 
see moral considerations as being reason-giving - this is part and 
parcel of what it means to be moral. This person may also, for all I 
know, enjoy the benefits of being a member of the moral 
community, but this seems, at best, to be a desirable consequence 
of being morai - these benefits do not seem to form the normative 
basis for being a moral person. Nothing Scanlon has said so far 
demonstrates that moral considerations are genuinely reason- 
giving.
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On Scanlon's proposal, there are two possibilities. On the one 
hand, if the reasons moral agents take themselves to be responding 
to when refraining from doing wrong actions are genuine reasons, 
then appealing to the value of standing in a justifiab ility relation to 
others is redundant with respect to answering the question 'why 
should I be moral?'. People should be moral because being moral 
consists in, or at least involves, seeing moral considerations in their 
true light - i.e. seeing them as being reason-giving.^^ The 
admittedly desirable state of standing in a justifiab ility relation to 
others does not 'underlie' our reasons to be moral; rather, our 
standing in this relation to others is, again, a consequence of our 
(and others') acting morally.
On the other hand, if the considerations moral agents take 
themselves to be responding to when refraining from doing wrong 
actions are not genuinely reason-giving, it is hard to see how an 
appeal to the benefits associated with standing in a justifiab ility 
relation to others could explain why we should be moral. I t  seems 
reasonable to suppose that we can enjoy the benefits of standing in 
this relation to others if and only If other agents believe that we 
stand in this relation to them. But if this is so, and since we could 
presumably secure the same benefits by (deceitfully) convincing 
others that we stand in this relation to them, it is doubtful whether 
it is our actually standing in this relation to others that is the source 
of these reasons. As Scanlon himself is well aware of, someone
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who cheated his way into the moral community could not by any 
stretch of the imagination be caiied moral. Considerations of actual 
or possible benefits simply do not provide the right sorts of reasons. 
So Scanlon's appeal to the dual aspects of being justifiably related 
to others is either redundant or of the wrong kind - or both!^®
However, with the buck-passing account of wrongness in 
place, we don't need to appeal to any reason (moral or otherwise) 
we may have for wanting to stand in a justifiability relation to 
others in order to explain why we should be moral. As I said in 
chapter one, a moral person is someone who structures her life in 
accordance with the demands of morality; i.e. she is a person who, 
at least as long as she is rational (i.e. under normal circumstances), 
refrains from doing what she believes to be wrong. Now, although 
it is true that the moral person is someone who (at least normally) 
refuses to do that which is wrong, a morally enlightened person 
(i.e. someone who has come to accept the buck-passing account of 
wrongness) will refrain from lying to others, cheating, harming, or 
exploiting them, not because these things are wrong, but because 
(being a competent speaker of English) she can see that she has 
reason not to perform actions that are accurately described as 
deceitful, harmful, or exploitative etc.
Furthermore, and in contrast with Scanlon's account of the 
motives of the moral person, the buck-passing account is consistent 
with (and may even lend support to) the idea that there is
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something objectionable about a person who refrains from cheating, 
lying, and stealing simply because he believes these things are 
wrong. Someone whose moral motivation was triggered solely by 
considerations of right and wrong could be accused of suffering 
from a kind of fetishism about w r o n g n e s s . Wh e n  an agent judges 
that some act is wrong, she usually (always?) has some idea about 
why, or in virtue of what, this act is wrong. In normal cases, such 
an agent will be motivated not by the judgement that the act is 
wrong, but by those considerations in virtue of which she takes the 
act to be wrong. Scanlon appears to disagree. He says:
When, for example, I first read Peter Singer's famous 
article on famine and felt the condemning force of his 
arguments, what I was moved by was not jus t the sense of 
how bad it was that people were starving in Bangladesh.
What I felt, overwhelmingly, was the quite different sense 
that it was wrong for me not to aid them, given how easily 
I could do so. I t  is the particular reason-giving force of 
moral wrongness that we need to account for."^°
This, I believe, is not a correct description of most people's natural 
reaction to the plight of the starving people in Bangladesh. I think 
that the natural and spontaneous reaction to cases like these is that 
it would be selfish or inconsiderate, or inhumane not to help these
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people, given how badly off they are and how easily we could help 
them. This reaction can, and often does, illicit the judgement that it 
would be wrong for us not to help these people. But this judgments 
is merely a consequence of the spontaneous (and, I would add, 
warranted) judgement that it would be inhumane not to heip these 
people. I t  seems to me that an agent who, whilst acknowledging 
that (|)-ing is inconsiderate, would not be prepared to refrain from (j)- 
ing until she had convinced herself that (j>-ing is wrong, would, in 
Williams' famous words, be having 'one thought too many'."^^
However, even with the buck-passing account in place, we 
have not yet established that we ought to be morai. To do so we 
must show that Williams' second (sceptical) proviso in his discussion 
of thick ethical concepts is incorrect. This is the proviso that the 
reason provided by considerations accurately expressed by thick 
‘ethicai concepts 'need not be a decisive one and may be 
outweighed by other reasons'. In other words, the buck-passer 
about wrongness, it seems, stili has to explain the moral 'must'.
4.7 'Reason', 'a  reason ', and 'ought'
Consider the following version of the buck-passing account of 
wrongness:
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An action's wrongness consists in the purely formal, 
higher-order property of having some lower-order property 
or properties - accurately expressible by, or accurately 
referred to by, thick ethical concepts -  which is such that 
an action's having this property makes it  the case that we 
ought not perform such actions.
This seems to be what we need. What can be said in defence of 
this account? Before I can answer this question I must say 
something about the relation between the concepts 'a reason', 
'reason', and 'ought'. On the version of the buck-passing account 
we have been working with in the last few sections, the key 
normative concept is that of'reason'. I have said things like 'the 
fact that (j)-ing is cruel gives us reason not to (j)' but I have not said 
much about the normative concept 'reason' itseif. I t  is important to 
distinguish 'reason' from 'a reason'. I have used (or at ieast 
intended to use) 'reason' as a generic normative concept. Used in 
this way, when we say that some consideration gives us reason to 
({), ail this means is that some unspecified ('positive') normative 
relation hoids between this consideration, us, and (|)-ing. This 
unspecified normative relation can be an 'ought' or a pro tanto 
reason (a normative entity the nature of which we wiil turn to 
presently) or anything else which is normative. I think tha t a 
proposition like 'the fact that Bob would enjoy going to the match
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gives Bob a (pro tanto) reason to go to the match' implies 'the fact 
that Bob would enjoy going to the match gives Bob reason to go to 
the match' but the opposite implications do not hold. There can be 
cases where it is true that there is reason for us to do something 
without its being the case that there is a pro tanto reason for us to 
do the thing in question. In this section I shall explain why I think 
this is so.
I said in chapter one that although all satisfactory answers to 
questions of the form 'why ought I...? ' must be sought in a sound 
theory of practical reason, it is far from obvious that a sound theory 
of practical reason is reducible to a sound theory of practical 
reasons - i.e. to a sound theory of pro tanto reasons. In other 
words, it is far from obvious that, as Raz puts it, 'The normativity 
of all that is normative consists in the way it is, or provides, or is 
otherwise related to r e a s o n s . W h e n  Raz speaks of'reasons' in 
the plural it is natural to interpret him as thinking of these as being 
pro tanto reasons. I f  this is what Raz is saying, then he is 
mistaken. Questions of the form 'why ought I...? ' are equivalent to 
questions of the form 'in virtue of what, if anything, is it true that I 
ought to...?'. I t  is easy to see why philosophers (like Scanlon) who 
share Raz's convictions concerning the centrality and importance of 
the concept of a reason should think that 'ought' statements are 
made true (when they are true) by there being more reasons 
favouring the action in question than there are reasons favouring
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not performing it. This is a natural assumption to make if you 
believe that, as John Broome puts it, 'All is reasons/"^^ Broome, 
however, does not share this belief. He says:
[Pro tanto] Reasons are undoubtedly important, but 
normativity has other important features, and our 
preoccupation with [pro tanto] reasons distracts us from 
them.' '^^
I think Broome is right about this. Broome says that 'The key to 
understand the concept of a reason is to look at how facts of a 
particular type are explained'."^^ The facts In questions are what he 
calls 'ought facts'."^®
Now, as Broome points out, much of the confusion 
surrounding the concept of a reason stems from a confusing feature 
of English which involves the concepts 'reason' and 'explanation'. 
When the fact that X explains why it is the case that Y, we often 
say that X is the reason for Y. In 'X is the reason for Y', however, 
'reason' is used non-normatively. I f  we say that the reason why 
the house burnt down was that it had faulty electrical wiring, we are 
not saying that house's having faulty electrical wiring was a 
normative reason for it to burn down. This would be silly: houses 
don't have normative reasons - only agents do. Thus when we say 
'the reason why you should be moral is X' we are simply saying that
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you ought to be moral and X explains why this is so. This is an 
unwelcome feature of English, but since, as Broome points out, we 
very often cannot resist the slide from the non-normative sense of 
'reason' to the normative sense of'reason ' (thus creating a 
normative sense o f'is  the reason for you to we must take this 
normative sense of'reason ' into account and clearly mark off its 
boundaries. Broome does this by calling reasons of this kind 
'perfect reasons'."^^ Thus 'X is a perfect reason for you to (j)' should 
be understood as 'you ought to and X is the explanation of why 
you ought to 4)'.
However, we sometimes say that X is a reason for you to (j) 
when it is not the case that you ought to (j). In this case X does 
obviously not explain why you ought tO(|) since it is, ex hypothesi, 
not the case that you ought to (j). The kind of reason we have in 
mind when we say this, then, cannot be a perfect reason - instead, 
it is a pro tanto reason. In chapter one I discussed some ways in 
which pro tanto reasons can be weighed against each other. For 
Broome, the weighing dimension of pro tanto reasons is essential to 
them. To explain this feature of pro tanto reasons, Broome uses an 
analogy with mechanical weighing: just like the weights in the pans 
of a pair of scales determine how the scales tip, so too do the 
weights of pro tanto reasons determine what we ought to do. 
Suppose we are wondering whether we ought to 4). Sticking with 
the analogy, we should be able to determine what to do by
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watching how the pro tanto reasons in favour of (j)-ing weigh against 
the pro tanto reason in favour of not-ct)-ing. What could happen is 
that
The numbers associated with the reasons to 0 add up to 
more than the numbers associated with the reasons not to 
0. That is why you ought to 0. [...] When an explanation 
of why you ought to 0 takes this form, I shali call it a 
'weighing explanation'. The idea of a pro tanto reason 
arises in the context of a weighing explanation."^®
The idea, then, is that a pro tanto reason is a 'functional' entity; it 
is something which plays a particular role in a weighing explanation 
of ought facts. More specifically, a pro tanto reason for someone to 
(|) is an entity which, as Broome puts it, plays the 'for-(|)' role in a 
weighing explanation of an ought fact. Importantly, since we can 
have reason to ^ even though it is not the case we ought to (j), the 
reason we have to (j) must play the for-(j) role in a weighing 
explanation of either (I) why we ought to cj), or ( II)  why we ought 
not to (j), or ( I II)  why it is not the case that we ought to (j> and it is 
not the case that we ought not to cj). On this conception of reasons
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Any weighing explanation of why you ought to 0 must 
include at ieast one pro tanto reason for you to 0. This 
reason must have a weight. But sometimes the 
explanation wili include no other reason - in particular no 
reason for you not to 0. In that case, you ought to 0, 
whatever the weight of the reason for you to 0. But if that 
is so, how does the weight of this reason play any role in 
the explanation? I t  plays a role counterfactually. I f  there 
were other reasons for you to 0 or not to 0, and this 
reason still held and had the same weight, its weight would 
participate in determining whether or not you ought to 0.
This would only be so if, were the contrary reasons weighty 
enough, it would be the case that you ought not to 0. So 
a characteristic of any pro tanto reason is that it is possible 
for it to be outweighed. Indeed, this is what the term 'pro 
tanto ' implies."^^
Broome's theory of reasons is unorthodox in that it denies the 
centrality and importance of (pro tanto) reasons to practical reason. 
We have already seen that authors like Scanlon, and Raz hold that 
the concept of a reason is primitive - that it cannot be analysed in 
terms of other normative (or non-normative) concepts. As you may 
recall, Scanlon, for instance, says
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I will take the idea of a reason as primitive. Any attem pt 
to explain what it is to be a reason for something seems to 
be to iead back to the same idea: a consideration that 
counts in favour of it. "Counts in favour how?" one might 
ask. "By providing a reason for it" seems to be the only 
answer.®®
Broome, on the other hand, takes the concepts o f'o u g h t' and 
'explanation' to be primitive. Rather than showing that Scanlon et. 
al. are wrong, I want to offer Broome's theory as an alternative to 
the orthodox view (presumably endorsed by Scanlon and Raz).
Broome himself has surprisingly little to say about why we 
should accept his 'functionalist' account of reasons over the 'pro 
tanto reason-as-primitive' view. He says that the preoccupation 
with reasons has led some authors to confuse 'wide scope' oughts 
with 'narrow scope' reasons (as in the case of his 'normative 
requirements'),®^ but although he is probably right about this, we 
certainly cannot, on this basis, draw the conclusion that the pro 
tanto-reason-as-primitive view is false. That would be an 
unacceptable ad hominem  way of arguing for Broome's theory. The 
closest Broome comes to actually producing an argument for his 
functionalist view (in opposition to the reason-as-primitive view) is 
in the following passage:
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'The reasons for action are considerations which count in 
favour of that action'. [...] These are Raz's words, but the 
remark is commonplace. [...] My definition of a pro tanto 
reason is a version of it, tightened up enough to make it a 
genuine definition. The definition specifies ju s t what 
counting in favour of amounts to. To count in favour of 0 
is to play a particular role in an explanation of why you 
ought to 0. Counting in favour of is sometimes thought to 
be the basic normative notion. [...] But it cannot be, 
because it is complex. I t  incorporates the two elements of 
normativity and explanation. The notion of a reason has 
the same complexity.®^
This may all be true, but it cannot count as an argument in favour 
of Broome's position. To say that the two notions of'counting in 
favour of' and 'a reason' are complex - that they Incorporate the 
two elements of normativity and explanation - is. In the present. 
context, question begging against Scanlon et. al.; it simply 
presupposes the truth of functionalism.
In my view, there are very few, if any, arguments that can be 
brought to bear on the question whether pro tanto reasons or 
oughts and explanation are primitive. I accept functionalism for 
two reasons. First, Broome's own example of a 'normative 
requirement' does seem to be genuinely normative but the
265
normativity of this requirement does not seem to be reducible to 
(some function of) pro tanto reasons. Second, it simply doesn't 
seem right that figuring out what one ought to do is simply (and 
always) a matter of weighing up the pros and cons of doing this 
thing. When I reflect on the fact that it wouid be cruel for me to 
intentionally humiliate someone in public for the sake of eliciting a 
cheap laugh, this consideration and its normative force, it seems to 
me, could not be outweighed by other considerations. When we 
deliberate about cases like these, as soon as the thought that an 
action wouid be cruel enters our deliberation, this usually settles the 
matter. That the act would be cruel seems sufficient in its own 
right to determine what we ought not do it. In the next section, I 
shall try  to argue that this is indeed so.
4.8  Buck-passing and why we ought to be moral
Since on Broome's theory of pro tanto reasons it must be possible 
for any pro tanto reason to be outweighed, if moral considerations 
necessarily determine what we ought to do -  i.e. if it is impossible 
for the normative force of morai considerations to be outweighed -  
then it follows on Broome's account that morai considerations do 
not -  indeed cannot -  provide us with pro tanto reasons. 
Consequently, if we accept Broome's theory of pro tanto reasons 
and if we want to retain our intuition that moral considerations
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necessarily override other practical considerations, we are 
committed to the thesis that the normative authority of moral 
considerations (i.e. the moral 'ought') cannot be explained by an 
appeal to pro tanto reasons -  moral or otherwise (although I shall 
have to qualify this claim later). This commitment in turn forces us 
to look for a non-weighing explanation of why moral considerations 
are 'ought-making' (if indeed they are). So what is this explanation 
then? To answer this question, let us return to thick ethical 
concepts and see if we can, by engaging in a bit of conceptual 
analysis, find some support for the thesis under consideration.
Providing a conceptual analysis of a concept is generally quite 
tricky, and providing such an analysis for thick ethical concepts is 
no exception. In what follows I shall only provide a very rough 
sketch of what I take some of the ingredient meanings of these 
concepts to be. My hope is to be able to pin down those features of 
thick ethical concepts that are relevant to the buck-passing account 
of wrongness. Ideally, in order to answer the moral question, we 
should provide such a story for each thick concept, but for obvious 
reasons, I cannot hope to do so in what remains of this dissertation. 
Instead, my strategy will be to try  to find that feature of 'cruel' 
which not only explains why actions correctly described as such 
ought not be done, but which is also shared by all other relevant 
thick ethical concepts. Before I can do this, however, I need to 
make some preliminary points.
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First (and this goes back to some points made in chapter 
one), although I have rather sloppily talked about acts and actions 
as if they were the same thing, thick ethical concepts apply only to 
actions. In everyday talk, the words 'act' and 'action' are commonly 
used as if they were interchangeable. In recent philosophical 
debates, however, these terms has come to denote different things. 
In order to characterise an event as an action we must specify the 
reason for which it was done; i.e. we must include the motive, 
intention, or purpose behind the agent's doing what he did in the 
description of the action. Thus, as Kant wouid put it, actions are 
specified and individuated by their maxims'. A (j>“ed in order fo, or 
fo r the sake op. This means that A's (j)-ing in order to ip is a 
different action from A's cp-ing in order to %. This should not (I 
hope) be controversial. Suppose A and B are both running through 
the park. This wouid be one description o f'w ha t they are doing'
(i.e. running through the park), but it would only be a description of 
what we might call their acts.®® Very roughly, an act is that which 
we can, or may, warrantediy ascribe to an agent solely on the basis 
of his overt bodily movements without knowledge of his intentions. 
This should be contrasted with A's running through to park in order 
to get fit and B's running through the park in order to escape from 
the police. Here we can correctly describe A's and B's actions as, 
respectively, exercising and fleeing because we know the intentions, 
purposes, or motives behind their running through the park. This
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general structure also applies to thick ethical concepts and the 
actions (as opposed to, merely, acts) they apply to. In what follows 
I shall nonetheless use these terms interchangeably, meaning by 
both of them what 'action' means in its distinctively philosophical 
use.
Second, it may be that the meaning o f'c rue l' and other thick 
concepts (like the meaning o f'gam e' perhaps) cannot be 
understood except in a Wittgensteinian 'fam ily resemblance' fashion 
according to which there is no determinate set of necessary and 
jo in tly sufficient conditions that an act has to meet in order to be 
correctly described as cruel. Nonetheless, we can still specify some 
of the essential semantic ingredients o f'c rue l' w ithout thereby 
giving a complete analysis of the meaning of the term. In what 
follows, then, I shall not be trying to provide a full-blown definition 
of 'cruel'; rather, I shall try  to highlight those features of the 
concept that are relevant to the buck-passing account of 
wrongness.
To begin with, cruel acts involve intentionally aiming 
(successfully or unsuccessfully) to harm someone in some way or 
other.®"  ^ But harming or intending to harm someone cannot be the 
distinguishing mark of cruel acts as such. Sometimes we cause 
harm to others unintentionally, and at other times we cause others 
harm with good intentions and for good reasons, e.g. for the sake of 
benefiting them in some way or other. In none of these cases
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would we describe such acts as cruel. (Incidentally, then, it is 
simply false that 'one sometimes has to be cruel to be kind'.) For 
an action to be cruel, the harm caused or intended (or both) by the 
action must be of a particular kind. My proposal is that 'A's (|)-ing 
was cruel' means, at least in part,
A intentionally aimed (successfully or unsuccessfully) to 
inflict harm by (p-ing for some reason, and A ought not 
have (j)-ed to the extent that, or in the manner that, or for 
the reason that he did.
The main idea is that we cannot possibly hope to characterise a 
cruel action without essential reference to the idea that the action in 
question ought not have been pursued or ought not have been 
pursued in the way it was.
Consider another example: 'unfair'. John Broome has 
suggested, plausibly, that fairness requires that people's claims (to 
a particular good) 'should [ought to] be satisfied in proportion to 
their strength.'®® This characterisation of fairness plausibly implies 
that if an act is unfair, then people's claims have not been satisfied 
in the way they ought to have been. I'm  not sure whether Broome 
would be willing to say that this is a conceptual truth, but the point 
here is simply that the concept of fairness somehow involves or 
incorporates the concept 'ought'. To say of A's action that it was
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unfair is to say, roughly, that A treated someone's legitimate claim 
to a particular good in a way that, or for a reason that, he ought not 
have. Here it also seems appropriate to add that if Rawls is correct 
(which he undoubtedly is) in saying that justice is, essentially, a 
matter of fairness, then considerations of justice are plausibly 
ought-making as well. Again, I think 'A acted unjustly' means, in 
part, 'A ought not have acted in the way he did'. To mention a final 
example; 'murder'.
Murdering someone does not only involve killing, it involves 
killing someone in a particular way, or more accurately perhaps, for 
some unspecified illegitimate reason (or motive). Surely it is no 
coincidence that someone who (in a court of law) has been proven 
to have killed in self-defence or in order to protect the life of others 
will not be found guilty of murder. I t  is only if the killing was 
prompted by some motive which under the circumstances ought not 
have prompted the killing that we can correctly describe the case as 
one involving murder. This does not mean of course that there 
cannot be reasonable disagreements about whether a particular 
event should be classified as murder or not; but this in turn should 
be taken to show that there can be reasonable disagreements about 
whether an agent's having acted in a certain way really was wrong. 
This being so, however, should not distract us from the fact that 
there are perfectly clear instances of murder -  and hence of wrong-
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doing. The same points apply, I believe, to the other concepts 
mentioned above.
These analyses are of course not very precise and more would 
have to be said in order to fully vindicate the buck-passing account 
of wrongness. Nonetheless, I dare say that when someone acts 
wrongly this person is In some way or other acting either from a 
motive which he ought not act on or in a manner in which he ought 
not be acting. So a person who acts wrongly is never fully 
practically justified in so acting. In one sense, then, Scanlon is 
absolutely right: an act is wrong if and only if it cannot be justified 
to others (or himself for that matter). But the connection between 
wrongness and justifiab ility is, on my account, established by the 
buck-passing account of wrongness and a conceptual analysis of the 
relevant thick ethical concepts. Such a conceptual analysis should 
reveal that the relevant thick concepts incorporate the property 
'ought-not-be-performed'. In essence, then, the explanation of why 
we ought not do those things that can be accurately described as 
cruel, unfair, unjust, inconsiderate etc. is that it is true in virtue of 
the meaning of these concepts that actions accurately described by 
them ought not be performed in the manner, or to the extent, or for 
the reason which they were performed.
So what about the ought fact 'we ought to be moral' - what 
explains it? The correct answer is that the explanation of why we 
ought to be moral is that being moral jus t is being sensitive to the
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fact that certain properties of various actions are genuinely ought- 
making. But why ought we be sensitive to, and act consistently 
with the recognition that, certain considerations are genuinely 
ought-making? Well, simply because these considerations are 
genuinely ought-making, that's why! By acting in accordance with 
the true normative beliefs we acquire by being sensitive to moral 
considerations, we are fully practically justified in acting morally.®® 
There is no appeal to any pro tanto reasons in this explanation of 
why we ought to be morai. We ought to be moral because being 
moral consists in doing what we ought to do, and for the right 
reasons.
4.9 Problems and prospects for the buck-passing account
I suspect that much of the scepticism about morality -  about, 
among other things, its metaphysical, normative, and epistemic 
status -  stems from a scepticism about the supposedly queer 
property of wrongness. I think that many of the metaphysical 
worries we might have about morality and wrongness can be eased 
if we accept the buck-passing account of wrongness. Whatever 
metaphysical scepticism may remain after the buck-passing account 
has been accepted, much if not ail of it can be allayed by, as I said 
in chapter one, rejecting the correspondence theory of tru th in 
favour of minimalism (or disciplined syntacticism  as it is sometimes
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called). In this chapter, and in the last few sections especially, I 
have provided some arguments that hopefully show that morai 
considerations are not only genuinely normative but overridingly so. 
I need to add quite an important qualification to this claim, but 
before I do that, I want to say something about the epistemological 
scepticism about morality and wrongness. To address this worry, 
consider again Thomson's challenge to Scanlon's contractualism:
I cannot bring myself to believe that what makes it wrong 
to torture babies to death for fun (for example) is that 
doing this 'would be disallowed by any system of rules as a 
basis for the general regulation of behavior which no one 
could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced 
general agreement.' My impression is that the explanation 
goes in the opposite direction - that it is the patent 
wrongful ness of the conduct that explains why there would 
be general agreement to disallow it.
My contention, of course, is that torturing babies for fun is wrong 
because doing so is cruel, and the fact that torturing babies for fun 
is cruel is also what explains why we could not reasonably reject 
principles disallowing such acts. I f  Thomson wants to insist that it 
is the 'patent wrongfulness' of the act which explains why doing this 
thing is not justifiable, then absent some story about what makes
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an action wrong, the familiar charge that wrongness is epistemically 
queer still retains its force. Were she to accept the buck-passing 
account of wrongness, however, she could still reject the idea that 
torturing babies for fun is wrong because doing so wouid be 
disallowed by principles we could not reasonably reject. The added 
benefit of doing so is that she wouid also be able to tell a more 
plausible epistemoiogical story about how we come to have 
knowledge about the wrongness of such acts.
Although this needs to be worked out in more detail, it seems 
to me that whatever story we are prepared to offer as an account of 
how we come to know that a particular, relevant, thick ethical 
concept applies to a particular action, the same story can (in 
conjunction with the buck-passing account of wrongness) be told 
about how we can come to know that an act is wrong. There may 
actually be reason to feel optimistic about the prospects of teiling 
such a story. Consider the foliowing passage from Wiiiiams:
[A thick ethical concept] may be rightly and wrongly 
applied, and peopie who acquired it can agree that it 
appiies or faiis to apply to some new situation. In many 
cases the agreement will be spontaneous, while in other 
cases there is room for judgement and comparison. Some 
disagreement at the margin may be irresoluble, but this 
does not mean that the use of the concept Is not controlled
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by the facts or by the users' perception of the world. (As 
with other concepts that are not totally precise, marginal 
disagreements can indeed help to show how their use is 
controlled by the facts.
This of course fits nicely with the points made earlier about murder 
etc. I f  my arguments in this dissertation are correct -  especially if, 
as I believe, it is true that propositions like 'you ought not act 
cruelly' are conceptual truths -  whatever epistemic scepticism about 
morality remains can only sensibly be viewed as a scepticism about 
whether some actions really are cruel, unjust, unfair, inconsiderate 
etc. But if these concepts in turn are, as Williams suggests, 
sufficiently world-guided to ensure general agreement on at least 
their 'non-marginal' application, many of the epistemic worries that 
have traditionally haunted moral philosophers can perhaps finally be 
laid to rest.
I turn now to the qualification of the buck-passing account I 
promised to say something about. I t  may be objected that the 
buck-passing account may lead to some unacceptable and overly 
moralistic conclusions. Although I have said that moral 
considerations necessarily outweigh other considerations, this is 
unfortunately not strictly true. The fact that I have promised 
something and the fact that I would be lying if I said that I hope 
Denmark do well in Euro 2004 are certainly moral considerations.
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but the concepts 'promise' and 'lie ' do not seem to have, as part of 
their meaning, the idea that we ought not do these things. To take 
a familiar example, suppose A has promised B to meet her at the 
cinema at certain time. On the way to the cinema A comes across a 
terrible traffic accident and he is the first one on the scene. I f  he 
were to stop and help the victims he would not be able to keep his 
promise to B. I f  promises are ought-making, A ought not stop and 
help the traffic accident victims. Yet this is absurd, clearly we ought 
to stop and the help the traffic accident victims. Therefore 
promises cannot be ought-making and if the buck-passing account 
implies this it should be rejected.
The correct response to this challenge is to admit tha t not all 
properties accurately expressed by some thick ethical concept are 
ought-making. But the buck-passing account of wrongness is 
consistent with the claim that some properties accurately referred 
to by thick ethical concepts may only be pro tanto reason-giving.
But this, in turn, should be taken to show that those actions to 
which thick ethical concepts of (merely) the pro tanto reason-giving 
type correctly apply are not going to be wrong (if they are) in virtue 
of having these properties. We should therefore draw a distinction 
between what we (somewhat inelegantly) might call strong and 
weak thick ethical concepts. Strong thick ethical concepts are those 
I have already discussed: cruel, unfair, unjust etc., concepts which 
have the idea o f'ough t-no t be doneness' built into them. Weak
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thick ethical concepts, on the other hand, concepts such as 'ly ing' 
and 'promising', are only pro tanto-reason giving since these 
concepts do not seem to have, as part of their meaning, that idea 
that we ought not do these things. Alternatively, we could say that 
promises are ought-making, but oniy defeasibiy so (this, of course, 
means that they are pro tanto-reason giving). A good case can be 
made for saying that promises have a defeasibility condition buiit 
into them. After all, this is how promises work in everyday life. 
When A promised B that he wouid meet her at the cinema, it would 
be absurd to think that A has thereby promised to meet B at the 
cinema no m atter what. A has not made such a promise; rather 
what he has promised (at least tacitly) is that he will meet B at the 
cinema unless certain conditions obtain. This defeasibiiity condition 
is, and perhaps must be, understood (again, at least tacitly) by all 
promisers and promisees - it is part of the institution of promising. 
So the obligation to keep one's promises is conditional, and the 
defeasibility conditions of a given promise may depend on the 
importance of the promise being kept and the circumstances in 
which it was made etc. I t  should also be pointed out that the 
defeasibility conditions cannot plausibly be thought of only as 
teleological in nature. I f  A has promised B to meet her at the 
cinema but then remembers that he has made an earlier promise to 
C to meet her at the pub, then it may be that A should keep the 
promise he made first simply because he made the promise to C
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first. I t  is of course true that in this case A incurs an additional 
obligation to apologise (or at least explain his actions) to B. But it 
would be false to say that promises can be defeated oniy by 
considerations relating to the goodness of the consequences of 
breaking a promise. I think a similar story can be told about lying.
Buck-passers should not be afraid to admit that the 
justifiab ility of an act may sometimes depend on the value of the 
outcomes of that action and sometimes it may not. Whether or not 
an agent is able to correctly determine whether an action wouid be 
wrong will to a large extent depend on that agent's capacity for 
correctly determining the 'salience and shape' (to borrow some 
terminology from Dancy) of the normative and non-normative 
features of the situation in which we find ourselves. Perhaps buck- 
passers should say that you ought not act in such a way that your 
action could accurately be described by using a weak thick ethical 
concept unless your failure or refusal to act in that way could 
accurately be described by using a strong thick ethical concept.
This should be taken merely as a rule of thumb however. As far as 
the buck-passing account of wrongness is concerned, it may even 
be morally permissible to break a promise or tell a lie if there were 
sufficiently strong prudential reasons to do so. Nonetheless, even if 
we have strong prudential reason to (j>, if (j)-ing can accurately be 
described by using a strong thick ethical concept, we ought not do
it.ss
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I t  may be objected at this point that I have provided no 
general method for distinguishing weak and strong ethical concepts. 
I accept this objection. At present I know of no principled way of 
distinguishing the two kinds of concepts. This is something which 
remains for the buck-passer to work out. I t  may of course be the 
case that there simply is no general way of distinguishing the two; 
it may turn out that there are no other distinguishing feature of 
these concepts besides their being ought-making and pro tanto- 
reason giving, respectively. Perhaps the best we can do is simply to 
look at them one concept at a time and see how they are used in 
ordinary language. Since my aim in this chapter has been merely 
to provide a sketch of what a successful buck-passing account of 
wrongness will look like, I am not too worried about this -  although 
I do of course acknowledge the importance of the objection.
Finally, I want to briefly say something about two rival 
accounts of wrongness. I said earlier that a generic version of the 
buck-passing account of wrongness should be acceptable to a wide 
range of moral theorists. I also said that these theorists will 
disagree about what the relevant reason-giving lower-order 
properties of wrong actions are. Utilitarians will say that there is 
only one relevant lower-order property: the property of failing to 
maximise utility (whatever that happens to be). Utilitarians will 
therefore think that the account I have given is wrong. To this I 
can oniy reply that the most commonly cited, and to my mind
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correct, reason for rejecting utilitarianism is precisely that it fails to 
acknowledge and give due normative weight to those properties of 
certain actions that be accurately described by, or referred to by, 
thick ethical concepts. To repeat a line from Prichard: 'the balance 
of resulting good may be, and often is, not on the side of justice.
For a utilitarian, the fact that an action is cruel, unfair, unjust, 
inconsiderate, or selfish has little or no significance when it comes 
to determining what we ought to do. This is exactly why 
utilitarianism strikes many, myself included, as implausible.
My account is compatible with many things Kantians want to 
say. In the Kantian tradition, autonomy plays a central role. I t  
may well be that, properly understood, this concept is also both 
'world-guided' and 'action-guiding'. To say of an action that it 
would violate someone's autonomy (by treating him as a mere 
means perhaps; and thus, for Kantians, to treat him wrongly) could 
plausibly be interpreted along buck-passing lines as meaning that it 
wouid be inconsiderate, unfair, or cruel or whatever the appropriate 
description might be. I f  any of these concepts apply to actions in 
which we treat others as mere means, this would mean that we 
could not justifiably treat this person in this way (whatever way that 
is). I t  may well turn out that those who accept my account of 
wrongness could agree with most sensible Kantians about the 
extension of the predicate 'is wrong'. More would have to be said in 
order to show that this is so, but the point I am trying to highlight
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here is that my account of wrongness and the substantive morai 
principles that follow from it wiii not, I suspect, diverge too much 
from what the Kantian thinks is right. I f  not entirely Kantian, my 
account is at least decidedly non-consequentialist.
Lastly, let me briefly say something about the buck-passing 
account of wrongness and how it relates to moral phenomenology.
I think Scanlon's appeal to the Kantian-flavoured ideal of standing 
in a justifiab iiity relation to others (or, as Kant wouid have put it, to 
be related to others by way of being a legislative member of a 
Kingdom of Ends) is absolutely correct in this context. More 
precisely, I think it is our deep desire to live up to this ideal (and 
hence to act only in ways that could be Justified to others) which to 
a large extent explains the particular phenomenology that 
accompanies judgements of right and wrong. When we judge that 
some act would be wrong (or when we realise that we have acted 
wrongly) this judgement, or this recognition, is -  at least for most 
of us, and for most of the time -  accompanied by the feeling that in 
so acting we wouid in some way or other alienate ourselves from 
not only the rest of the moral community but from ourselves as 
well. I f  we cannot justify our acting in a certain way to others, then 
we cannot justify our acting in that way to ourselves either. This 
self-alienating aspect of morality is brought out clearly by the 
common thought that 'I  couldn't live with myself if I did that'.
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The essentially moral feelings of guilt, blame, and remorse etc 
dispose, as John Skorupski puts it, 'to  withdrawal of recognition, 
casting out of the c o m m u n ity '.T h is  morai community (or 
Kingdom of Ends), in turn, is the one to whose members most of 
us, most of the time, strive to live in justificatory harmony with. 
This, in turn, can be done only if we refrain from doing that which 
can accurately be described as cruel, or unfair, or unjust -  and, 
hence, wrong.
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^Hurley, pp. 151-2.
^Hooker, p. 43.
^Scanlon (1998), p. 96. My italics. Although Scanlon's buck 
passing account of value has generated a great deal of controversy, 
he is not the originator of this kind of value analysis. Various 
versions of the buck passing account can be found in Brentano, 
Broad, Ross, Ewing, Rawls, Chisholm, Wiggins, and Lemos. For a 
brief historical exposition of these authors' views, see Rabinowicz 
and Rpnnow-Rasmussen.
'^Scanlon (1998), p. 99.
^Ibid., p. 97. My italics.
Naturalistic' does not in the present context mean 'empirical'. 
'Naturalism ' should here be understood as an umbrella doctrine 
which encompasses ail theories that reject the existence of su/ 
generis 'value facts'. According to this definition of'natura lism '. 
Divine Command Theory, for example, would be a naturalistic value 
(or moral) theory. 'Naturalism' is sometimes (and perhaps more 
frequently these days) used in a narrower sense. In this sense, 
'naturalism ' is the ontological doctrine that only natural properties 
exists, and that natural properties are all and only those properties 
countenanced by natural science. See Pigden.
^Here I intend 'natural' to mean 'countenancable by natural 
science'.
®See Rabinowicz and Rpnnow-Rasmussen. See also Parfit (2002). 
^Scanlon (1998), p. 96.
^°Dancy has recently argued that we cannot analyse value in terms 
of reasons. See Dancy (2000b).
^^Scanion himself refers to this problem as 'Prichard's dilemma', but 
I think the dilemma Scanlon discusses is not the same as the one 
Prichard thought he had identified.
^^Ib/d., pp. 149-50.
i^in Scanlon (1996) Scanlon (following Kurt Baler) suggests that 
the question 'why be moral?' might be asked as a request for an 
elucidation of the relation between morai and nonmorai reasons. I 
will not be discussing this interpretation here.
^^Scanlon (1998), p. 147.
^^Ibid., pp. 147-8.
^% /d., p. 148.
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid., p. 149.
^°This formula comes from Scanlon's characterisation of 
contractualism on p. 153 of Scanlon (1998). Here Scanlon presents 
the formula in such a way that the justifiab iiity condition provides a
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sufficient, but not a necessary condition of an act's being wrong.
The reason why Scanlon does not present his contractu a list formula 
as a biconditional in this context is that he is (here) oniy interested 
in wrongness in the sense o f'w h a t we owe to each other' - i.e. what 
we owe to other agents. There may be other kinds of wrongness 
that are not captured by Scanlon's formula - the wrongness 
resulting from cruelty toward animals for instance. I f  the 
justifiab ility condition also specified a necessary condition for an 
act's being wrong, Scanlon would not be able to explain why for 
example torturing animals for fun is wrong. For a discussion of this 
topic see Scanlon (1998), pp. 177-88. Also, and importantly, the 
clause I have italicised does not appear in the particular formulation 
of contractualism I have quoted. However, Scanlon makes it clear 
in other passages of his book that this clause is vital to his 
contractualism. I t  is particularly important for his discussion of 
aggregation. See Scanlon (1998), pp. 229ff.
what follows I have been helped greatly by reading the 
foliowing papers: Stratton-Lake (2003), Stratton-Lake (2003b), 
Ridge (2001), Ridge (2003), McNaughton and Rawling (2003). 
^^Ibid.f p. 170. My italics.
^^Thomson, p. 30, n. 19. See also Pettit (1999), pp. 7-8, and 
McGinn (1999), pp. 34-8.
^"^Scanlon (1998), p. 11.
^^Ridge, pp. 472-73.
^^Scanlon (1998), p. 391, n. 21.
^^Ibid., p. 11. My italics.
^®See Stratton-Lake (2003).
^^Scanlon (1998), p. 11.
^^Interestingly, there are strong similarities between the buck- 
passing account of wrongness (and value, perhaps) and 'program 
explanations' (as developed by Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit) of 
causally relevant (as opposed to causally efficacious) properties in 
natural science. See Jackson and Pettit.
^% iiiiams (1985), p. 140.
^^Wiliiams (1995), pp. 37-8.
^^See Scanlon (1998), p. 187.
^"^Ibid., p. 161. What Scanlon (somewhat misleadingly) here calls 
the problem of moral motivation is what I take to be the problem 
posed by the moral question.
^^Ibid., p. 162. Given that Scanlon (rightly) accepts the buck- 
passing account of value (as an account of the normatively 
epiphenomenal character of value), it is odd (to say the least) that 
he goes on to claim that it is the (very great?) value of standing in 
a justifiability relation to others that gives us overriding reason to 
be related to others in this way. To be consistent, Scanlon should 
say that it is the properties in virtue of which it Is valuable to stand
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in this relation to others that give us reason to be related to others 
in this way. Scanlon does not, to my knowledge anyway, say 
anything about what these properties might be.
^®One could easily imagine a friendship between two evil persons In 
which the 'dictates of friendship' were not reason-giving a t all.
^^If these reasons are genuine reasons, however, we are still owed 
some account about why this is so - after all, it is precisely the 
claim that moral considerations have reason-giving force that the 
amoraiist denies (even though Scanlon is not interested in the 
a moralist's challenge).
^^Stratton-Lake disagrees. He says: 'Scanlon's contractualist 
principle goes beyond the mere idea that we have moral reasons, 
and aspires to tell us the general nature of those reasons.
Moreover, it aims to characterize their nature in such a way as to 
connect the importance of moral reasons with the value of an ideal 
of mutual recognition via the notion of justifiab iiity to others. [...] I t  
characterizes...moral reasons...in such a way as to make possible a 
Kantian explanation of their importance and priority.' (2003b, pp 
336-7) I think the appeal to the ideal of mutual recognition is 
somewhat misplaced. The ideal of standing in a justifiab iiity 
relation to others adds nothing significant to the reasons we have 
for being moral; rather, our standing in this relation to others is, as 
I have already said, a consequence of acting morally. However, I 
do think this ideal, or more accurately, our deep desire to live up to 
this ideal, can explain the peculiar phenomenology that attends 
moral judgements. I will return briefly to this idea toward the end 
of this chapter.
39por an important discussion of (moral) fetishism and judgement 
internalism and externalism, see Smith (1994), pp. 71-6.
^“Scanlon (1998), p. 152.
"^^Williams (1976), p. 18. I have here taken Williams' slogan slightly 
out of the context in which he employs it.
^^Raz (1999), p. 67.
"^^Broome (forthcoming), p. 1.
p. 3.
"^ T^o call these kinds of entities 'ought facts' does not entirely 
square with what I said in chapter one about the metanormative 
assumptions I am working with in this dissertation. Given the 
assumptions I made in chapter one, it would be more correct (or 
consistent) to call these things 'ought truths' rather than 'ought 
facts', but for simplicity, and to avoid unnecessary confusion, I shall 
simply adopt Broome's terminology.
^^As far as I'm  aware, the concept of a perfect reason Is an 
invention of Broome's; it is certainly not commonly used in the 
literature.
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^^Op. at, p. 8 .
p. 9.
^°Scanlon (1998), p. 17.
^^Op. at. See pp. 2-3.
^Hbid., pp. 11-12.
53por more on this distinction and its significance, see Korsgaard 
(2002), Lecture One.
should emphasize that a cruel act need not actually cause any 
harm. If, for instance, I pour poison into the city's water supply 
with the intention of increasing my sales of antidotes, then this act 
counts as cruel even if some hero manages to neutralise the danger 
before anyone is (actually) harmed.
^^Broome (1999b), p. 116.
^®0r, at least, very nearly fully practically justified. In order to be 
fully practically justified It may not be enough that we act 
consistently with our true (strongest) normative judgement. I t  may 
well be that we have to include some epistemic 'tru th-tracking ' 
constraint on the acquisition of our normative beliefs in order for 
our action to be fully practically justified. I shall not address this 
concern here.
^^Williams (1985), pp. 140-1.
^®Sometimes it may be cruel to tell the truth ('does my bum look 
big in this?'), and in such cases there can be nothing wrong with 
telling a (white) lie, in fact, given certain circumstances it may even 
be required.
^^Alternatively, we could say that on any plausible theory of 
prudence we could never have sufficient prudential reason to act 
cruelly, unfairly, and unjustly etc. The idea here wouid be that an 
agent's life could not plausibly be considered to 'go better' if he 
were to do these things. Some philosophers may reject such a 
theory of prudence and prudential reasons on the grounds that it 
would be too moralistic. I disagree with this. I th ink such a theory 
has a lot going for it.
®°Prichard, p. 5.
^^Skorupski (1999), p. 180.
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